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ABSTRACT
This dissertation synthesizes theory and research in
economics,

social psychology,

sociology and management to

present and test a model of employee propensity to withhold
effort

(PWE)

in work groups in 10 organizations.

The

dissertation extends to work organizations Knoke's

(1990)

synthesized motivation model, which suggests that rational,
normative conformity and affective bonding incentives act
together to predict whether people will contribute to
collective activities.

A study of 570 private-sector

employees found that when employees perceived high degrees
of task visibility, group effort norms, equity and altruism,
they would be less likely to withhold effort in job-related
tasks.

As predicted, payment of a wage premium,

controlling

for alternative unemployment opportunities, was negatively
related to PWE in two of four variants of the dependent
variable.

Work group size was positively related to PWE in

two of four variants of the dependent variable.

Whereas

the complete model was not supported in multivariate
analyses, results indicated that contextual variables are
important predictors of PWE and merit further study.

xi

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
This dissertation brings together theory and research
in economics,

social psychology,

sociology,

and management

to present a model that depicts conditions under which
employees are likely to withhold effort in completing
assigned tasks.

An important element of the dissertation is

the extension of Knoke's synthesized motivation model
(Knoke,

1990; Knoke & Wright-Isak,

organizations.

1982) to work

The model blends rational, normative

conformity and affective bonding incentives to predict
whether people will contribute to collective activities.
Concern about employee propensity to withhold effort
(PWE) goes back to management pioneers such as Frederick
Taylor

(1911), whose scientific management was designed,

in

part, to prevent workers from limiting the amount of work
they would do in a day.

In the Hawthorne studies, observers

discovered how informal norms could hold production at
levels that group members felt were appropriate
(Roethlisberger & Dickson,

1939).

Since then, various

studies have focused on withholding effort,
elsewhere
& Harkins,

(e.g., Cappelli & Chauvin,
1979; Marwell & Ames,

at work and

1991a; Latane, Williams

1979,

1980; Roy,

1952).

This study considers relations among variables such as
group size, task interdependence, task visibility,
opportunities for establishing and repeating cooperation,
1

group demography, perceptions of group compliance effort
norms and of altruism,

and employee PWE.

Need for the Study
The proposed study is needed because (a) an integrated
model of PWE determinants has not been proposed and tested,
(b) previous research into PWE has overemphasized selfinterest motives,

(c) previous research into PWE has not

considered on-going work groups across organizations,

and

(d) gaining knowledge of such group processes may enhance
organizational effectiveness by improving performance by
work t e a m s .
Although there have been several PWE studies, there has
not been an attempt to test a model integrating determinants
that are theoretically important in predicting when
employees are likely to withhold effort.

Theorists have

proposed models with which to study PWE (e.g., Jones,
Spicer,

1984;

1985), but their models have not been empirically

tested in on-going work groups.

Previous research has

concentrated on a few of the determinants that may
contribute to employee PWE.

For example, George

(1992)

studied perceived task visibility and intrinsic motivation
as predictors of PWE.
explain employee PWE,
interdependence,

Contextual characteristics that may
such as group size, task

and perceived group norms were not

addressed in her study.

In addition, previous models have stressed rational
cost-benefit analysis in attempting to explain PWE (Jones,
1984) .

In doing so, they neglect on-going social influence

processes.

Economic theories —

applications —

and their management

generally fail to consider the impact of

social structure,

such as group norms,

on predispositions,

or they treat social structure as something that sets action
in motion and then does not intervene

(Granovetter, 1985).

Many work-group phenomena in business organizations
(e.g., concern for other team members, prosocial behavior
and organizational citizenship), may contain elements that
cannot be explained by pure calculation,
incentives

(Shamir,

1990).

but involve moral

No existing model brings

together rational cost-benefit considerations as well as
conformity to norms and employee desires to establish
emotional attachments with co-workers to suggest how these
variables might predict PWE.

Following Knoke's

(1990; Knoke

& Wright-Isak,

1982) work in collective-action

organizations,

this study will attempt this synthesis.

A major unanswered question concerning PWE is the
extent to which job context and group composition help shape
levels of individual effort in work groups.

It is important

to address this question because managers as well as
academics continue to emphasize that group performance can
enhance or inhibit organizational effectiveness
(Bettenhausen,

1991).

Thus far, most studies of withholding

effort have used small-group laboratory simulations or work
groups in a single organization.

Studying more than one

organization provides greater contextual information,

and

may confirm in existing groups the findings from research of
temporary groups that were formed to be studied and then
disbanded.

It is important to study PWE in existing work

groups because much of the research into related topics has
taken place in newly formed groups of strangers where
interpersonal relationships have yet to crystalize
Moreland,

1990; Shepperd,

1993).

(Levine &

Studying individual

behavior in work-group contexts may yield results not seen
in other studies because employee perceptions and
predispositions may be shaped by informal relationships and
norms that do not fully develop in temporary groups.
Finally,

if important antecedents to withholding effort

can be identified in existing work groups, managers could
use this information to improve organizational
effectiveness.

Organizations beset with productivity

problems are likely to be ineffective in coping with a tough
competitive environment, and their survival could be
threatened.

Identifying variables that contribute to

employee PWE may aid organizations in making necessary
changes to obtain optimal group performance.
Shirking.

Social Loafing and Free Riding

The terms shirking
loafing

(Alchian & Demsetz,

(Latane, Williams & Harkins,

1972), social

1979) and free riding

(Albanese & Van Fleet,

1985a) have been employed in studies

of withholding effort.

Whereas shirking,

social loafing and

free riding have been used to describe similar phenomena by
researchers in different disciplines, they often have been
treated as conceptually distinct.

Articles on these three

topics sometimes use the terms synonymously and sometimes
define them differently.

Some authors mention two of the

terms and not the third;

some only employ one of the terms.

Exhibit 1.1 lists definitions of the three terms used
in previous PWE theory and research.

In brief, the

literature summarized in this chapter suggests that
shirking,

social loafing and free riding all involve

individuals withholding effort while performing a task, that
social loafing and shirking are related to imperfect
monitoring of effort, and that free riding may be a tendency
that occurs because of the nature of a group's task.1
Shirking,
as follows.

social loafing, and free riding are defined

Shirking is the tendency for employees not to

give full effort in performing a work-related task.
Propensity to shirk is a likelihood that an employee will
not provide full effort.
than performance,

The focus is on effort, rather

because the former is most directly under

employees' control, where the latter depends on various
factors that may be outside employees' control.
addition,

In

employees with less ability may give 100 percent

6
Exhibit 1.1
Definitions of shirking, social loafing and free riding
SHIRKING
AUTHOR

DISCIPLINE

DEFINITION

Alchian &
Demsetz,
1972

Economics

With several members on the
team, each has an incentive
to cheat the others by
engaging in more than an
average amount of leisure
if the employer cannot tell
at zero cost which employee
is taking more than
average.
As a result, the
total productivity of the
team is lowered.

Leibowitz &
Tollison,
1980

Economics

Shirking is an increase in
an individual's tendency to
supply less effort.

Jones,

Management

Shirking occurs when a
person has a positive
incentive to supply less
effort.

Economics

Shirking was equated with
unproductive behavior in
this study.

Social
Psychology

In clapping and shouting
tasks, subjects exhibited a
sizable decrease in
individual effort when
performing in groups
compared to when they
performed alone.
The
decrease, termed social
loafing, is in addition to
losses from faulty
coordination of group
efforts.

1984

Cappelli &
Chauvin,
1991a
SOCIAL
LOAFING
Latane,
Williams,
Harkins,
1979

&

(exhibit con'd)

7
Kerr &
Bruun, 1983

Social
Psychology

Social loafing is a
motivation loss in groups
caused by reduced
identifiability or
evaluation.

Williams &
Karau, 1991

Social
Psychology

Social loafing is a
tendency to reduce one's
effort when working
collectively compared with
individually on the same
task.

Stigler,
1974

Economics

Free riding is a tendency
for individuals to fail to
participate in collectively
profitable activities in
the absence of coercion or
individual incentives.

Leibowitz &
Tollison,
1980

Economics

Free riding is a dilution
in the concern to control
costs.

Jones,

Management

Free riding occurs when a
person has a negative
incentive to control or
minimize costs.

Management

Free riding is a passive
reaction to task
conditions.
Free rider is
a group member who obtains
benefits from the group but
does not bear a
proportional share of the
costs.

FREE RIDING

1984

Albanese &
Van Fleet,
1985a

(exhibit con'd)

8
Albanese &
Van Fleet,
1985b

Management

Free riding behavior is
manifested in a variety of
ways, including social
loafing, shirking,
excessive argumentation,
'dropping out', and
attempts at individual
domination.

effort and not perform as well as those who give less than
100 percent effort.

Thus, employees giving less than 100

percent are shirking even though their output may be higher
than those giving more effort.
Social loafing is a special case of shirking that
occurs in groups.

Social loafing is a tendency to reduce

one's effort when working collectively compared with
individually on the same task

(Williams & Karau,

1991).

Social loafing involves a loss in contribution from declines
in motivation rather than coordination

(Steiner,

1972).

Free riding is also a special case of shirking that
happens in a group context,

but it occurs by passive

reaction to conditions rather than an active attempt to
withhold effort.

Free riding is a tendency for individuals

to fail to participate in collectively profitable activities
in the absence of coercion or individual inducements
(Stigler,

1974).

As Jones

(1984) states,

free riding might

occur when there are negative incentives for each employee
to control or minimize production costs.

A defining feature

of free riding is the instance in which it occurs:
production of public goods.

A public good has two characteristics
Fleet,

1985a; Olson,

1965):

(Albanese & Van

(a) Impossibility of exclusion.

No one can be prevented from using the good.
of supply.

If a good has jointness of supply,

(b) Jointness
its

consumption by one person does not reduce the amount
available to others.

Public goods,

costs, committee reports,
working conditions,

such as low production

a drug-free workplace,

safer

or increased departmental reputation,

must be provided to all group members if they are provided
to any group member.
individually,

None of these goods can be consumed

and in many cases benefits cannot be

restricted to the group that helped produce them (Shamir,
1990).
The common denominator of shirking,

social loafing, and

free riding is an individual who provides less than 100
percent participation or effort, and the difference among
the three concepts may be the reason why, or context in
which, a lack of participation or a drop in effort occurs.
In shirking, withholding effort can result from various
motivations and circumstances,
difficulties,

such as monitoring

self-interested behavior,

and opportunism.

In

social loafing, withholding effort results as one moves from
an individual performing alone to the same individual
performing in a group, perhaps because a collective task is
involved and individuals can hide in a crowd.

In free

riding, withholding effort occurs because public goods are

10
involved, and it is rational not to contribute because free
riders believe they can receive the goods by letting others
produce them.
Economists have attempted to predict when shirking
(i.e., withholding effort) will occur based on whether above
market wages are paid in times when employees lack
alternative employment opportunities
1991a; Yellen,

(Cappelli & Chauvin,

1984). Psychological research has

concentrated on social loafing and attempts to predict when
withholding effort in group activities will occur based on
group size and whether tasks are identifiable and visible
(Harkins & Petty,

1982; Williams, Harkins & Latane,

1981),

and whether there is equity within the group (Jackson &
Harkins,

1985).

Sociological research has looked at free

riding and collective action in providing public goods
(e.g., Marwell & Ames,
Teixeira,

1985)

1979,

1980,

1981; Oliver, Marwell &

and tried to predict when withholding effort

will occur based on normative influences on group members
and the presence of a critical mass of support.

Management

theorists and researchers have pursued all three avenues:
social loafing (e.g., Earley,

1989,

shirking (e.g., Judge & Chandler,
(e.g., Albanese & Van Fleet,

1993; Schnake,

1991a),

1990), and free riding

1985a).

The following example involving provision of a public
good may help clarify

(a) how shirking,

free riding are similar,

social loafing and

(b) how all three concepts can be

11
present simultaneously and studied in a work group and (c)
how all three concepts are due to withholding effort by
individuals.
An employee belongs to a five-member work group at the
XYZ corporation, which pays all members based on group
productivity.

While working with the group one day, the

employee does not provide full effort on a job-related task.
Observers might label the employee's behavior shirking,
social loafing, or free riding, perhaps depending upon their
research orientation.

Economists may consider the behavior

shirking because it was unproductive leisure that lowered
total output of the work group.

Social psychologists may

label the behavior social loafing because lack of effort
resulted from reduced identifiability because the employee
worked in a group, rather than alone.

Sociologists might

consider the lack of effort to be free riding because a
public good

(group output) was involved, and the employee

permitted co-workers to make greater contributions.

Yet,

the employee shares the group reward despite giving less
effort than others.

In summary,

shirking,

social loafing,

and free riding may confound an employee's behavior with the
reasons for and the context in which it occurred.
Reasons to Study Withholding Effort in Groups
Propensity to withhold effort
characteristic of shirking,

(PWE)

is a common

social loafing, and free riding.

It is used as the dependent variable in this study because

12
it encompasses varied tasks, different settings, and
individual predispositions whereas shirking,

social loafing

and free riding are more specific applications.

Studying

PWE in general terms may provide clues about how and when
processes such as shirking,

social loafing and free riding

occur.
This study addresses an overriding research question:
How do contextual organizational elements relate to the
propensity of employees to withhold effort in work groups?
But this implies another question:

Why are group contexts

important to the study of an individual's PWE?

The first

reason is that whereas withholding effort is a behavior
engaged in by individuals,

it occurs and is usually studied

in the context of group and organizational activities, and
can be a function of group characteristics
1984; Latane, Williams & Harkins,

(e.g. Jones,

1979; Spicer,

1985).

Withholding effort becomes more prevalent when group
members have less incentive to contribute effort because
their individual contributions cannot be measured
task visibility is low; Jones,

1984; Spicer,

incentives could influence PWE,

(i.e.,

1985).

Several

including (a) the inability

of the supervisor to monitor what employees are doing
(Yellen,

1984),

compliance norms

(b) the employee's perception that strong
(Heckathorn,

certain effort levels,

199 0) in the group require

(c) the perceived presence of

altruism among co-workers

(Spicer,

1985),

and (d) the lack

13
of opportunity for repeated interaction among co-workers
(Spicer,

1985).

These incentives all emanate from

interaction in the work group.

Hypotheses regarding the

relationship of these contextual variables to PWE will be
discussed in Chapter 2.
This study considers relationships between two
interdependent components:

individuals and work groups.

A

social system is formed from the mutual activities,
interactions and sentiments of active work-group members
(Homans,

1950).

As is true in relations between individuals

and collective action organizations

(Knoke,

1990),

links

between a work group and its members produce many important
research questions.
size,

incentives,

These include how variables such as

a group's formal and informal means of

governance, demography,

and norms constrain predispositions

and actions of group members.
In relating an individual to a collective action
organization, Knoke

(1990) suggests that the most proper

theoretical stance is methodological individualism, which
views social phenomena as reciprocal relations between
individuals and groups in the social system.

Knoke

(1990)

suggests that the first step in studying collective action
organizations is considering the process by which people get
involved in these organizations: how they decide to join,
how much they participate,
commitment.

the extent of their psychological

He brings together three theoretical
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perspectives in addressing how individuals are motivated to
join and make contributions: rational choice,

normative

conformity and affective bonding.
In this attempt to extend his model to work groups,

it

is first recognized that individual motivation to join work
organizations is mainly economic, and economic exchange
girds relationships

(Jones,

1984; Brief & Aldag,

between employee and employer.

However,

1989)

it is true that not

all behavior in organizations can be explained by economic
motivation

(Shamir,

1990).

This recognition led to the

study of organizational behavior performed to help other
people (Brief & Motowidlo,

1986; Organ,

1988) ; it also

argues for considering the role non-calculative incentives
such as normative conformity and affective bonding play in
an employee's tendency to act in a certain way.
Figure 1.1 shows a general model of work-group
interaction that presents withholding effort
social loafing and free riding)

(shirking,

as an intervening process

that leads to important outcomes such as performance.
and task variables such as size,

Group

interdependence, visibility

and demography are contexts that affect group processes as
well as outcomes.

This figure shows relationships

considered in previous conceptual work or tested in previous
research,

as well as relationships proposed as part of a

model to be tested in this study.

The figure will structure

the review that comprises the rest of this chapter.
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CONTEXTS
Group Structure
Size

>-

PROCESSES
Shirking
Social loafing
Free riding

OUTCOMES
Performance

Turnover rates
—

Group demography

Group Interaction

Type of
Reward system
— Wage Premium

Norms
—

Equity perceptions
- Altruistic behavior

Task Characteristics
—

Perceived visibility

—

Task interdependence

Figure 1.1
A preliminary model of work-group interaction
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Review of Relevant Theory and Research
The following sections summarize research into
withholding effort in economics,

social psychology and

sociology, citing advances and limitations in each area.
Major theoretical and empirical studies are listed in
Appendix A.
Economics:

Shirking, efficiency wage and gift exchange

Shirking is central to major economic areas of theory
and research such as theory of the firm (Alchian & Demsetz,
1972), agency theory (Jensen & Meckling,
transactions costs perspectives
1984) .

1976), and

(Williamson,

1975, Jones,

Economists view shirking as a moral hazard that

occurs due to monitoring difficulties,
interest and opportunistic behavior
1972; Jensen & Meckling,

pursuit of self-

(Alchian & Demsetz,

1976).

A prominent strategy in economics has been to deal with
shirking by enhancing the visibility of an individual's
contribution to an organization's tasks

(Alchian & Demsetz,

1972), and by internalizing externalities
(i.e., creating a firm).

what Olson

1988)

This property rights perspective

in industrial-organization economics
1972; Demsetz,

(Demsetz,

(Alchian & Demsetz,

1988) stresses the importance of transforming

(1965) called public goods [or public property]

into private goods [private property] to pinpoint individual
accountability.

The theory of the firm (Alchian & Demsetz,

1972)

examined individual incentives to engage in shirking.

It

suggested that each employee will have more incentive to
shirk when working as part of a team than in situations when
individual performance could be monitored easily, or when
not working as part of a team.
shirking in team production
trucks)

One method of reducing

(e.g.,

lifting heavy cargo into

is for a monitor to check the input performance

(effort)

of team members.

Concentration on inputs is

necessary because in team production individual outputs may
be hard to isolate.

Establishing a monitor,

and a monitor

of the monitor, gave rise to the firm.
Opportunistic shirking is an element of agency theory
(Jensen & Meckling,

1976).

Agency theory attempts to

resolve two problems in relations between principals and
agents.

These problems are:

(a) agency, which arises when

there is goal conflict between principal and agent, and when
it is difficult for the principal to monitor the agent's
behavior; and (b) risk sharing, when principal and agent
have different attitudes toward risk.

Agency theory has

been applied to both macro and micro organizational
phenomena,

such as compensation, diversification strategies,

vertical integration,

and relationships between boards of

directors and top management
r e v iew ) .

(see Eisenhardt,

1989,

for a

A model linking structure, technology and individual
shirking behavior was proposed by Jones
transaction costs approach.
Figure 1.2.

Jones

(1984) who used a

His model is reproduced in

(19 84) suggested that transaction costs

approaches differ from job modification approaches

(e.g.,

Brass,

1981) to structure-behavior relationships in two

ways.

Transaction-costs approaches provide an extrinsic

rationale for behavior,

and they take a rational,

interested view of behavior.

self-

Job modification approaches

put greater emphasis on intrinsic motivation and selfactualization.
Transaction costs economics

(Williamson,

1975)

argues

that employees have strong incentives to withhold effort and
no incentive to improve performance unless they can
demonstrate discrete performance contributions and obtain
rewards that come with higher performance.

The Jones

(1984)

model stresses the importance of shirking and free riding as
a mediator between structure and technology,
performance.

and individual

Once again, visibility of individual

contributions is considered a predeterminant of a person's
shirking behavior.

The model focused on designing work

procedures or controls to allow monitoring and evaluation of
an employee's discrete performance.

The model's predictions

have not been explicitly tested, other than a study by
George

(1992).
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Size

Division of Labor-

Task Nonroutineness

Horizontal
Differentiation

Task Interdependence

Vertical
Differentiation

----------- Task Visibility-

Shirking
Free Riding

Performance
Satisfaction

Source; Jones, 1984

Figure 1.2
Relationships among structure, technology and performance

Efficiency wage models identify four benefits to
companies that pay wages higher than the market rate:

(a)

reduced employee shirking due to higher cost of job loss,
(b) lower turnover,
better morale

(c) improved applicant quality,

(Yellen,

1984).

and (d)

The most popular arguments of

the efficiency wage hypothesis are "those suggesting that
wage premiums and the threat of losing them create
incentives for employees to reduce unproductive behavior or
'shirking'

" (Cappelli & Chauvin,

1991a, p. 769).

The relation of shirking to above-market wages stems
from a monitoring problem that results because of discretion
that most employees have in their jobs.

An employer can

rarely specify all aspects of an employee's performance,
particularly amount of effort expended.

Piece rates and

constant supervision are often hard to implement because of
cost or inaccuracy.

In these circumstances, the employer

may pay a wage higher than market to give employees an
incentive not to shirk.

Employees who shirk may be caught

and fired.

assumed by this theory to be

Employees —

rational, utility maximizers —

would see that if they were

fired in times of less than full employment, they would lose
a wage premium.

If there is no unemployment and all firms

paid the same, there would be no shirking costs, and it is
assumed that all employees would shirk.
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Recent tests of the efficiency wage hypothesis by
economists found support for the relationship between above
market wages and a decline in shirking.
Chauvin (1991a)

Cappelli and

examined employee discipline rates and

relative wage premiums across plants in the same company.
They found that greater wage premiums are associated with
lower levels of shirking, as measured by disciplinary
dismissals, when labor market conditions,
unemployment,
Krueger

such as

limit alternative employment opportunities.
(1991) contrasted company-owned fast-food

restaurants with those owned by franchisers, predicting that
these types of ownership arrangements give managers of
company outlets less incentive to monitor and supervise
employees than franchisers.

He found compensation higher at

company-owned outlets than at franchise outlets,

and a

stronger relationship between tenure and wages at company
outlets.

These results suggested that monitoring problems

influence timing and amount of compensation,

lending support

to the efficiency wage model.
Akerlof
models

(1982,

1984),

in his variant of efficiency wage

(labor contracts as partial gift exchange) proposed

that employees' efforts depended on norms determining a fair
day's work.

The partial gift exchange model suggested that

companies pay more than a market-clearing wage to affect
those norms.

Akerlof began with Homans's

(1953,

1954)

studies of utility company workers, which found that a small
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group of workers significantly exceeded minimum company work
standards even though the workers did not expect or desire a
promotion in return for their efforts.
The partial gift exchange model suggested that in
working together,

employees acquired sentiment for each

other and for the company,

and because of sentiment for the

firm, the employees gain utility for an exchange of 'gifts'
with the firm —

the amount of utility depending upon the

norms of gift exchange.
Akerlof suggested that behavior norms —
contracts —

implicit

are a major determinant of output.

Akerlof

(1984) said that payment of efficiency wages in the context
of partial gift exchange is applicable to four labor market
paradigms.

These paradigms include dual-labor markets

(Doeringer & Piore,

1971), Weber's theory of organization,

informal work-group dynamics
1939), and equity theory

(Roethlisberger & Dickson,

(Adams,

1963).

Two common themes

that run through these paradigms and affect the amount of
effort employees will provide are loyalty to the company and
perceptions of fairness between employer and employee.
Akerlof

(1984) suggested that paying above-market wages

improves loyalty, affects fairness perceptions

(equity

overpayment), and increases effort.
Other economic approaches to shirking suggest that
compensation policies decrease employee motivation to shirk.
These include the delayed-payment model in which companies
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pay wages that, are first below and later surpass current
marginal product

(Lazear,

1979), and use of tournament games

in which employees compete for top-paying jobs
Rosen,

1981).

(Lazear &

The shirking model is considered in this

study because it has a greater concern with normative
influences on PWE in work groups.

The other approaches —

while involving compensation policies —

are not as centered

on how group interaction may influence PWE.
Summary of the economic approach.
(i.e., shirking)

Withholding effort

provides a foundation for economic theories

such as agency, transaction costs, efficiency wage and other
compensation approaches and theory of the firm.

Economists

who study shirking generally assume that employees want to
maximize self-interest.

Even when fairness and exchange

norms are noted (e.g. Akerlof,

1982), the focus is on the

material gain acquired by employees who are affected by
sentiments for each other and a firm.
The most complete model of shirking determinants at
different levels of an organization

(Jones,

economic assumptions of self-interest,
tested.

1984) rests on

and has yet to be

The model is important because it ties together

different levels of analysis that may have an impact on an
individual's PWE, but it does not consider motivations that
are non-economic.
Other difficulties in economic approaches to shirking
involve measurement and assumptions of the efficiency wage

hypothesis regarding shirking.

The shirking model suggests

that employees who are caught shirking are fired, and that
they know they will be fired if they are caught.

However,

workplace discipline typically involves a progression of
sanctions from oral reprimands, to written reprimands,
finally to termination

(Arvey & Jones,

1985).

and

These

disciplinary actions provide an opportunity for employees to
correct inappropriate behavior and, as a role model, to
deter other employees from engaging in deviant behavior.
Further, there is a problem in using disciplinary dismissals
as a sole proxy for shirking
1991a) .

(e.g. Cappelli & Chauvin,

Many shirkers may be reprimanded instead, and this

use of discipline may have an impact on the PWE of others.
Disciplinary dismissals may be most appropriate to use in
combination with other measures to indicate shirking at
work.
Shirking has been defined and operationalized in
economic studies as productivity or performance rather than
effort

(e.g., Cappelli & Chauvin,

1991a).

The problem with

using performance to measure shirking is that work effort is
much more in an employee's control than performance
Olian-Gottlieb & Heneman,

1979),

(Schwab,

and may be less affected by

the many factors that influence performance.

It may be true

that withholding effort is not merely the reverse of
performing well.

As noted, Jones

to mediate actual performance,

(1984) considered shirking

not to be the opposite of
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performance.

For example, a high performer can produce more

with less effort,

and may produce what is required at a

particular job but not give full effort.

At times, the high

performer may hold back effort, and this may not be
reflected in productivity measures.
One important contribution of economics to the study of
shirking is the idea that compensation is a major
determinant of whether employees withhold effort.

In this

study, compensation practices are used to test a model that
offers a multi-faceted view of motivation that goes beyond
rational choice assumptions to consider several determinants
of employee PWE.

Measurement may be enhanced because PWE is

more related to the shirking process than performance
measures frequently used in economics.
Social psychology;

Social loafing and social dilemmas

Social loafing refers to a tendency for people to put
forth less individual effort while working in groups than
they would working alone (e.g., Earley,
Williams,

& Harkins,

1979).

1989; Latane,

A recent meta-analysis of 78

studies found the social loafing effect to generalize across
tasks and populations,

and be moderated strongly by

performance identifiability, expectations of co-worker
performance,
Williams,

task meaningfulness,

and culture

(Karau &

1992a).

Research interest in comparing individual productivity
with overall group productivity dates to the 19th century

26
when Ringelmann conducted studies into group effort at
pulling on a rope

(Kravitz & Martin,

1986).

Ringelmann

observed that when groups of people pulled on a rope, their
collective performance was inferior to what should have been
expected from previous individual performances.

Ringelmann

asked subjects to pull as hard as they could on a rope
either alone or with one, two or seven others.
Using a strain gauge to measure how hard they pulled —
assuming that one person alone pulled at 100 percent of
effort —

Ringelmann found that when pulling with one other,

each member pulled at 93 percent of potential average
ability.

Members of triads pulled at 85 percent of ability,

and members of groups of eight pulled at 49 percent of
ability.

Ringelmann illustrated that lack of individual

effort became greater as groups grew in size and
contributions of individual members became less visible.
Later researchers viewed the problem as one of coordination
(Steiner,

1972) and motivation

(Latane, Williams,

& Harkins,

1979).
Laboratory studies
Harkins & Latane,

1981)

(Harkins & Petty,

1982; Williams,

indicate that individual efforts in

such exercises as handclapping and shouting decreased as
group size increased.

In addition to group size, task

variables were manipulated in loafing studies.

These

included identifiability, uniqueness and type.

Studies

reporting social loafing effects used non-identifiable tasks
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(Harkins, Latane,

& Williams,

1980).

Studies that

manipulated identifiability of individual members'
contributions

(Harkins & Petty,

Latane,

suggested that social loafing effects can be

1981)

1982; Williams, Harkins,

&

eliminated by making tasks identifiable with particular
individuals,

eliminating ability to hide in the crowd.

But Harkins and Petty
are unidentifiable,

(1982)

found that even when tasks

social loafing may not occur if subjects

believed tasks to be difficult or unique.

Loafing can be

reduced by making a task more challenging or by giving each
subject a different task to perform.

Zaccaro

(1984)

found

less social loafing in work groups of two to four when task
attractiveness was high rather than low.
increased,

As group size

social loafing increased when task attractiveness

was low, but social loafing decreased as size increased when
task attractiveness was high.

A recent study supported the

notion that people work harder collectively when they expect
co-workers to do poorly on a meaningful task (Williams &
Karau,

1991).

Other research has attempted to increase understanding
of loafing by considering what mechanisms may lead to it.
Jackson and Harkins

(1985)

investigated if individual group

members would reduce effort because they expect co
performers to loaf, and thus reduced their own efforts to
establish equity.

Subjects were believed to reduce effort
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"rather than be a sucker and carry a free rider"

(Kerr,

1983, p. 823).
The manipulation used to test for this effect is
similar to an underpayment condition in equity theory
research:

Two people arrive at a lab to take part in a

purported study together for similar compensation [extra
credit or class requirements].

A subject is led to believe

that a co-worker [a confederate] will put in less effort on
the task, and researchers test whether the subject
subsequently reduces effort.

Equity theory would predict

this result as the subject tried to reduce tension caused by
perceived inequity.

Attempts by the confederate to reduce

effort may violate norms of equity and social
responsibility, that everyone should do a fair share
(Schnake,

1991a).

Research has also demonstrated that the social loafing
phenomenon occurred in tasks believed to have social value
to participants and required cognitive information
processing,

rather than physical effort

1985; Weldon & Mustari,

1988).

(Weldon & Gargano,

Subjects led to believe they

shared responsibility with another person tended to use less
information in evaluating a decision than those who believed
they were solely responsible.

These studies led to a

conclusion that feelings of dispensability can sometimes
cause social loafing and that feeling necessary can motivate
effort despite anonymity

(Weldon & Mustari,

1988).
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In a study of salespeople in an on-going organization,
it was found that task visibility and intrinsic task
involvement were both negatively related to social loafing
(George,

1992).

That study found that intrinsic involvement

moderated the relationship between task visibility and
social loafing.

The relation between task visibility and

social loafing was strongest when intrinsic involvement was
low.
Social dilemmas

(Dawes,

1980; Orbell & Dawes,

1981)

occur when individual group members engage in behavior that
would have negative consequences if all members engaged in
it, as seen in the "tragedy of the commons"

(Hardin,

1968).

Each group member receives a higher monetary payoff for not
cooperating with other members of the group in some activity
regardless of what other members do; this lack of
cooperation is often manifested in diminished effort.
are two varieties of dilemmas:

collective traps

There

(in which

behaviors that reward individuals yield negative outcomes
when exhibited by enough people; Platt,
collective fences

1973), and

(in which behaviors that cost individuals

yield negative outcomes when avoided by enough people;
Levine & Moreland,

1990).

Two solutions to social dilemmas have been advanced:
(a) Individual solutions,

in which behavior of individual

group members is modified,

and (b) structural solutions,

which a dilemma is removed through group action (Levine &

in
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Moreland,

1990).

Liebrand's

(1986)

study indicates that in

reaching individual solutions to social dilemmas the motives
and social values of group members influence their conduct.
Research on provision of step-level public goods, goods that
result from a multi-step process,

indicates that altruism

and other social values may be meaningful in determining
behavior

(Rapoport,

1987).

Studies focusing on social dilemmas involving shared
group resources found that three factors impacted group
members'

individual solutions:

(a) self-interest;

desire to use the resource responsibly,
to inherent group norms
addition,

and

(b) a

(c) conformity

(Samuelson & Messick,

1986).

In

communication among group members may aid in

cooperation by promoting group identity or providing a
chance for members to make promises of cooperation (Dawes,
Orbell,

Simmons,

& van de Kragt,

1986).

Researchers have considered several variables in
examining structural solutions to social dilemmas.

These

studies examined variables such as a payoff system (Dawes,
et al.,

1986), the framing of cooperative and competitive

decisions

(Rutte, Wilke,

1989a), and social norms
Moreland,

1990).

& Messick,

1987), group size (Kerr,

(Kerr, 1989b,

cited in Levine &

Structural solutions such as electing a

strong leader or developing a punishment system may be
appropriate when a group is not efficient in dealing with
common resources,

and when free access to resources leads to
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large inequities among members
Samuelson, Messick, Wilke,

(Samuelson & Messick,

& Rutte,

1986).

1986;

Yamagishi's

(1986) structural goal/expectations theory assumes that
structural solutions are adopted when group members develop
cooperative goals, and understand that structural solutions
are effective.
Summary of the social psychology approach.

Research

into social loafing and social dilemmas has helped increase
our understanding of how group processes serve as
intervening variables in relationships between group
structure and group performance.

Whereas rationality

assumptions undergird much of the research,

these studies

have introduced variables and findings that point out the
importance of the social influence process, particularly
conformity to group pressure,

on individual PWE.

These

variables include nature of the task, norms of equity
involved in relative individual contributions,

and

altruistic values.
Group characteristics —

particularly size and

visibility of member contributions —

that were seen to be

important in the study of social loafing seem to echo the
work of economists regarding propensity to shirk among
employees.

It is rational for members not to withhold

effort in return for reward if efforts can be seen by
monitors and fellow group members.

Considerations,

such as

equity norms and altruism, which are not necessarily based
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on rational self-interest,

also enter the equation, and

these affect PWE.
Social dilemma and social loafing studies usually
involve newly formed groups of strangers where relationships
are not allowed to develop

(Levine & Moreland,

1990).

The

group is expected to exist for a short period, and members
have equal power.

By focusing on existing work groups in

organizations as in this study,
group,

contextual information about

status and power relationships is provided that was

lacking in previous research.
Sociology: Public goods and free riders
Sociologists emphasize public goods,

free riders and

group formation to take collective action.

The perspective

reflects a traditional sociological emphasis on group
solidarity.

When groups possess solidarity, their members

behave in ways that are consistent with the group's
collective standards of conduct, or norms,
obligated to do so (Durkheim,

because they feel

1893/1933).

In sociology, withholding effort is approached from a
standpoint of collective action toward a common goal.
goal has the characteristics of a public good.

The

Those who do

not contribute cannot be excluded from consumption.
Examples of public goods include low production costs of a
work group, group grade for a class project,
report,

and a drug free workplace.

a committee

The inability to exclude non-contributors makes free
riding attractive,

allowing individuals to profit from

activities of others without making a contribution
& Frey,

1982).

(Stroebe

Such activities can occur in work groups as

some free riders withhold effort toward the common good,
e.g., workplace safety,

increased group reputation,

production costs, drug-free workplace.

low

Withholding effort

toward these public goods should be stronger, the larger the
group, as costs are spread among many, and a non-contributor
becomes less visible

(Olson,

1965) .

Some sociologists restate this collective action
problem as one of getting a small subset of a group that is
interested in providing a public good to contribute time,
money, or other resources toward the good's production.
This subset, the critical mass
1985)

(Oliver, Marwell,

is needed for group action.

& Teixeira,

A small number of people

who contribute to increased work-group reputation,
example,

for

can provide benefits of improved reputation to a

much larger number of non-supporters when the gain shared by
all does not cut the benefits enjoyed by those contributing.
The application of critical mass to work-group activity
can be made by considering an academic department.
departments,

In some

a core faculty of two or three may strive for

excellence in teaching,

research and service while other

colleagues do mediocre work.

The strivers will continue to

do so despite colleagues who do not.

The reason is when
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departmental reputation is enhanced,

the benefit to the core

faculty is not reduced even though they share this benefit
with those who give less, or very little,

effort.

The Oliver-Marwell analysis of critical mass
Marwell,
Oliver,

& Teixeira,
& Prahl,

1985; Oliver & Marwell,

1988)

(Oliver,

1988; Marwell,

is important to the current study of

PWE because it clashes with Olson's idea that material
incentives must be present to stimulate collective action.
Their analysis suggested that collective action does not
have to be a spinoff from pursuit of private goods but can
occur by a direct appeal to common goals.

Thus,

conformity

of members to group norms and repeated interactions of group
members may have effects on PWE beyond a basic economic
exchange between employer and employee.
A critical mass emphasis challenges the idea that free
riders should always be viewed negatively.

A few dedicated

people and a large number of free riders is sometimes the
most efficient way to provide a public good.

For example,

if every member of a professional association wanted to make
equal contributions to the group's work by coming to
business meetings and serving on committees,

it would be

difficult for the group to get anything done.
Oliver and Marwell's work modified a belief that free
riding makes it irrational for others to contribute when
members of large groups.

The assumptions involved in the

Oliver-Marwell analysis started with the idea of

interdependent decisions.

Most of the previous work on

collective action assumed that each person makes an
independent decision about contributing,
other people's behavior.
cases —
letters

not considering

While this may be true in some

for example, responses to mass-mailed fund-raising
(Oliver, Marwell,

& Teixeira,

1985)

apply to most organizational phenomena.

—

it does not

People in

organizations may make decisions on contributing effort
based on what they believe others have contributed and based
on their on-going relationship at work.

When people know

they will meet again or all parties have experienced a
similar situation before, then cooperation becomes less
difficult
Macy

(Axelrod,

1984).

(1990) provided further undergirding for the

importance of normative,

interdependent decisions in work

group functioning by relaxing four constraints in the
Oliver-Marwell original model:
completely rational;

(a) that people are

(b) that each decision is isolated from

previous decisions and their results;
deterministic,

(c) that outcomes are

and (d) that public goods have pure jointness

of supply and collective profit.

His model extended the

theory of critical mass by greatly reducing an individual's
cognitive demands and by applying it to behavior based on
normative as well as instrumental concerns.
The theory of critical mass used a rational choice
assumption that people with limited resources seek to spend

36
cost-effectively.

This limited chances to apply the model

to cooperation in every-day organizational life, as Macy
(1990) and Oliver and Marwell

(1988) noted.

Whereas

strategic planners and entrepreneurs may calculate costs and
benefits, the average work-group member probably does not
have the time,

information or analytic abilities to do cost-

benefit analyses of cooperation toward providing public
goods

(Macy, 1990).
Macy

(1990) applied social learning theory to show how

costs and benefits affect successful collective action, even
when there are unintended consequences.

His proposed

behavioral model retains a rational choice assumption that
costs and benefits condition behavior, but rejects the
assumption that this occurs because each person estimates a
rate of return on public goods investments.
In the Macy model, positive and negative cues from
social interaction guide individuals through a search
process, based on reinforcement and changing tendencies to
cooperate.

To relate this to organizations,

as the level of

individual and work-group involvement changes,
received by group members,

so do cues

and these cues modify a person's

tendency to make contributions to collective activities.
By incorporating learning theory into Macy's model, the
scope of critical mass is extended to those who believe
cooperative efforts are worthwhile based on normative tests.
Learning theory is typically applied to behavior that is
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unthinking or habitual,
(Scott,

1971).

such as internalization of norms

Contributions of effort based on norms

serves as an end in itself regardless of whether it is also
a means to achieve other ends.
Scott's

(1971) theory of moral commitment argues that

attachment to prosocial norms increased when those who
comply with prevailing norms are repeatedly rewarded and
when those who disregard norms and collective welfare are
penalized.

In contrast,

attachment declines when compliance

is penalized, and deviance is rewarded.
builds on Homans's

Scott's theory

(1961) model of social exchange in which

one person's behavior serves to stimulate another person and
the other person's behavior then stimulates the first
person.

When more than two people are involved, as in a

work group, this mutual conditioning can generate patterns
with different degrees of regularity.

Over time, a

consistent pattern of positive and negative cues makes for
habit-forming responses.
These repeated sanctions result in the emergence of and
compliance to norms.

A compliance norm —

a form of group-

mediated control that requires certain procedures to be
followed by all group members

(Heckathorn,

powerful in regulating group behavior
Heckathorn,

1990).

1990) —

(Axelrod,

can be

1986;

If work-group culture stresses

collective effort in providing public,

as well as private

goods, group members may receive reinforcement leading to

38
more cooperation and collective action.

There may be less

cooperation in situations where cooperative behavior is not
rewarded,

or deviance from it is not punished.

The presence of behavioral norms such as equity and
reciprocity

(Schnake,

1991a)

and altruism (Rushton &

Sorrentino,

1981) may reduce PWE.

The fact that people's

motivation to behave in a certain way generally involves
mixed altruistic and self-interested motives seems to
2

indicate why a strong free-rider hypothesis

usually finds

no empirical support (Albanese & Van Fleet,

1985a).

On the

other hand, support for a weak free rider hypothesis is
usually found because people generally make decisions based
on selfish interests reduced somewhat by altruism or
fairness expectations

(Marwell & Ames,

1979; 1980; 1981).

Empirical evidence suggests that self-interest is
moderated by a "norm of fair dealing" that people comply
with even though they are not threatened by punishment
(Stroebe & Frey,

1982, p. 127).

The fairness norm

explanation for high levels of contributions by group
members departs from a rational behavior
assumption

(Albanese & Van Fleet,

1985a).

(economic exchange)
One implication

when social-learning theory is applied to the study of
collective action is that leaders may be able to provide
cues and informal sanctions that teach participants to care
about each other, a strategy that has been previously
suggested in promoting cooperation

(Axelrod,

1984).

Marwell and Ames

(1981)

looked at fairness as a

behavioral norm and its influence on public goods
contributions.

In their study, which simulated market

transactions, they found that subjects who considered
fairness when deciding how to behave and defined higher
levels of contribution

[in providing a public good] as fair

were those who contributed most.

Compared to other

participants, graduate-level economics majors placed less
importance on fairness norms in making contribution
decisions,

and contributed less to a public good than other

participants.

Marwell and Ames

(1981) pointed out that

economists are trained to value self-interested behavior,
which may explain their lower level of contributions.
The importance of norms in guiding human action is
basic to sociology

(Durkheim,

1893/1933; Parsons,

1937).

Group norms are powerful controls of human behavior and
periodically receive calls for more empirical attention
(Bettenhausen & Murnighan,

1991).

More than 50 years ago,

norms were extended to functioning of work groups through
equal treatment expectations and how they influenced
employee behavior.

If management is expected to treat all

employees the same, a concession to management by one worker
can pressure others to acquiesce to authority.
basis for output restriction norms
Dickson,

This forms a

(Roethlisberger &

1939), which prohibit overcompliance to management.

Much of the social control resulting from sanctions
imposed by supervisors may actually result from compliance
norms

(Heckathorn,

1990).

Presence of strong compliance

norms in a work group can set behavioral standards resulting
in high effort as well as low effort

(Ouchi,

1981).

A

rational perspective suggests that when costs of monitoring
by conventional means become too high, an organization may
adopt an organic structure, which relies on strong group
norms to pressure members to provide high effort.
control

(Ouchi,

1980; 1981)

This clan

is based on common goals and

strong group identity.
Granovetter

(1985) argued that Williamson's

(1975)

markets and hierarchies approach underestimated the
importance of informal,

interpersonal controls and on-going

social influence in building trust and discouraging
opportunism.

Granovetter suggested that Ouchi's clan

concept is a more highly developed instance of the type of
informal control process that occurs in all organizations.
Summary of the sociology approach.

By considering

variables that stress more than material incentives and self
interest, the sociological approach enhances the focus taken
by economists.

Variables such as altruism,

and norms of

compliance and fairness focus on the role of informal
control through social pressure in shaping decisions of
individuals to contribute effort.

One way these norms are

formed is through repeated interactions among the group
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members.

These interactions indicate that when members know

each other and have continued dealings they may have
different attitudes toward contributing effort than if just
starting an activity together as a group.
Although sociologists relax rationality assumptions
somewhat, there remains a tendency to argue that individuals
undertake cost-benefit analyses before they make decisions
about contributing effort and resources.

Macy's

(1990)

approach stressed the importance of social relations and
development of norms in determining individual contribution,
even though this experience is later entered into a costbenefit calculation of social exchange relationships.
Perhaps Macy's theory attempts to find a middle ground
between an undersocialized, rational approach of economists
and an oversocialized norms approach of sociologists and
some economists to the study of behavior.
Macy follows the thinking of Granovetter

If this is true,
(1985), who

suggested that most behavior is embedded within
interpersonal networks, and one should avoid extreme under
and over-socialized views of human action.
Knoke's Synthesized Motivation Model
A theme that pervades this review has been a repeated
emphasis on assumed rational exchange.

A work organization

provides material incentives in exchange for effort from its
members.

A collective action organization employs voluntary

actions and democratic procedures to seek nonmarket
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solutions to individual and group problems
7).
Knoke

(Knoke,

1990, p.

In examining research regarding collective action,
(1990) argued that a strict focus on economic

incentives as motivation to contribute to collective action
organizations does not fully explain propensity of
individuals to behave in a certain way.
For example,

in Marwell and Ames's research,

factors strongly influence economic decisions.

normative

The

importance of norms has been offered to explain rejection of
a strong free rider hypothesis in repeated studies
& Van Fleet,

1985a).

(Albanese

One empirical example showing the

importance of material incentives combined with normative
factors was Condie, Warner,

and Gillman

(1976) who found

that in a mass blood drive, donors were more responsive to
incentives such as a free health check-up than non-donors,
and perceived lower costs of donating and greater social
pressure to donate than non-donors.
Whereas theorists

(e.g., Olson,

1965) tended to

discount the possibility that some group members may value a
group's well-being and thus "irrationally" contribute to
provision of public goods when the group is large, other
researchers

(e.g., Gooding & Wagner,

1985) have concluded

that "irrational" contributions to public goods can occur to
some extent in larger g r o u p s .
The discrepancy illustrates a problem with focusing
solely on material incentives to motivation in work
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organizations.

Individuals have large differences in

preferences for and responses to organizational incentives,
thus theorists have suggested other motivational bases
(e.g., Clark & Wilson,
Isak,

1982).

1961; Etzioni,

1975; Knoke & Wright-

Reducing complex motives for behavior to a

cost-benefit calculation ignores the way organizations match
incentives to fit diverse member interests

(Knoke,

1990).

In addition to rational c h o i c e , which involves an
individual calculating costs and benefits of material
incentives in an effort to maximize individual utility,
Knoke (1990) examined two other explanations for propensity
of members to provide effort to collective action
organizations:

normative conformity and affective bonding.

In a normative conformity model, an individual is
motivated to follow standards of conduct that are grounded
in socially instilled values about principled behavior.
Individual action occurs in a framework of regulation by
norms, which are prescribed guides for conduct or action
that are generally complied with by members of a group
(Ullman-Margalit, 1977).
with norms.

Action is an effort to conform

Taken alone, the normative conformity model

appears to suffer because it relies too much on
socialization to explain human action.
In an affective bonding model,

an individual is

motivated to provide effort based on emotional attachments
to other people and groups.

This occurs as part of an
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identification process in which the member's role is
internalized along with specific affective bonds to other
members and to the group

(Knoke,

1990).

Studies of

religious groups and communes have revealed the importance
of solidarity for commitment to an organization
1972; Zablocki,

1980).

(Kanter,

"The resulting sense of 'oneness'

between person and group strengthens the member's motives
for contributing personal resources to the organization"
(Knoke,

1990, p. 42).

Knoke argued that no one motivation can explain a
person's decision to contribute time, money and effort to
collective action organizations.

He combined all three

approaches and suggested they jointly affected decisions
about individual involvement in collective action: whether
to join, whether to stay, how much to participate,

and what

amount of personal resources to contribute.
Collective action organizations,

as defined by Knoke,

are distinct from business organizations in several ways:
(a) they seek non-market solutions to specific individual
and group problems,

(b) they maintain formal criteria for

voluntary membership,

(c) they may provide democratic

procedures to allow members to participate in making policy
decisions

(Knoke,

1990, p. 7).

Application of Knoke to work organizations
Whereas Knoke focused on organizations such as lobbying
groups and associations, this dissertation uses his
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framework to study withholding effort in private firms.

An

issue to be resolved in this study is whether a motivation
model bringing together material, normative and affective
bonding incentives is appropriate to study PWE in economic
organizations.
Organizations that use incentives such as wages,

fringe

benefits and other rewards with monetary value are termed
utilitarian organizations.

Clark and Wilson

(1961)

predicted that these organizations seek material rewards for
their members,

and their leaders focus their efforts on

obtaining resources needed to provide incentives.

Business

firms are an example.
Organizations that focus on intangible rewards such as
sociability,

identification and status are called solidary

organizations,

e.g. social clubs.

Organizations that rely

on intangible rewards related to the achievement of
organizational goals are termed purposive organizations
(e.g. protest groups, Clark & Wilson,

1961).

Whereas businesses provide money in exchange for
employee contributions,

creators of incentive typologies

suggested that all organizations use all three types of
incentives

(Clark & Wilson,

Clark and Wilson

Knoke

1975).

Although

(1961) asserted that few organizations can

easily combine utilitarian,
systems,

1961; Etzioni,

solidary and purposive incentive

(1990) pointed out that there is a lack of

empirical evidence showing that only pure types of incentive

46
systems exist.
Knoke's model,

In viewing the typology in the context of
it appears that all three types of incentives

can exist at varying levels for employees of a business.
Whether businesses actively use all three types to minimize
employee PWE is an empirical question.
Economic exchange between an employee and an employer
is fundamental to work motivation
Jones,

1984).

(Brief & Aldag,

1989;

Although a business focuses on economic

incentives as a major tool in producing employee effort,
normative and affective bonding incentives can also be
present on a job, even if not an element of the official
incentive package.
incentives,

Barnard

(1938) described varied

including objective and subjective inducements

specifically tied to individual employees

(material rewards

and non-material benefits,

such as prestige), and general

interpersonal incentives.

He recognized that different

people are motivated by different types of incentives and
that their interests vary over time.

He argued that

organizations never offer all incentives that lead people to
provide effort and must try to change people's desires
through persuasion,

including coercion and socialization,

so

that available incentives can win enough employee
contributions for organizations to reach their goals.
Organizational leaders create normative incentives for
employees by establishing a strong culture that is taught to
new employees as the right way to perceive,

think and feel

in relation to problems of external adaptation and internal
integration

(Schein,

1984).

A more natural source of

normative job incentives is informal structure.

It has long

been recognized that work-group members can establish norms
of conduct that are not sanctioned by an organization and
may even be opposed by the organization
Dickson,

1939).

(Roethlisberger &

Employees have a strong sense of what

behaviors are expected from each other and may tailor their
job efforts to comply with group norms in an effort to avoid
ostracism meted out to deviants.
Affective bonding incentives can arise as employees
work together and develop relationships transcending a
formal job description.

Employees who need camaraderie,

friendship and acceptance may be motivated to provide effort
that enhances their abilities to receive those sentiments,
or gifts

(Akerlof,

1982),

from their co-workers and

employer.
Investigations into shirking,

social loafing and free

riding have used variables that assume all three motivations
in decisions to withhold effort

(See Exhibit 1.2).

Some of

the variables emphasize motivations to withhold effort that
stem from material rational-choice considerations, while
others result from normative conformity and affectivebonding incentives.

Employees are assumed to rationally

weigh benefits to withhold effort and the costs associated
with being caught shirking in efficiency wage models.
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Efficiency wage is one illustration of the importance of
reward system as a variable relating to shirking propensity.
Other variables that emphasize individual cost-benefit
analysis include group size, task interdependence,

and task

visibility.
Exhibit 1.2
Predictors of withholding effort within Knoke's framework
Rational Choice/ Cost-Benefit Analysis
Efficiency wage (wage premium)
Group size
Task interdependence
Perceived task visibility
Normative Conformity
Perceived effort compliance norms
Equity perceptions
Affective Bonding
Perceived altruism
Turnover rates
Group length-of-service heterogeneity

Individuals are assumed to consider normative
conformity incentives when variables such as effort norms
and fairness are studied in relation to withholding effort.
Affective bonding incentives include variables such as
altruism and repeated plays.

The potential association of

altruism and care for fellow human beings with individual
decisions about whether to contribute effort has been
discussed.

If individuals have developed a relationship

over time and will meet again, that relationship may help
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determine whether they cooperate with others
1984) .

(Axelrod,

Contextual variables that involve the repeated plays

aspect of affective bonding incentives can include turnover
rates

(Spicer,

1985).

In addition to turnover rates, a variable that may
figure in the opportunity to engage in repeated plays and
affective bonding is a demography variable: heterogeneity of
a work group's length-of-service distribution.

Length-of-

service distribution is an aspect of organizational
demography

(Pfeffer,

1983) that has not been considered in

research into withholding effort.
The demography approach builds on the idea that one of
the most important determinants of interpersonal attraction
is similarity (Lott & Lott,

1965).

Demography refers to

composition of a social entity in terms of basic attributes
such as age, gender, educational level,

length of service or

residence,

race,

socioeconomic status and other variables

(Pfeffer,

1983).

Organizations and groups are generally

characterized as demographically homogeneous or
heterogeneous, using either a single variable or a set of
demographic variables to make the determination
Lawrence,

1989).

Blau

(Zenger &

(1977) has argued that inequality and

heterogeneity are important organizational properties that
may affect several of their critical processes.
A work group with a heterogeneous length-of-service
distribution is a unit composed primarily of people who have
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dissimilar tenures in the unit.

Under certain conditions,

individuals are likely to identify with their groups and
this identification encourages them to comply with group
obligations

(Fireman & Gamson,

1979).

The potential

importance of a homogeneous length-of-service distribution
(all members having the same or similar tenure)

is alluded

to in Schein's discussion of the organizational
socialization process:
The formation of a peer group of novices is
often a solution to the problem of defense
against the powerful organization, and at the
same time can strongly enhance the socialization
process if peer group norms support
organizational norms (Schein, 1988: 56).
Length-of-service similarity may bond individuals
together: each person generally entered the group at the
same time and may have had similar experiences.

Demographic

similarity of a work group, particularly regarding length of
service distribution and potentially in connection with
other facets of demography such as race and gender, may be
important in an employee's decision whether to provide full
effort as part of an obligation to other group members.

On

the other hand, demographic heterogeneity may make it less
likely that affective bonding among group members will
occur.
Research Questions
There are several potential avenues for research into
the topic of withholding effort in work groups and
organizations.

The major purpose of this dissertation is to
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test a model that brings together variables that have been
used across disciplines in the study of individuals
withholding effort in group and organizational contexts.
Will a test of this model —

which combines various employee

incentives to withhold effort,

such as rational choice,

normative conformity and affective bonding —

reveal

relationships between various formal and informal contextual
elements and an employee's propensity to withhold effort?
Variables such as group size, wage premium,

task

visibility and interdependence have been previously
associated with the decision of individual employees to
withhold effort.

These variables are concerned with an

individual making a rational cost-benefit analysis before
deciding whether to withhold effort.

Combining these

variables with variables such as perceived peer compliance
effort norms, and perceptions of equity and altruism, which
tap normative conformity and affective bonding motivations,
may provide a more complete explanation of PWE when working
with others.
The hypotheses advanced and tested in this study
address two general questions:
(a)

Is Knoke's model an appropriate theoretical

framework in which to study the determinants of an
employee's PWE in work organizations?

(b)

How do variables, based on rational choice,

normative conformity or affective bonding incentives,
explain an individual employee's PWE?

CHAPTER 2
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES
This chapter develops hypotheses tested in the reported
study.

Variables used in the study of withholding effort

are described, and proposed relations among these variables
and employee propensity to withhold effort
advanced.

(PWE) are

Five different types of variables are used to tap

the three sets of variables in Knoke's model.

These

variables reflect environmental characteristics,
organizational characteristics,

objective group

characteristics, perceived task characteristics and
perceived group characteristics.
Variables and Hypotheses
Knoke's motivation model has been advanced as a means
to consider PWE.

His model suggests that an employee's

predisposition to act to attain valued goals is based on
motivations that include rational choice, normative
conformity and affective bonding.
As a starting point,

Figure 2.1 presents a PWE model

based on Chapter l's discussion of previous theory and
research.

Proposed relationships and hypotheses are marked.

The organization level variable shown in the figure —
payment of a wage premium —

is proposed to affect an

employee's PWE in times of higher unemployment,

controlling

for the individual's lack of alternative employment
opportunities.
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RATIONAL CHOICE VARIABLES
Wage Premium
(HI)
Work-Group Size
+ (H2)
Task
Interdependence

(H4)
(H3)

(H5)

Perceived
Task
Visibility

(H6)

Employee
Propensity
To Withhold
Effort

NORMATIVE CONFORMITY VARIABLES

Perceived
Effort Norms

(H7)

Equity Perceptions
(H8)

AFFECTIVE BONDING VARIABLES

Perceived Altruism
(H9)
Group-Turnover Rate
+ (H10)
Length-of-Service
Heterogeneity

Figure 2.1
Model of employee propensity to withhold effort
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Three variables designed to measure objective work
group characteristics are shown in Figure 2.1.

These are

work-group size, group-turnover rate and length-of-service
heterogeneity.
Two variables related to task perceptions are shown in
the figure: task interdependence and task visibility.
Finally, perceived effort norms, perceived altruism,

and

equity perceptions represent three variables that tap
individual perceptions of work-group properties.

The

dependent variable in the model is propensity of employees
to withhold effort.
Wage premium
Economic theories suggest that compensation policies
can be used to decrease the likelihood that an employee
withholds effort.

The efficiency wage hypothesis proposes

that employers pay above-market wages in the hope that
employees will reduce shirking for fear they will be fired
and lose their wage premiums when it would be difficult for
them to find a comparable job (Akerlof, 1984).

The relation

of above-market wages to lower levels of shirking is based
on the employees'

fear of losing above-market wages if they

are caught withholding effort in times of high unemployment.
Recent tests of the efficiency wage hypothesis by economists
supported a negative relationship between payment of above
market wages and shirking when there is less than full
employment

(Cappelli and Chauvin,

1991a).
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The economic model assumes a rational self-interested
person who weighs costs and benefits associated with
withholding effort.

PWE should be lower when expected costs

associated with being fired are greatest: when employees
fear that wages in the labor market are lower than an
employee's current pay,

and there is more difficulty in

finding a new job because there is higher local unemployment
(Cappelli & Chauvin,

1991 a ) .

Higher local unemployment is one factor that could lead
to a lack of alternative employment opportunities.

Others

include whether employment at an employee's company is
growing or declining,

and percentage of the company's

workforce on layoff.

In addition,

it is logical that the

predisposition of an employee is related to his or her
perception of lack of alternative employment opportunities
(Gerhart,

1990).

Few layoffs, high growth rates,

and

perceived ease of movement to another job would tend to
lessen the impact of a wage premium on PWE.

This discussion

and previous research suggests the following hypothesis:
Hi: Payment of a wage premium will be negatively
related to propensity to withhold effort, controlling for
labor market area unemployment rate and other factors that
indicate a lack of alternative employment opportunities.
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Group Size
Individual anonymity that occurs in larger groups makes
monitoring harder and reduces visibility of an individual's
effort

(Albanese & Van Fleet,

Williams,

and Harkins

six people)

1985a; Jones,

1984).

Latane,

(1979) manipulated group size (up to

in physical tasks.

They found that as group

size increased, a person's average output fell and total
group output increased at a diminishing rate as new members
were added.
Leibowitz and Tollison (1980) suggested that optimal
law-firm size for controlling shirking in the partnerships
was about five.

Examining effects of group size on

performance, Littlepage

(1991)

found that on tasks with high

coordination demands and with more than an optimal number of
participants, decreased participation by some members may
result in higher performance.

However, he concluded that it

is difficult to determine the most efficient group size;
optimal group size depended on task characteristics and
participation levels likely within the group.
Small groups may be more successful in producing higher
average individual effort because in a small group it may be
easier to encourage effort and cooperation and police
individual behavior

(Hechter,

1987).

In a small group,

contributions from each member may be more crucial to
success than in a large group.

This provides incentive for

members to give effort lest co-workers,

or a supervisor,
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punish them.

Therefore,

increased group size will make it

more likely for a rational,
withhold effort.

self-interested employee to

This discussion implies the following

hypotheses:

H2: Work-group size will be positively related to
propensity to withhold effort.
H3: Work-group size will be negatively related to
perceived task visibility.
Task interdependence
Using transaction costs theory, Jones

(1984)

suggested

that task visibility is a major determinant of shirking and
free riding.

Jones applied Thompson's

(1967) technology

typology to shirking and suggested that as one moves from
mediating technology

(pooled interdependence)

to long-linked

technology

(seguential interdependence)

technology

(reciprocal interdependence), it is harder to

monitor individual performance.

to intensive

Further, Jones argued that

the more unstructured or ambiguous a task, the greater the
difficulty in observing and measuring performance.

More

monitoring problems lead to the suggestion that withholding
effort will be greater when there is greater task
interdependence.

When interdependence is low, supervisor

monitoring is easier, and there is less shirking.

Applying

this argument to PWE yields the following hypothesis:

H4: Greater task interdependence will be positively
related to propensity to withhold effort.
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Perceived task visibility
As indicated, Jones

(1984) suggested that task

visibility was a function of more complex tasks.

He

suggested a congruence between interdependence and task
visibility.

In a field study such as this,

it would be

difficult to treat task visibility as an absolute.
George

As

(1992) stated, task visibility can be absolute in a

lab study because subjects are told if their individual
efforts are visible.

At work, perceptions of task

visibility would vary among individual employees.
Therefore,

for theoretical and practical reasons, perceived

task visibility will be measured in this study.
Perceived task visibility is an employee's belief that
a supervisor is aware of that employee's individual effort
on the job.

The level of visibility of an individual

employee's task depends in large part on whether individual
performance can be monitored and evaluated

(Jones,

1984) .

When employees are paid by piecework and work alone,
they would be likely to perceive task visibility as high.
When employees work in groups and the task is obscure,

such

as in research teams, the employees would be likely to
perceive task visibility as low.
low task visibility,

In situations of perceived

employees would be more likely to

withhold effort because they believe their effort is not
seen.

A laboratory study found that subjects, working in a

group, were less likely to withhold effort when they
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believed their individual contributions could be identified
by others

(Williams, Harkins & Latane,

Jones

1981).

(1984) proposed that nonroutine tasks and complex

technologies decreased task visibility and thus increased
the need to monitor individual effort.

This study measures

perceived task visibility of individual employees in
addition to group technology characteristics.

The interest

here is in the impact of task characteristics relative to
the impact of employees' perceptions of those
characteristics, which will be discussed in subsequent
sections of this chapter.

Previous research suggests the

following hypothesis:

H 5 : Greater task interdependence will be negatively
related to perceived task visibility.
In addition,

employee perceptions that a supervisor has

a problem monitoring their tasks results in greater PWE
because workers perceive their efforts to be less visible
(George,

1992).

In this study, the following hypothesis

will be tested to replicate that finding in work groups
across organizations:

H6: Perceived task visibility will be negatively
related to propensity to withhold effort.
Effort norms
The previous variables considered rational cost-benefit
analysis as an incentive influencing PWE.

The next set of

variables considers normative conformity incentives.

The
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normative conformity model assumes that individual action is
motivated by a desire to follow standards grounded in
socially instilled values about principled behavior.
occurs via normative regulation.

Action

Norms are prescribed

guides for conduct or action that are generally complied
with by group members

(Ullman-Margalit, 1977).

Internal group dynamics, particularly perception of
strong group norms by individual members,

can strongly

influence the decision of members to behave,
in a certain way
Hackman's

(Asch,

1951; Janis,

or not behave,

1972; Milgram,

1974).

(1983) review of several group studies suggested

that norms may influence an individual's performance more
than the individual's knowledge,

skills,

and abilities.

In a discussion of organizational dissent,

Graham

(1986) suggested that perceived group unanimity helps
maintain a social reality that encourages members to remain
loyal.

Conversely,

lack of perceived agreement on correct

conduct allowed members to redefine their situation,
increasing the likelihood of dissent. Along these lines of
thinking,

an employee's perception that strong compliance

norms to provide effort exist in a work group should lessen
the propensity of the employee to defy the norm and withhold
effort .
This would only be true,

of course,

if the peer

compliance norm was for each work-group member to provide
strong effort in completing the work group's tasks.

If the
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strong group norm was to withhold as much effort as
possible, then such a norm should have a positive effect on
an employee's PWE.

This study tests a proposition that

perceptions of informal controls,

such as compliance effort

norms, can discourage the likelihood that an employee will
opportunistically even when such behavior would be
considered a rational pursuit of self-interest.

H7:

Employees' perceptions of norms to provide effort

will be negatively related to propensity to withhold effort.
Equity perceptions
Marwell and Ames

(1981)

expectations of fairness,

indicated that normative

rather than narrow economic

interests, accounted to a large extent for their subjects'
decisions to contribute to a public good.

They found that

subjects who considered fairness when deciding how to behave
and defined higher contribution levels to be more fair were
those who contributed the most.
One explanation of the social-loafing phenomenon is
Worker A's fear that others in a group will withhold effort
and thus benefit from Worker A's contributions
Harkins,
effect"

1985).

(Jackson &

Many people are averse to this "sucker

(Orbell & Dawes,

1981), and may decide to withhold

effort themselves when believing that others also plan to
withhold effort.

Many people don't want to be a sucker

because it violates norms of equity,
responsibility,

reciprocity and social

i.e., everyone should give their fair share

63
(Kerr,

1983).

Equity theory suggests that individuals are

sensitive to others receiving similar rewards for less
effort,

and they may adjust effort to reflect individual

perceptions of fairness

(Adams,

1963).

Research into the sucker effect and contributions to
public goods indicated that individuals may adjust effort
based on fairness judgments about the situation.

Those who

perceive fairness tend to withhold less effort and make
greater contributions.

This leads to the following

prediction:
H8: Employees' perceptions of equity will be negatively
related to propensity to withhold effort.
Perceived altruism
The next set of variables involve affective bonding
incentives.

Affective bonding refers to emotional

attachments to other persons and groups

(Knoke,

1990).

Sociability from personal ties is a very important need that
group membership may fulfill

(Hechter,

1987).

This set of

incentives involves the idea that people who act together
become emotionally bound together.

This notion has been

stressed in a study of political cohesion in groups
(Lasswell,

1977), and in the study of social movements

(Fireman & Gamson,

1979).

The variables that may be

important influences on PWE in work groups include the
perceived presence of altruism in the group,

and objective
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group characteristics that indicate group members have been
together over time.
Altruism is defined as a pro-social act toward other
organizational members,

such as helping with heavy work

loads, orienting new people, and helping those who have been
absent

(Smith, Organ & Near,

1983).

Altruism is a dimension

of organizational citizenship behaviors, which are acts not
formally required of employees but are desired by an
organization

(Organ,

1988,

1990).

Organizational

citizenship is a form of prosocial organizational behaviors,
which are defined as acts performed within or outside the
employee's role to aid individuals,
within or outside an organization

groups or organizations

(Brief & Motowidlo,

1986).

Prosocial organizational behaviors may or may not benefit
the focal organization.
In discussing organizational citizenship behaviors,
Schnake

(1991b) suggested that on-the-job altruism may

result from simple friendships or reciprocal relations
between co-workers.

In general, altruistic behaviors are

assumed to be motivated by internalized moral principles or
by empathy and sympathy toward others

(Eisenberg,

1991).

Studies of collective action and the production of
public goods indicate that people often fail to behave in a
completely self-interested fashion and instead engage in
helping behavior toward others

(e.g., Marwell & Ames,

1980).

Research on solutions to social dilemmas suggested group

members' social values may influence their behavior
(Liebrand,

1986). Work on the provision of step-level public

goods, goods that result from a multi-step process, treated
altruism and other social values as potentially important
determinants of behavior

(Rapoport,

1987).

Altruistic

behavior has also been seen in bystander-intervention
studies of impersonal urban environments.

For example,

subway riders sometimes extended aid to a person who
suffered a staged injury (Latane & Darley,

1970) and to an

apparent drunk (Piliavin, Rodin and Piliavin,

1969).

These

studies question assumptions that individuals will withhold
effort if it is in their self-interest.
There have been few, if any, organizational studies in
which altruism was explicitly considered as an antecedent to
employee effort.

However,

research has considered the

relationship between prosocial behaviors and performance.
In a study of sales people,
was positively related,
performance

(Puffer,

prosocial behavior of employees

although modestly,

1987).

to sales

In a group-level analysis of

sales people, prosocial behavior,

operationalized as

customer service, was positively related to sales
performance

(George & Bettenhausen,

1990).

Neither of these

studies considered the impact of perceived altruism,
prosocial behaviors,

among co-workers.

or

In one instance,

managers provided ratings of prosocial behaviors of
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employees;

in the other study sales people rated their

store's customer service.
Research that reveals relationships between altruism
and helping behavior and solutions to social dilemmas,
provision of public goods, performance and collective action
indicated that perceived altruism may be an important
consideration in how work-group factors could affect the
emotional bonding incentives of work-group members to behave
in a certain way.

Williams and Karau

(1991)

suggested that

in some situations people are willing to shoulder the burden
for others.

If an employee perceives a high degree of

altruism in the work group, the employee may be less likely
to withhold effort so as not to threaten a spirit of
camaraderie and emotional bonds with co-workers.

This leads

to the following hypothesis:
H9: Employees' perception of altruistic behavior by
others in a work group will be negatively related to their
propensity to withhold effort.
Repeated plays: Turnover
Time may be a factor in how successful work groups are
in developing cooperation among their members
1985).

(Spicer,

When opportunities to cooperate are repeated, the

group members have an incentive to cooperate because
violations of cooperation could lead to a deterioration in
relations among the members.

When individuals know they
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will meet again,
(Axelrod,

future cooperation becomes less difficult

1984).

Implicit in the idea of mutual cooperation among work
group members is a tendency to give effort acceptable to co
workers.

It would be easier for an employee to refuse to

cooperate and reduce effort if that employee were only a
temporary work-group member,

or if an employee had little

previous relations with other members.

Thus,

chances for

more cooperation depend partly on a group's turnover rate
(Spicer,

1985).

Low or no turnover may lead to relationships among
work-group members that are expressive and personal,

and

this may affect the group's work (Granovetter, 1985).

If

turnover is high, an employee is expected to experience
little bonding with work-group members and no incentive to
cooperate regarding effort levels

(Spicer,

1985).

Emotional

bonds that develop through repeated interaction and
transcend a simple cost-benefit analysis may have an impact
on the effort levels an individual is willing to offer.
H10: Turnover in a work group will be positively
related to propensity to withhold effort.
Length-of-service heterogeneity
Group and organizational demography have been
associated with work unit dynamics and outcomes such as
communication frequency,
Zenger and Lawrence

turnover and social integration.

(1989)

found a positive association
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between organizational tenure similarity and technical
communication frequency in an organization but not in its
work groups.

Wagner, Pfeffer and O'Reilly

(1984) used

length-of-service distribution to predict turnover among top
management teams.

O'Reilly,

Caldwell and Barnett (1989)

found that heterogeneity in group tenure was associated with
lower levels of group social integration.
Demography explanations often include intervening
processes, which result from demographic variables and
predict organizational outcomes

(Lawrence,

1991).

Although

these processes are important in explaining organizational
phenomena, many researchers assume the processes are
congruent with demographic predictors and do not need to be
evaluated.

Lawrence

(1991) argued that this congruence

assumption is not empirically supported,

and the demography-

outcomes relationship is more complex.
The congruence assumption is required in demography
research that uses intervening variables in explaining
organizational outcomes as the indirect result of
demographic variables through their relationship with other
variables such as conflict,
(Lawrence,

1991).

communication and social norms

For example, Wagner et al.

(1984)

suggested that those who communicate with each other are
more likely to develop shared beliefs and perceptions than
those who do not speak to each other.

People who join an

organization at the same time are likely to speak to each
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other more frequently than with others thus an
organization's tenure distribution should indicate groups in
which members' beliefs and perceptions are shared.
The impact of demographic length-of-service
distribution could be predicted in the model of PWE by
suggesting that it has an indirect influence on effort by
its effects on group-turnover rates and effort norms.
However, that requires a congruence assumption.

Testing

conditions in which demography has an impact on outcomes
would be a more important contribution as Lawrence (1991)
noted.

In this study, direct effects of length-of-service

distribution are considered.
Demography research suggests that homogeneity of work
group members'
cooperation,

length-of-service distributions leads to

and to a prediction that there would be less

propensity for individual employees to withhold effort the
more homogeneous the distribution.

Under conditions of

demographic homogeneity of length-of-service distribution,
network of relations is developed,

leading to shared

understandings of appropriate behavior.
more heterogeneous group,

Conversely,

in a

it is argued that the members

would be less likely to develop shared understandings,

and

that would affect their propensity to withhold effort.
Hll: Heterogeneity of a work group's length-of-service
distribution will be positively related to propensity to
withhold effort.

a

Pfeffer
variables,

(1983) suggested that other demographic

such as age, gender, and race,

organizational phenomena.

could affect

Heterogeneity of these

characteristics in a work group could have similar
implications for PWE.

Whereas heterogeneity of tenure

distribution indicates less opportunity for repeated plays,
which have been tied to cooperative behavior and, therefore,
less PWE, the relationship of other demographic variables to
PWE is less developed.

Thus, no a priori propositions

concerning other demographic variables are made.
variables were collected,

These

and relationships to PWE will be

explored in a supplementary analysis.
Control variables
In addition to lack of alternative employment
opportunities,

three control variables are examined.

Group

cohesiveness. which is related to the affective bonding
variables, has long been important in studying group
dynamics

(Zander,

1979).

In two laboratory experiments,

in

which group cohesiveness was operationalized by degree of
previous acquaintance and desire to work together,

results

suggested that cohesiveness moderated social loafing
& Williams,

1992b).

(Karau

Despite these findings, the relation of

cohesiveness to effort is unclear, due in part to problems
of measurement and definition

(see Mudrack,

1989,

for

examples of varying definitions of this construct).

Because

the dependent variable in this proposed study is PWE, which
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may relate ultimately to productivity, and several of the
independent variables measure affective bonding incentives,
it is important to consider the role of work-group cohesion.
Each work-group member was asked to provide information
on group cohesiveness,

and their perceptions of a group's

cohesion are used as a control.

Previous research into the

relation between group cohesiveness and productivity found
the two connected,

but much of this research suffered from a

lack of focus and cohesiveness
reason,

(Mudrack,

1989).

For this

no predictions about the relation between

cohesiveness and effort are offered.
In addition, a social desirability scale was
administered to respondents.

Social desirability is a

tendency for individuals to present themselves in ways that
make them appear positive regarding cultural norms and
standards

(Ganster, Hennessey & Luthans,

1983).

Research

that seeks self-report measures from employees should
include a measure of social desirability and control for its
effects in data analyses
& Organ,

1986).

(Crowne & Marlowe,

1960; Podsakoff

This controls for the potential of socially

desirable responses to produce spurious correlations among
variables, and suppress true correlations among variables
(Ganster et al.,
performance,

1983).

Self-reports of effort, motivation,

citizenship behavior and attributions of

performance may be contaminated by the tendency of
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respondents to provide socially desirable responses
(Ganster, et al.,
Finally,

1983; Schnake,

1991b).

internal validity could be threatened in this

study because in considering multiple organizations,

there

are many ways for work groups to differ other than on the
independent variables.

Testing in a single state and

testing for differences among employees on other factors
were among the efforts to confront this limitation.
However,
factors.

organizations are never quite the same on all
Every effort can be made to minimize differences,

but the history of the organization
the work groups)
1965).

(as well as history of

could affect the results

Therefore,

(Stinchcombe,

organization membership should be

controlled in the analyses.
Chapter Summary
This chapter presented a model of individual employee
PWE drawing on economics,
management.

social psychology,

sociology and

Hypotheses implied by the model were presented

under the guiding assumption that employees are motivated to
contribute effort based on three types of incentives:
rational cost-benefit analysis that is largely concerned
with economic exchange,

normative conformity to perceived

peer effort norms and equity perceptions,

and affective

bonding with fellow employees reflected in the opportunity
for repeated interaction with co-workers and perceptions of
altruism in the work group.

Heterogeneity of a work group's length-of-service
distribution was offered as an additional variable that is
expected to have an impact on an individual's propensity to
withhold effort.

Other demographic variables were discussed

as were variables that should be controlled in this multi
organization analysis.

CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN
This chapter describes research methodology and design
to be used in testing hypotheses advanced in Chapter 2.

The

sample and procedures for data collection are discussed.
Measures and scales used to tap underlying constructs are
summarized.
Sample
Data were collected from employees at ten worksites in
Louisiana, drawn from a sampling frame provided by the
Louisiana Department of Employment and Training, Division of
Research and Statistics.

The sample was drawn randomly from

the division's taxmaster file.

Procedures used to select

these companies are described in the data collection section
of this chapter.
Correlational and regression analyses were used to test
the hypotheses.

In such analyses,

a statistical test's

power is a function of expected strength of the association
between two

(or more) variables and the tolerable threshold

of Type I and Type II errors.
and power

(or beta)

Alpha is generally set at .05

at .80 (Cohen & Cohen,

there are multiple independent variables,

1983).

Because

a power analysis

for multiple correlation was conducted using a method
provided by Gatsonis and Sampson

(1989).

The analysis

showed that this study, which will include a maximum of 22
predictor variables in one of the regression equations, will
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required at least 233 subjects to achieve statistical power
of .80 at a .05 confidence level with hypothesized effect
size of .30, considered a moderate population effect size
(Cohen,

1977).

To address potential problems with missing

data, gain variation in labor market area responses and
achieve required statistical power to test the hypotheses,
more than 550 employees were sampled in ten companies.
The unit of analysis in the study was the individual
employee.

To be eligible for the study, an individual had

to be part of a work group, defined in this study as two or
more rank-and-file employees under authority of a common
supervisor to whom members of the group are directly
responsible

(Glisson & Durick,

1988).

All employees in each

work group and their supervisors were asked to complete a
questionnaire at their work sites.

Measures used in the

questionnaire were pre-tested on a sample similar to that
used in the actual study.

Factor and reliability analyses

were performed as part of the pre-test.
Data Collection
There were two visits to each worksite.

The first

visit involved an interview with the person on site who was
most familiar with human-resource practices at that site.
At the conclusion of the interview, those individuals were
asked if they would participate in a survey of several
employee groups.

If they agreed to participate,

a time was

arranged to return and administer a survey to employees.

In

76
the case of one company, the researcher met with the
operations director of the work groups that were asked to
participate in the study and with two of the supervisors of
those work groups, returning the next week to administer the
surveys to employees.
Measures of individual propensity to withhold effort,
perceptual measures of work-group altruism and peer effort
norms and demographic measures were among the variables
collected on the second visit.

Appendix B shows a list of

variables, the measures used in the study,
of data collected in the study.

and the sources

Appendix C includes the

pre-test questionnaire while Appendix D contains the field
study instruments.
Measures
Independent variables
Wage pr e m i u m .

Supervisors were asked to review their

records and calculate an average wage of employees in the
work group they supervised.

To determine if a wage premium

was being paid, the wages reported by the supervisors were
compared to the estimate of median salary provided by the
BTA Economic Research Institute for jobs included in the
sample.

This publication provided a prevailing market wage

for most of the jobs performed by those in each work group
(n = 474) .
The use of this resource was comparable to that used in
previous measures of wage premium

(i.e., a comparison of the

77
hourly wage being paid within the plant to the average
hourly wage paid in each Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Area, Cappelli & Chauvin,

1991a).

Prevailing wage

information was unavailable for about 100 individuals
sampled.

Either they performed jobs not listed in the BTA

report or they worked in the Houma,

Louisiana,

labor market,

which had no wage information listed in the report.
Size of work g r o u p .

Supervisors were asked the number

of employees they supervise in each work group.
Task interdependence.
perceptions,

To measure work-group technology

items that gauge degree of interdependence were

used in this study.

Work-group members were asked to

respond to five items that collectively reflect reciprocal
interdependence

(Pearce & Gregersen,

1991).

The items

indicated whether respondents rely on others to complete
their tasks or work on their own.

Sample items included "I

work closely with others in doing my work" and "I frequently
must coordinate my efforts with others."

Items were summed,

and higher scores indicated that employees perceive a
greater degree of reciprocal interdependence present in the
tasks of each work group.
Perceived task visibility.
earlier study

(George,

A five-item measure from an

1992) was used to gauge employee

perceptions of task visibility.

Sample items included "My

supervisor is generally aware of when I am putting forth
below average effort" and "My supervisor is aware of the
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amount of work I do."

Items were summed so that higher

scores indicated greater perceived visibility.
Perceived effort n o r m s .

The first step in tapping this

variable was a pilot study to produce a measurement.
discussing reward systems, Kerr and Slocum

In

(1987)

differentiated between those that are performance-based and
those that are hierarchically-based.

Their research showed

that a clan culture emerged in a hierarchical reward system.
Ouchi

(1980) used the term clan to describe a control system

based on socialization and internalized values and norms.
In this culture,

individual employees are similar to a

fraternal group with strong pressures to conform to group
standards.

The variable of interest in this study,

perceived peer compliance effort norms,

is related to clan

control in the sense that it is concerned with individual
members' perceptions of the strength of work-group norms to
control their activities.
Twenty items that attempt to tap perceptions of this
work-group characteristic were considered.

These items were

suggested by Kerr and Slocum (1987) and by Van de Ven and
Ferry

(1980).

The items, presented on seven-point Likert

scales, attempted to measure perceived strength of
tradition,

conformity pressures,

independence,

internal control present in the work group.

teamwork and

Sample items

included "There is a great deal of pressure from my co
workers to exert effort" and "Members of my work group
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encourage individuals to excel and strive for increasingly
higher levels of performance."

Higher scores indicated

greater perceived presence of strong normative pressure to
conform to standards.
Following guidelines recommended by Sheatsley (1983), a
measure was developed based on these items and pre-tested in
groups similar to the sample to be tested in the actual
study.

This enabled a check of internal consistency and

test-retest reliability of the questionnaire.

Results were

factor analyzed to check construct validity of the items.
Acceptable items were included in the survey of employees.
Details of the pretest are included in Chapter 4.
Equity perceptions.

Employee perceptions of equitable

treatment were tapped by use of a distributive justice
scale.

Distributive justice is concerned with a perceived

lack of fairness based on outcomes received by employees,
such as pay raises, promotions and status
1988).

(Lind & Tyler,

A seven-point measure consisting of three items

measured employee perceptions of distributive justice
(Martin,

1987).

Sample items include "I am compensated

fairly for the work I do here,

based on the effort I give on

the job" and "I am compensated fairly here considering the
responsibilities I have."

Items were summed so that higher

scores indicated greater perceived equity in rewards.
Perceptions of a l t ruism.

Perceived altruism was

measured by five items that make up a portion of the
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organizational citizenship behavior measure developed by
Smith, Organ, and Near (1983).

This measure is anchored

with a five-point scale, ranging from "practically never" to
"almost always."

Sample items include "Members of my work

group help others who have been absent" and "Members of my
work group volunteer for things that are not required."
Items were summed so that higher scores indicate greater
perceived altruism on the part of co-workers.
Turnover r a t e s .

The group supervisors were asked to

state the number of employees who quit, were fired or
otherwise left the work group in the past 12 months.

The

number of employees who had left was divided by total number
of employees in the work group to provide a turnover rate
for each work group in the study.

Both voluntary and

involuntary turnover potentially limit opportunities for
cooperation in the work group
Work-group heterogeneity.

(Spicer,

1985).

Employees were asked to

provide demographic information such as age,
service in this work group, race, gender,
level.

length of

and education

This information was used to obtain demographic

heterogeneity measures of each work group.
Two types of indices were computed.
variables

For interval

(e.g., tenure: number of months in this work

g r o u p ) , the coefficient of variation (standard deviation
divided by the mean) was computed.

This measure was used

because its psychometric properties are preferable to the
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standard deviation in establishing a measure of
heterogeneity (Allison,

1978).

For categorical variables such as race, gender and
education level, Blau's
computed.

(1977)

index of heterogeneity was

This index varies from a low of 0 if all group

members are the same to a theoretical high of 1.
Heterogeneity is defined as follows: Heterogeneity = (1 - £
p i 2), where p is the proportion of group members in a
category and i is the number of different categories
represented in a group.

These procedures were used to

calculate heterogeneity of work groups on the following
dimensions: race, gender and education level
school graduate, high school graduate,

(non-high

some college, college

graduate, graduate s chool).
Dependent variable
Propensity to withhold effo r t .

The dependent variable

is the propensity of employees to withhold effort.
pre-test,

several measures were considered.

measure employed by Judge and Chandler
Using seven-point Likert-type scales,

In a

First, a

(1990) was used.
respondents were asked

how often they give less than 100 percent effort on
important activities of their jobs, how often they expect to
give less than 100 percent effort on those activities in the
future, and how often they fail to perform tasks not
formally required of their jobs.

Supervisors were asked how

often the respondent gives less than 100 percent effort on
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important job tasks and how often the respondent fails to
perform tasks not formally required.
duties not formally required

(working to job description)

may indicate lack of task effort
In addition,

Failing to perform

(Judge & Chandler,

a seven-item scale

(George,

presented to each pre-test respondent.

1990).

1992) was

The supervisor of

each work group was asked to provide data about each
respondent.

These measures were pre-tested,

and a

confirmatory factor analysis was performed on these measures
and the Judge and Chandler measure to determine if both
gauge the same construct.
George labeled her measure a "social loafing" scale,
but its items are descriptive of withholding of effort by
employees,

and may just as validly been named a withholding

effort scale.

Finally,

five original items designed to tap

free-riding behaviors were included in the pre-test.
Variants of PWE m e a s u r e .

Included in the field survey

questionnaire were several other measures designed to tap
effort withholding behavior.

These included a measure of

job neglect

1992) as well as an adaptation

(Leek & Saunders,

of the Judge and Chandler
free riding items.

(1992) and original

The adaptation asked employees to

evaluate the PWE (shirk,
workers as a group.

(1990), George

loaf,

free ride)

In addition,

of their fellow

supervisors were asked to

evaluate the effort provided by each employee by using the
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George scale.

These additional measures were included so as

to have multiple measures of the dependent variable.
Control variables
Alternative employment opportunities.

The efficiency

wage hypothesis implies that alternative employment
opportunities should be controlled when predicting a
negative relation between the interaction of wage premium
and unemployment rate,

and PWE.

Lack of alternative

employment opportunities have been operationalized in
previous research by unemployment rate, and percentage of
employees on layoff from a particular plant
Chauvin,

1991a,

(Cappelli &

1991b).

An average unemployment rate for the last year in the
parish where each worksite is located was provided by the
Louisiana Department of Labor.

To obtain an unemployment

measure for the labor market area

(LMA), the parish

unemployment rate was weighted by the percentage of LMA
labor force that lived in each parish,

and then summed to

create an LMA unemployment rate.
Percentage of employees laid off at each of the 10
worksites in the last year was obtained.

An employment

growth trend measure was calculated by asking each human
resource manager to provide the current number of employees,
and the average number of people employed at the worksite in
each of the last three years.

There was little variance in

layoffs and growth trends across companies so these
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variables were not used in the analysis; however,
organization membership was controlled in the multivariate
analyses.
Individual employee perceptions of labor market
conditions were collected.

Three items, measured on a

seven-point scale and based on O'Reilly and Caldwell
and Gerhart

(1990), were used.

(1981)

The items were designed to

gauge an individual's perceived ease of movement to another
job.

Subjects were asked whether they agree or disagree

with the following:

(a) "If I were to leave my current job,

it would be difficult for me to find another job that was
just as good."

(R)

(b) It would be easy for me to change

jobs should I decide to do so."

(c) "There are numerous

jobs as good as this one that would be available to me if I
decided to leave my current job."

Higher scores indicated

respondents believed it easier to move to a comparable job.
Social desirability.

When researchers ask employees to

provide self-evaluation concerning effort, motivation or
performance, they should include a measure of social
desirability in the questionnaire and control for the
effects of social desirability in the data analyses
& Marlowe,

1960; Podsakoff & Organ,

(Crowne

1986).

In the field study, the 16-item, two-point "Responding
Desirably on Attitudes and Opinions"
Hittle & Cardascia,

(RD-16; Schuessler,

1978) was given to respondents.

The

scale is appropriate to use in opinion surveys because items
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were taken from a large pool of general attitude measures,
selected from ratings completed by a cross section of adults
and screened so no items differed in desirability across
racial or educational lines

(Paulus,

Perceived group cohesiveness.

1991).
This variable was

measured with an eight-item Group Cohesiveness scale adapted
from Dobbins and Zaccaro

(1986).

Items,

such as,

"The

members of my work group get along well together",

tap

various facets of cohesiveness including attraction to the
group and social interaction,
samples

(Mudrack,

1989).

and can be adapted to fit most

Items were summed so that higher

scores indicated greater degrees of perceived group
cohesiveness.
Organization.

This is a dummy variable indicating in

which of the 10 organizations the surveyed employee works.
This information is used to control for organization in the
multivariate analyses.
Conclusion
This chapter summarized the general research strategy
and the measures used in the study.

In the next chapter,

the pre-test and its results are discussed.

Then,

the

sample and procedures for the hypothesis tests are
described,

and the results of correlational and regression

analyses are presented.

Chapter 5 discusses the results as

they pertain to the hypotheses,
directions for future research.

the study's limitations, and

CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
This chapter reports the results of both the pre-test
and the hypothesis tests.

First, results of a pre-test

designed to develop two measures used in the study are
discussed.

Then, a description of procedures employed to

collect the field data is provided.

Demographic

characteristics of the sample and measures used in the study
are reported.

Correlational and regression analyses to test

the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 are described,
results of these tests are reported.
of supplemental analyses are provided.

and the

In addition, results
All of these results

are discussed in Chapter 5.
Pre-test
Goals
The pre-test had four specific goals:
1.

Assess reliability and validity of a propensity to

withhold effort measure.
social loafing,

The dissertation argues that

free riding and shirking are manifestations

of the same phenomenon: propensity to withhold effort
To obtain a measure of PWE,

items representing social

loafing and shirking were taken from existing scales.
addition,

(PWE).

In

original items that represented free riding were

considered.

The goal was to identify the subset of items

that best capture variance in the underlying construct of
PWE.
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2. Assess reliability and validity of a measure of
perceived group effort norms.

Theoretical consideration of

the proposed measure led me to conclude that all of the
proposed items for work-group effort norms did not
necessarily pertain to norms to provide high effort on the
job.

For example,

"My co-workers and I care about each

other's well being" does not represent an effort norm.
Therefore,

a pre-test was needed to identify those items

specifically reflecting effort norms in work groups.
3. Empirically distinguish between the group effort
norm measure and an established measure of group
cohesiveness.

The model to be tested considers group effort

norms as a predictor of PWE.

Group cohesiveness,

an

important variable in determining how individual group
members behave in accomplishing group tasks
is included as a control variable.

(Zander,

1979),

Because group effort

norms and group cohesiveness are conceptually similar,

a

factor analysis was conducted to determine whether the two
scales could be distinguished empirically.

Such a result

would also provide evidence for the discriminant validity of
the effort norm measure.
4. Ensure that the final survey could be read and
comprehended by participants in the field study by using a
computer program to ascertain the reading level required to
understand the measurement instrument.
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Sample and Procedure
Surveys were administered over three weeks during Fall,
1992 to MBA students at LSU-Baton Rouge,

University of

Southwestern Louisiana and Southeastern Louisiana
University,

and to undergraduates at LSU-Alexandria.

An

analysis of variance of survey items by site and cross
tabulations of items by demographic variables revealed no
significant differences across sites or demographic groups.
One hundred fifty-two students in 10 classes
participated;

149 usable responses were returned,

rate of 98 percent.

a response

Respondents were asked to keep in mind

their current or most recent job when answering.

All

respondents had work experience, more than half as
supervisors,

and most were currently employed.

Sample

demographics are shown in Table 4.1.
Sample size is sufficient to undertake planned pre-test
analyses.

A pre-test in which factor analysis is performed

should sample more than 100 respondents,
five observations per item to be analyzed
Tatham,

1987).

and obtain about
(Hair, Anderson &

Attempts were made to sample individuals

similar to the study's target population

(Bolton,

1993), but

pre-test respondents had higher education levels than field
study respondents and a fourth of pre-test respondents
worked in the public sector.
such as this is recommended,

Whereas pre-testing a survey
"there are no general

principles of good pretesting..."

(Converse &
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Table 4.1
Characteristics of pre-test sample
Mean
27

Age
Race
White
Black
Asian
Other
(or no answer)

—
—
—
—

SD
5.76

-

-

n
149

Percent
---

149
130
5
10
4

87
3
7
3

69 percent
31 percent

percent
percent
percent
percent

Gender
Men
Women

—
——

—

149
103
46

Education
Some college
College degree
Advanced degree

—
—
——

—

149
6
130
13

4 percent
87 percent
9 percent

Emblovment tvoe
Full-time
Part-time
Non-supervisors
Supervisors

—
—
—
——

—

149
92
57
72
77

62
38
48
52

Sector
Service
Manufacturing
Public

—
—
—

—

149
85
27
37

57 percent
18 percent
25 percent

Work-group size

Presser,

-

9

1986, p. 52).

9.8

Size range

percent
percent
percent
percent

2-60

Because of differences between pre

test sample and target population,

it was important to be

conservative regarding item deletion based on pre-test data.
Pre-test Results
Reliability and validity of PWE measure.

Because the

goal was to find one factor that explains the most variance
underlying PWE, and perfect reliability among items could
not be assumed,

a common factor analysis with varimax

rotation

(Nunnally,

in Exhibit 4.1).

1978) was performed on 15 items (shown

Common factor analysis is appropriate when
Exhibit 4.1
Proposed PWE items

Item 1. How often do you give 100 percent effort on
the job?
Item 2. How often do you expect to give 100 percent
effort in the future?
Item 3. How often do you perform duties that are not
normally required by your job description?
*Item 4. I defer responsibilities I should assume to
my co-workers.
*Item 5. I put forth less effort on the job when
others are around to do the work.
Item 6. I do not do my share of the work.
*Item 7. I give less effort than other members of the
work group.
Item 8. I avoid performing housekeeping tasks as much
as possible.
*Item 9. I leave work for the next shift that I should
really complete.
*Item 10. I take it easy if others are around to do
the work.
Item 11. I contribute to lowering production costs in
this work group.
Item 12. I am absent from work more than others in
this work group.
Item 13. I make an effort to increase this work
group's reputation.
Item 14. Improving the equipment used by this work
group is not my concern.
Item 15. I contribute to a work environment that is
free of safety and health problems.
* —

Retained in field study

a researcher wants to obtain a minimum number of factors for
prediction purposes

(Hair, et al.,

1987),

and perfect

reliability among the proposed items cannot be assumed
(Gorsuch,

1990).

measure shirking

The items included were purported to
(3 items, Judge & Chandler,

1990), social
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loafing (7 items, George,
items).

1992), and free riding

Table 4.2 shows results of this analysis

(5 original
(n = 149).

Table 4.2
Results of pre-test on proposed effort items
F 1
Item 1 (SHRK)
.13
Item 2 (SHRK)
.18
Item 3 (SHRK)
.18
Item 4 (SL)
.68
Item 5 (SL)
.70
Item 6 (SL)
.22
Item 7 (SL)
.39
Item 8 (SL)
.27
Item 9 (SL)
.43
Item 10 (SL)
.81
Item 11 (FR)
.01
Item 12 (FR)
.01
Item 13 (FR)
.04
Item 14 (FR)
.03
Item 15 (FR)
.24
Eigenvalues
3.2
% Variance Exp. 21.6

F 2
.70
.85
.06
-.05
.12
.17
.10
.08
.27
.11
.03
.22
.17
.09
.04
1.3
8.7

F 3
.31
.04
.43
.03
.07
-.00
.07
.12
.31
.02
.07
.21
.74
.31
.24
.73
4.9

F 4
.05
.23
-.02
.16
.26
.65
.38
.09
.00
.02
.01
.18
.05
.26
.23
.57
3.8

F 5
.16
.06
.17
-.42
-.15
-.09
.15
.06
-.02
.38
.25
-.14
.05
.18
-.00
.38
2.6

The latent root criterion, eigenvalues greater than 1,
was used to determine how many factors to extract
al.,

1987).

After rotating the solution,

(Hair et

a factor loading

of .30 was used as a criterion to discern important items
(Hair et a l . , 1987).

Five items loaded on the first factor,

explaining 21.6 percent of the variance.

Coincidentally,

these items were all taken from a social loafing measure.
These five items

—

4, 5, 7, 9 and 10 -- represented PWE in

the final survey because their wording taps elements of
shirking,

social loafing and free riding

(i.e., PWE).

PWE describes the likelihood that an individual will
give less than full effort in performing a job-related task.
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This is reflected by asking employees if they defer their
own responsibilities to co-workers,

if they put forth less

effort than co-workers or "take it easy" when others are
around to do the work,

and if they leave work for the next

shift that they really should complete.

These tendencies

are clearly addressed in the items loading on the first
factor.
Table 4.2 shows that Items 7, 9 and 10 crossloaded on
other factors.

As noted, the goal of this factor analysis

was to develop a PWE scale.

Because the wording of these

three items is conceptually similar to the PWE construct and
the three items loaded on the first factor, they were
included in the field survey.
A reliability analysis was performed on the five items
retained from the pre-test.
obtained.

A coefficient alpha of .75 was

An alpha level of .70 is considered acceptable

for exploratory research

(Nunnally,

1978), thus these five

items were judged internally consistent based on that
criterion.
Internal consistency is a "necessary but not sufficient
condition for construct validity"

(Nunnally,

1978, p. 103).

Further testing is required to determine how proposed
measures of a construct fit into a network of
relationships that would be expected based on theoretical
considerations.

Whereas such tests are limited by

assumptions about the soundness of a theory,

they address
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concerns regarding the position of a proposed measure within
a nomological net (Nunnally,

1978/ Schwab,

1980).

In this case, PWE should be related negatively to
perceptions of high-effort norms
altruism (Williams & Karau,

(Heckathorn,

1990),

1991), task visibility

1992), and distributive justice

(Jackson & Harkins,

and positively related to task interdependence
1984), and group size

(George,
1985),

(Jones,

(Latane, Williams & Harkins,

1979).

Group cohesiveness has been negatively correlated with
social loafing

(Karau & Williams,

1992b).

Social

desirability responses are expected to be negatively
correlated with self-reports of a negative behavior such as
withholding effort (Ganster, Hennessey & Luthans,

1983).

Established scales measuring the aforementioned
variables were collected in the pre-test.
scales are shown in Table 4.3.

Alphas for these

All approached or exceeded

acceptable levels, ranging from .64

(social desirability)

to

.88 (distributive justice).
Correlations were computed on the five PWE items and
the established scales

(n = 142).

As expected,

the results

show significant negative correlations with scales measuring
effort norms

(r = -.18; p < .05), altruism (r = -.25; p <

.01), group cohesiveness

(r = -.20; p < .05, task visibility

(r = -.20; p < .05) and social desirability
.01).

(r = -.37; p <

These findings support the nomological validity of

the PWE scale based on theoretical expectations.
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Non-significant results were obtained between PWE and
the task interdependence, distributive justice and group
size measures.

These results may have been due to sample

specific causes induced by pre-test conditions.

A field

study to test the hypotheses considered intact groups where
within group consistency existed across tasks,

reward

Table 4.3
Results of pre-test reliability analysis
Scale

Number of Items

Alpha

n

Altruism

5

.86

147

Interdependence

5

.86

148

Effort norms

6

.79

146

Group cohesiveness

8

.92

148

Distributive
justice

3

.88

149

Perceived task
visibility

5

.81

149

16

.64

149

Social desirability

systems and size.

For example,

size was measured

objectively in the hypothesis tests rather than by
recollection of respondents as in the pre-test.

In the pre

test, a failure to find correlations among these three
variables and PWE may have resulted because there was a vast
variety of objective interdependence,

reward systems and

group sizes that existed within the sample;
were represented,

one per respondent.

149 work groups

Such variety may not
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be present for perceptual measures dealing with altruism,
effort norms, group cohesiveness, and task visibility.
In sum, items identified in the common factor analysis
will be used in the field study to represent PWE based on
the following:

(a) A factor analysis of items associated

with withholding effort produced five items addressing PWE
on the job,

(b) A test of the internal consistency of the

items met the criterion for exploratory research,

and (c) A

test of relationships between the proposed scale and other
measures showed associations that represent the measure's
theoretically proposed nomological network.
Reliability and validity of group effort norm measure.
The second goal of the pre-test was to find one factor that
explains the most variance in the domain underlying group
effort norms.

To address this goal, a common factor

analysis with varimax rotation was performed on 20 original
items written to measure perceived group norms
4.2).

(See Exhibit

These items were suggested by the work of Kerr and

Slocum (1987) and Van de Ven and Ferry (1980).
As in the PWE factor analysis,

a latent root criterion

was used to determine the number of factors to extract (Hair
et al.,

1987).

After the solution was rotated,

loadings on

the first factor greater than .30 were viewed as important
and merited close examination

(Hair et al.,

1987).

The

results shown in Table 4.4 indicate that six items related
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Exhibit 4.2
Proposed group effort norm items
*Item 1. My co-workers and I stress teamwork.
Item 2. It is the supervisor's job to see that my
co-workers and I work as hard as we can. (R)
*Item 3. There is a great deal of pressure from my
co-workers to exert effort.
Item 4. My co-workers and I don't talk much about the
way we do our jobs.
*Item 5. My co-workers and I are rewarded here based
on how well our group does its job.
Item 6. My co-workers rarely worry about how hard I
am working. (R)
Item 7. The supervisor has little impact on how hard
we work here. (R)
*Item 8. My co-workers and I have little obligation
to work together to do the best job we can.
Item 9. Maintaining close friendships is important to
my co-workers and me.
Item 10. My co-workers and I regularly socialize
together. (R)
Item 11. I have a great deal of independence from my
co-workers.
Item 12. My co-workers do not urge me to work hard. (R)
Item 13. Each member of this work group is rewarded
based on how well that person does the job,
compared to other mem b e r s .
*Item 14. In this work group, we expect everyone to
pull together to get the job done.
Item 15. It is routine for my co-workers and I to get
together during non-work hours.
Item 16. My co-workers compete with each other to
achieve performance targets.
Item 17. My co-workers gang up on the person whose
work is far below that of the others.
Item 18. My co-workers gang up on the person whose
work far exceeds that of the others.
*Item 19. My co-workers encourage individuals to excel
and strive for increasingly higher levels of
work performance.
Item 20. My co-workers try to get ahead at the expense
of other work-group members.
* —

Retained as a measure of group effort
norms in the field study.
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Table 4.4
Factor loadings on proposed effort norm items
F 2

F 3

F 4

F 5

F 6

F 7

.34
-.07
.17
.19
.11
.08
.02
.02
.71
.86
.26
.17
-.08
.18
.83
.11
.00
-.03
.22
-.06
2 .1

.13
.01
-.04
.04
-.05
-.04
.02
.11
.05
-.02
-.16
-.02
.10
.07
-.04
-.26
-.37
.95
.16
-.56
1.3

.12
.06
.25
.29
.03
.50
-.22
.14
-.01
.19
.24
.74
.11
.11
.19
.36
.13
.04
.24
.12
.89

.15
.00
.14
.26
.32
-.15
.00
-.03
.07
.05
.17
.13
-.75
.05
.09
.53
.07
-.03
.24
.19
.78

.02
-.14
.38
-.04
.06
.11
.22
-.25
.13
.05
-.14
.07
-.05
.16
-.08
.18
.60
-.05
.15
.30
.62

.09
-.77
.19
.03
.08
-.05
.05
.07
-.00
.08
.20
-.02
.06
-.09
.03
.17
.13
.02
.01
.06
.49

10.6

6.6

4.4

3.9

3 .1

2 .5

F 1
.57*
Item 1
Item 2 - .06
.37*
Item 3
Item 4
.06
.56*
Item 5
.13
Item 6
Item 7 - .31
.72*
Item 8
Item 9
.23
Item 10
.12
Item 11
.00
.21
Item 12
Item 13 - .16
.72*
Item 14
Item 15
.12
Item 16
.22
Item 17 - .03
.05
Item 18
Item 19
.42*
Item 20 - .23
Eigen
4.3
values
Percent
21.7
Variance
Explained
* —

These items reflect perceived norms to provide
effort and were retained in the field study.

to group effort norms loaded on the first factor,

explaining

21.7 percent of the variance.
Examination of these six items reveals that they would
generally indicate the presence of perceived effort norms in
work groups.

For example, these items related to pressure

to produce effort,

and to rewards based on high group

effort and teamwork.

Reliability analysis on the six

retained items yielded a coefficient alpha of .79 (n = 146).
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Table 4.4 indicates that Items 3 and 5 crossloaded on
other factors.

However, the wording of these two items

reveals conceptual similarity to other group effort norm
items.

Because the goal of the factor analysis was to

develop a group effort norms scale and these two items
loaded on the first factor, they were retained in the field
survey despite the crossloadings.
Item 7 was dropped despite a loading of -.31 on the
first factor.

The item was eliminated because even though

it had been reverse scored before the factor analysis,

its

loading remained negative and opposite to the other items
loading on the first factor.

This finding appeared to

indicate a problem with respondents' understanding of the
item, thus it was not used in the field study.
As discussed earlier in regard to the PWE measure, the
correlations of the effort norm measure with other scales
that are theoretically related and were measured in the pre
test were assessed to consider nomological validity
(Nunnally,

1978).

The effort norm measure should be

positively related to a group cohesiveness measure,
should be negatively related to PWE

(Heckathorn,

and

1990).

Results showed that effort norm items were positively and
significantly related to an eight-item group cohesiveness
scale

(r = .62, p < .01, n = 142) and negatively and

significantly related to the PWE scale
= 142).

(r = -.20, p < .05, n

Based on the evidence of internal consistency and
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nomological validity found in the pre-test, these six items
were used on the final survey.
Group effort norms and cohesiveness.

A common factor

analysis with oblique rotation was performed on the six
group effort norm items and an eight-item group cohesiveness
scale (Dobbins & Zaccaro,

1986).

Oblique rotation was used

because conceptual similarity of the effort norm and
cohesiveness constructs indicates the potential that they
may be highly correlated
The analysis —

(Nunnally,

1978).

results shown in Table 4.5 —

produced

two factors with effort norm items loading on one factor and
cohesiveness items loading on the other factor.

These

results show that whereas the two scales are indeed highly
correlated

(r = .62, p < .01), one can empirically

Table 4.5
Factor loadings of effort norms and cohesiveness items

Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

2 (GEN)
4 (GEN)
7 (GEN)
10 (GEN)
16 (GEN)
21 (GEN)
(GCOH)
(GCOH)
(GCOH)
(GCOH)
(GCOH)
(GCOH)
(GCOH)
(GCOH)

Eigenvalues
Percent of Variance
Explained

Factor 1
.29
-.08
-.00
.06
-.02
.20
.63
.80
.74
.87
.93
.48
.78
.83

Factor 2
.50
.43
.61
.55
.77
.44
.00
.00
.03
.00
-.02
.01
-.03
.02

6.22

1.05

44 .5

7.5

100

distinguish between the effort norms scale and the group
cohesiveness scale.

These factor analysis results provide

evidence of discriminant validity of the effort norms scale.
Survey comprehension.

It was important to determine

whether respondents in the field study could comprehend the
survey.

To address this question,

the proposed survey was

submitted to the Grammatik III program
Walker,

1988).

(Wampler, Williams &

This test showed the following scores

regarding reading level and reading comprehension:
1. Flesch Reading Ease: 71. This result is based on a
scale of 0 to 100 with 0 being very difficult to read and
100 being very easy to read; a score of 71 indicates that
the questionnaire is easy to read based on this test.
Criteria consist of average length of sentences, percentage
of long words and number of syllables per word.
2. Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level: 6.

This grade level

readability score is used by many U.S. government agencies,
and indicates the average number of school years needed to
understand the work.
Survey respondents worked in organizations that
required minimum reading requirements for employment,
as job application and other employee forms.

such

Based on this

information and analysis of the questionnaire by Grammatik
III, the questionnaire should be understood by the
respondents.

Reading skill necessary to comprehend the

survey is below the 8th grade -- the level at which average
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local newspapers are edited.

The Grammatik III results

indicated that further adjustments to lower reading levels
of the instrument to ensure comprehension were unnecessary.
Pre-test summary
The results of the pre-test produced five items for use
as a PWE scale, and six items for use as a perceived group
effort norm scale in the field study.

Pre-test findings

showed evidence for the reliability and construct validity
of these scales.

Results indicated that the effort norm

scale was empirically distinct from the cohesiveness scale.
Finally, a computerized grammatical analysis of the survey
instrument indicated that respondents should be able to read
and comprehend the survey.
Field Study
Sample and procedure
Five hundred seventy employees, representing 110 work
groups at 10 Louisiana worksites, participated in the field
study.

Eight of the companies employed 31 to 47 0 people,

whereas two larger companies
participated.

(N = 2 000; N = 2 814) also

At each site, the first company visit

involved an interview with the human resource manager or the
person most familiar with personnel practices.

At the

conclusion of the interview, those individuals were asked if
they would permit a survey of several employee groups.
If they agreed to participate,

the author returned to

administer a survey to employees and their supervisors.
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Employees —

usually two or three at a time —

were surveyed

in a conference room away from their work stations.

A list

of names of those who would be surveyed at particular times
was provided so each employee's survey could be coded by the
author and later matched with their supervisor's survey.

No

supervisors were present during the surveying of employees.
Supervisors completed their surveys of employees during
separate meetings.
Employees were told that the survey involved an
academic study of factors involved in successful work
groups.

They were ensured that responses would be seen only

by researchers at LSU and that their responses would be kept
confidential.

They were provided with the researcher's

phone number so they could call if they had any guestions
about the survey.

They were told that a general summary of

the results would be returned to the company, but no
individual responses would be identified.
given the same assurances and instructions.

Supervisors were
There were no

subsequent phone calls.
In the case of one company, the author met with the
operations director of the work groups that were to
participate and with two of the supervisors of those work
groups, returning the next week to administer the employee
surveys.

In these large work groups,

it was impossible to

match employee survey with supervisor survey without the
help of employees.

Two employee facilitators who knew names
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of their fellow employees passed out the coded surveys to
the correct employees at a meeting during working hours.
Demographic characteristics of the employee sample (n =
570) are shown in Table 4.6.

Five of the 10 companies had

experienced slight employment growth over the last year
356) while the other five companies

(n =

(n = 214) had neither

increased nor decreased their work force.

Mean size of the

work groups represented in the sample was 12.6, size ranged
from two to 59 people with a median group size of six.

The

median turnover rate over the last 12 months was 10 percent
within these work g r o u p s .
The supervisors of the 110 work groups surveyed had the
following characteristics:

97 percent were white and 3

percent were black; 51 percent were men and 49 percent were
women; 2 percent had less than high school education,
percent had graduated from high school,
college education,

23

34 percent had some

35 percent had graduated from college,

and 7 percent had attended graduate school.
Measures
Chapter 3 contained a detailed description of the
source of measures for this study and the logic behind using
certain measures to test hypotheses proposed in Chapter 2.
The following section reports statistical properties of
items used in hypothesis tests.
Dependent variable.

PWE was tapped using the five

items identified in the pre-test.

A common factor analysis,
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Table 4.6
Characteristics of the field study sample
Mean
38.6

SD
11. 07

n
557

Ranqe
17-67

Months employed
by company

113.8

106.6

557

1--447

Months as member
of current work
group

50.17

54.4

549

1--283

—
—
—
—

570
450
82
6
32

78.9
14 .4
1.1
5.6

—
—
——

570
123
429
18

21.6 percent
75.3 percent
3 .2 percent

—
—
—
—
—

570
18
261
216
52
10
13

3 .2
45.8
37.9
9.1
1.8
2.3

570
522
38
10

91.6 percent
6.7 percent
1.8 percent

570
435
135

76.3 percent
23.7 percent

Age

Percent
Race
White
Black
Hispanic
Other (or
no answer)

Coded
1
2
3
4
9

Gender
Men
Women
No answer

1
2

Education
< than H.S.
H.S. degree
Some college
Coll. degree
Grad, school
No answer

—
—

—
—

—
—
—

1
2
3
4
5
9

—
—
—
—
—
—

—

Emolovment tvoe
1
Full-time
Part-time
2
9
No answer

—
—
—

—
—
—

Sector
Service
Manufacture

—

—

1
2

percent
percent
percent
percent

percent
percent
percent
percent
percent
percent

presented in Table 4.7, showed that one item ("I defer
responsibilities I should assume to my co-workers")
load well with other items.

did not

This item was dropped from the

PWE measure used in the analyses.
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Table 4.7
Results of factor analysis of proposed effort items

Item
Item
Item
Item
Item

Factor 1
.23
.60
.65
.54
.75

4
5
7
9
10

Eigenvalue

1.71

Variance explained

3 4.3 percent

To consider convergent and discriminant validity
1980) of the new PWE measure,

(Schwab,

the PWE items were compared

with a job-neglect scale developed by Leek and Saunders
(1992) and administered in the field study.

Job effort and

job neglect are considered related concepts; the positive
and significant intercorrelation

(r = .25, p < .01, n = 526)

indicates a degree of relation between the two concepts.
Next, a common factor analysis of PWE and neglect items
yielded a two-factor solution.

This indicates that PWE and

neglect can be empirically distinguished and provides
evidence of discriminant validity.
coefficient alpha of .73.

The four PWE items had a

In light of these results, these

four items were used to compute individual PWE.
However,

a frequency analysis of the field study

results identified a problem of non-normality in the PWE
measure

(skewness = 3.008; kurtosis = 10.7; range = 16).

Many respondents reported they did not engage in any
withholding of effort at work.

About 62 percent of the
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individuals surveyed gave the most extreme response of
disagreement with statements that would indicate they
withheld effort on the job.

Whereas controls for social

desirability to take into account bias in the self-report
PWE measure were planned, such high skewness is beyond the
correction provided by statistical control of response
desirability.

The natural log of each respondent's PWE

score was used in subseguent analyses and hypothesis testing
to adjust for non-normality of the dependent variable
(Johnson & Wichern,

1988).

Additional measures of withholding effort
The non-normality of the PWE scale, which resulted in a
range restriction problem,

and the collection of the PWE

measure and several of the independent variables from the
same source,

focused the need to use other measures that

reflect employee PWE.
bias —

A strong social desirability response

beyond what could be statistically controlled —

have affected PWE responses as well.
dependent variable measures,

may

By using alternative

a better judgment regarding the

efficacy of the proposed model may be forthcoming.
The following variations of the dependent variable were
measured:

employee self-report of job neglect

Saunders,

1992),

(Leek &

supervisor perceptions of effort expended

by each employee using a scale similar to that given to each
employee

(SPWE), and employee perceptions of the work-group

members' tendency to withhold effort

(GPWE).
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The job neglect scale provided a measure similar to
that sought by the PWE measure.
with the PWE scale

As noted,

(r = .25, p < .01).

it was correlated

The neglect items

focused on how much an employee is likely to withhold
required job duties and attempt to withdraw from work
requirements by avoiding the boss,

calling in sick when not

sick, daydreaming and generally not providing job effort.
Because of these similarities to withholding of job effort,
the measure was used to test the hypotheses.
Frequency analysis showed responses on the neglect
scale to be skewed, though not to the extent of the PWE
scale (skewness = 2.5; kurtosis = 9.1; range = 30).
Respondents were less likely to deny ever engaging in job
neglect

(33 percent)

than to deny ever withholding effort.

To correct for skew, the natural log of each respondent's
neglect score was used in the analyses.
The supervisor measure

(SPWE) provided an estimate of

each employee's PWE from a different source than employee
self-report.

The supervisor, while expected to be familiar

with effort given by each member of the work group,
observe all employees at all times,

in part due to some of

the factors of interest in this study,
size,

cannot

i.e., work-group

interdependence and task visibility.

Whereas this

circumstance negates a supervisor's ability to accurately
measure effort, the supervisors' perceptions are important
because of their role in performance appraisal, work-place
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discipline and other outcomes that could have a serious
impact on the employee.

Whereas supervisor judgments of

employee PWE may be flawed due to lack of visibility, their
views regarding effort expended would be much more
consequential to the employee than a self-report measure.
In addition, although the supervisor might want to
provide a favorable response on each employee

(so as to

reflect favorably on his or her own supervisory abilities),
there is less incentive for the supervisor to provide a less
than candid response to the researcher.

Employees may

believe that if they report lack of effort or job neglect
such information will be used against them, despite
assurances of confidentiality.

The SPWE measure was not

correlated with the PWE self-report measure.
The perceived group PWE (GPWE) was a third measure of
the dependent variable considered in the analysis.

Whereas

employee perception of PWE by other work-group members may
not reflect a particular employee's actual PWE, this measure
was included to aid in evaluating other findings and provide
grounds for future research at a group level of analysis.
GPWE was correlated with PWE (r = .09, p < .05).
Common factor analyses were conducted on items
comprising the job neglect scale,

a group propensity to

withhold effort scale

(GPWE) and a supervisor report of

employee PWE

These results are shown in Table 4.8.

(SPWE).

When a reliability analysis was performed,

the results
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Table 4.8
Results of factor analyses: Job neglect, GPWE and SPWE
Job neglect factor loadings
Factor 1
.66
.70
.56
.49
.72
.71
2 .49

Item 1
Item 2
Item 3
Item 4
Item 5
Item 6
Eigenvalue
Percent of
variance explained

41.6%

Group propensity to withhold effort factor loadings
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Factor 1
.60
.18
.67
.81
.85
.86
.65
.57
.84
-.09
.50
.12
.03

Eigenvalues
Percent of
variance explained

Factor 2
.32
.31
.00
.07
.09
.11
.08
.12
.06
.44
.04
.69
.53

4.82

1 .07

37%

8 .2%

Supervisor report of employee PWE factor loadings
Factor 1
Item 1
.81
Item 2
.88
Item 3
.88
Item 4
.62
Item 5
.71
Item 6
.88
Eigenvalue
Percent of
variance explained

3 .89
64 .8%
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indicate that five items should comprise the job neglect
scale (alpha = .91; n = 556), nine items should make up a
GPWE scale (alpha = .90; n = 556), and six items should
comprise an SPWE scale

(alpha = .91; n = 558).

The items

are listed in Exhibit 4.3.
Exhibit 4.3
Alternative measures of dependent variable
Job Neglect: How likely would you be to engage in the
following behaviors at work?
*1. Avoid working by talking to co-workers, attending to
personal business, daydreaming, etc.
*2. Put in less effort in your wo r k than you know you can.
*3. Show up late for work even when you could make it on time.
4. Deliberately avoid your boss.
*5. Take more and longer breaks than you should.
*6. Call in sick even when you are not sick.
PWE (Supervisor measure): This employee ...
*1. Defers responsibilities he/she should assume to co-workers.
*2. Gives less effort on the job when others around to do
the work.
*3. Gives less effort than other members of the work group.
*4. Avoids performing housekeeping tasks as much as possible.
*5. Leaves work for the next shift that he/she should really
complete.
*6. Takes it easy if others are around to do the work.

*1.
2.

Group Propensity to Withhold Effort
Members of my work group give 100percent effort on the
job
I expect members of my work group to give 100percent effort
in the future.

Some members of my work group:
*3. Defer responsibilities they should assume to other members.
*4. Put forth less effort on the job when others are around
to do the work.
*5. Do not do their share of the work.
*6. Give less effort than other members of the work group.
*7. Avoid performing housekeeping tasks as much as possible.
*8. Leave work for the next shift that they should really
complete.
*9. Take it easy if others are around to do the work.
10. Contribute to lowering production costs in this company.
*11. Are absent from work more than others in this company.
12. Make an effort to increase this work group's reputation.
13. Contribute to a w o r k environment that is free of safety
and health problems.
* - Used in measure.
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Independent variables.

Independent variables measured

in this study included wage premium, work-group size, task
interdependence, perceived task visibility, group effort
norms, distributive justice,
of service heterogeneity.

altruism, turnover and length

This section describes

statistical properties of item measures.
To establish an effort norms measure,

common factor

analysis was performed on the six items identified in the
pre-test.
Table 4.9.

All six items loaded on one factor as shown in
In light of the factor analysis and a subseguent

reliability analysis of these six items,

Items 2, 16 and 21,

which all loaded above .40 in the factor analysis,

should be

used to compute individual perceptions of work-group effort
norms.

These three items had a coefficient alpha of .74.

Table 4.9
Results of factor analysis: Work-group effort norms
Factor 1
.68
.12
.37
.28
.64
.78
1.71
28.5 percent

Item 2
Item 4
Item 7
Item 10
Item 16
Item 21
Eigenvalue
Variance explained
Table 4.10 presents means,

standard deviations and

alpha levels and number of items used to measure
independent variables:

altruism,

task interdependence,

effort norms, distributive justice,
visibility.

and perceived task

Although the interdependence measure did not
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Table 4.10
Results of reliability analysis:
Mean

Scale

Independent variables

S.D.

# of
items

Aloha

n

Altruism

19.10

4 .20

5

.78

556

Interdependence

20.45

3 .80

5

.67

556

Effort norms

16.98

3.90

3

.74

556

Distributive
justice

12.84

5.31

3

.85

558

Perceived task
visibility

24.85

6.35

5

.70

556

reach the threshold of .70 suggested for exploratory
research

(Nunnally,

1978),

all other scales reached or

exceeded this recommended level.
Control variables.

Control variables in this study

were group cohesiveness,
membership,

social desirability,

organization

labor market area unemployment rate and

perceived ease of movement to another job.

This section

reports statistical information regarding item scales used
in the field study.
Reliability analysis revealed that an eight-item group
cohesiveness scale, described in Chapter 3, had an alpha
level of .88 (X = 44.32,

SD = 10.08, n = 555).

Group

cohesiveness was strongly correlated with effort norms
.60, p < .01) and altruism

(r = .62, p < .01).

(r =

A three-item

perceived ease of movement scale,

also described in Chapter

3, had an alpha of .73

SD = 4.98,

(x = 9.87,

n = 559).
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A Kuder-Richardson reliability estimation

(K-R 20) was

performed on the social desirability scale, which had a
dichotomous response format.
estimation,

To run the K-R 20 reliability

formula and procedures outlined in Gatewood and

Feild (1990) were used.

‘'Correct" scores were given to

respondents who answered the survey questions in a socially
desirable manner whereas "incorrect" scores were awarded to
those who did not answer in a socially desirable fashion.
The K-R 20 analysis showed internal consistency of .64 for
the 16 items that comprised the scale.

This score compares

favorably to previous measures of internal consistency
reported for this scale and is considered acceptable
(Paulus, 1991).
Analyses
Hypothesis 1 was tested using multiple hierarchical
regression with control variables,

including unemployment

rate and perceived ease of movement to another job, entered
first,

followed by the wage premium.

The remaining

hypotheses were first tested using zero-order correlations
and then partial correlations controlling for social
desirability.
The synthesized motivation model was then tested using
a multiple hierarchical regression analysis.

Such an

analysis allows for control of multiple factors that may
provide incentives for employees to withhold effort in
performing their jobs.

After control variables

(social
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desirability, group cohesiveness, unemployment rate,
perceived ease of movement,

and organization membership)

were entered, the set of rational choice variables was
entered,

followed by sets of normative conformity and

affective bonding variables.
This order of entry does not reveal the unique
contribution of each variable set, thus a test for the
significance of unique contribution in explaining variance
in PWE by each variable set (Cohen & Cohen,
performed.

198 3) was

Unfortunately, there were more than 100 survey

respondents for whom wage premiums could not be computed
because they performed jobs that were not listed in the BTA
Economic Research Institute report, which provided average
labor market wage for particular jobs in most of the labor
markets included in the study.

Thus,

these individuals were

not included in the multivariate analyses.
Supplementary analyses were performed on demographic
variables to determine if heterogeneity of age, gender, race
or education distributions in the work group were related to
any of the PWE measures.
Results
Correlational analyses.

Appendix F provides a

correlation matrix of all variables
shows partial correlations of PWE,
GPWE —

(n = 556).
job neglect,

with proposed explanatory variables,

social desirability.

Table 4.11
SPWE and

controlling for

Also, Table 4.11 contains partial
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Table 4.11
Partial correlations controlling for social desirability
PWE
Wage Premium

.16

.06
.09
439

.001
436

.05
.12
513

.01
.44
515

.10

.23

.01
510

.001
513

-.10
.02
515

.01
.40
510

-.07

E <

-.03
.31
513
-.05
.14
513

-.08

-.11

-.14

E <

-.10

-.27

Work Group Size

E <
n =
Interdependence
n =

n =

.04
515

.005
510

.05
513
.001
513

-.04
.16
510

-.32

.001
515

-.02

.02

-.16

-.13

E <

.33

.33

n =

513

515

-.15

-.19

Effort Norms

E <
n =

Altruism

E <
n =

.02
513

.001
513

.001
515

-.08

-.08

n =

.04
521

.04
522

-.08

E <
n =

-.02
.33
521

Turnover Rate

E <
L.O.S. Hetero
geneity

GPWE

.01
.45
439

n =

Distributive
Justice

SPWE

-.03
.28
438

E <

Perceived
Task Visibility

Neglect

.04
522

.001
510

-.07
.05
510

.001
513
.001
513

-.49
.001
513

-.03
.22
518

.02
.48
519

.04
.19
518

.05
.15
519

correlations of perceived task visibility with work-group
size and task interdependence,

again controlling for social

desirability.
Hypothesis 1 stated that PWE would be negatively
associated with payment of a wage premium,

controlling for
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labor market area unemployment rate and other alternative
employment opportunities.

The hypothesis was tested using

hierarchical regression so controls for alternative
employment opportunities,

social desirability,

and organization could be included.

The results of this

analysis with PWE as the dependent variable,
4.12,

cohesiveness

shown in Table

indicate support for Hypothesis 1.
When PWE was replaced with SPWE as the dependent

variable in the regression model shown in Table 4.12, wage
premium was negatively related to SPWE at a marginal level
of significance

(b = -.135, p = .07)

in Step 2.

When job

neglect and GPWE were employed as dependent variables in
this multiple regression model,
was found.

no support for Hypothesis 1

Results of zero-order and partial correlations

indicate varied levels of support for the other hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2, a positive relationship between work
group size and PWE,

is weakly supported by the zero-order

correlations when a one-tailed test of significance is used
(r = .0789, p < .10).
desirability,

When controlling for social

PWE's relation to work group size is not

statistically significant.

This leads to the suspicion that

the relation of PWE and work group size was a chance
correlation.

However,

work group size was positively

correlated with SPWE (r = .103, p < .05) and GPWE (r = .239,
p < .001).

These relationships between work group size and
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Table 4.12
PWE regression results: Wage premium
Variable

Step 1
b

Step 2
SE

b

SE

Group Cohesiveness

-.0 34 "

.015

-.033**

.015

Social Desirability

-.345*"

.133

-.327***

.132

Unemployment Rate

-.009

.028

-.009

.027

.011

.011

.010

.011

Organization 2

-.044

.096

-.002

.096

Organization 3

-.098

.095

-.036

.096

Organization 4

-.154

.097

-.074

.100

Organization 5

-.036

.079

.122

.091

Organization 6

-.038

.106

-.016

.105

Organization 7

-.062

.081

-.037

.080

Organization 8

-.079

.119

-.044

.119

Organization 9

-.021

.011

.224*

.332

Organization 10

-.023

.090

.217*

.120

-.053***

.018

2.12—

.267

Perceived Ease o f Movement

W age Premium
Constant

2.016*“

.270

.069

R2

.088

A R2

.019
ri

2.449***

F
A F

N o te :

8.889*'*

n = 442

* E < .10

” E

<

.0 5

““ E -01

GPWE and SPWE held when controlling for social desirability.
Therefore, two of the four variants of the dependent
variable had a strong positive correlation with increasing
group size.

This result supported one of the most often

observed findings in laboratory studies regarding social
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loafing: that as group size increases, there is greater
likelihood that individuals will withhold effort.
Hypothesis 3 predicted a negative relationship between
work group size and perceived task visibility.
hypothesis is supported by correlational
.01) and partial correlational

This

(r = - .13, p <

(r = -.11, p < .01) tests.

Hypothesis 4, predicting a positive relationship
between task interdependence and withholding effort,
supported when using the PWE measure
neglect scale
measures.

is not

(r = -.05, n s ) , the job

(r = -.12; p < .01) or the SPWE and GPWE

In all instances, the task interdependence

variable was negatively related to the PWE variants;

in only

one of these instances was the relationship significant.
Hypothesis 5 predicted a negative relationship between
task interdependence and perceived task visibility.
also contradicted by the data

(r = .16, p < .001).

It is
The

findings relative to hypotheses 4 and 5 call into question
the efficacy and the meaning of the task interdependence
measure to survey respondents.

A problem of measure

reliability may have resulted in these findings,

or the

findings may indicate a need to reexamine a theoretical view
of the relationship between task interdependence and
withholding effort.

The contrarian findings regarding task

interdependence will be discussed further in Chapter 5.
Consistent with Hypothesis 6, PWE is negatively
correlated with perceived task visibility

(r = -.08, p <
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.05).

Job neglect is also negatively correlated to

perceived task visibility

(r = -.10, p < .05) as are SPWE (r

= -.15, p < .001) and GPWE (r = -.18, p < .001).

As seen in

Table 4.11, three of the four relations hold when
controlling for social desirability.

These findings echo

much of the literature in the area of shirking and social
loafing,

supporting theoretical models

and empirical findings
& Williams,

(e.g., George,

(e.g., Jones,

1984)

1992; Latane, Harkins

1979).

Hypothesis 7 posited that perceived effort norms would
be negatively related to PWE.

This hypothesis was generally

supported as effort norms were negatively correlated with
PWE
GPWE

(r = -.08, p < .05), job neglect
(r = -.35, p < .001.)

(r = -.29, p < .01) and

The correlation of effort norms

with SPWE was negative but not significant.
controlling for social desirability,
repeated.

When

these findings are

Whereas the literature indicated that negative

relations between effort norms and PWE should be expected
(Heckathorn,

1990), this finding provides empirical evidence

regarding the importance of norms on effort levels.
Hypothesis 8, a negative relationship between
distributive justice and PWE,

is not supported when the PWE

scale is used as the dependent variable

(r = - .01, n s ) .

However, the other three variants of the dependent variable
are correlated with distributive justice at varying levels
of significance: Job neglect

(r =

- .07; p < .10); SPWE (r
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= -.17; p < .001) and GPWE:

(r = -.16; p < .001).

SPWE and

GPWE are negatively correlated with distributive justice
perceptions,

even when social desirability is controlled.

These findings lend support to the importance of equity
norms

(Kerr,

1983) and to equity theory

(Adams,

1963):

employees are less likely to lower effort levels if they
perceive that rewards are fairly tied to their efforts.
Hypothesis 9 is supported as PWE has a negative
relationship to perceived altruism
the work group.

(r = -.14, p < .01)

Similar results were found when the other

three variants of the dependent variable were used:
neglect
GPWE

in

job

(r = -.22, p < .01), SPWE (r = -.09, p < .05), and

(r =

-.51, p < .001).

These relations held when

controlling for social desirability.

Whereas altruism and

other social values have been described as important
determinants of behavior, particularly in social dilemma
(e.g., Liebrand,
1987)

1986)

and public goods

(e.g., Rapoport,

research, this study provided evidence that the

presence of altruistic behavior in work groups is strongly
related to members'

effort levels.

Finally, Hypotheses 10 and 11 were not supported by the
results.

Hypothesis 10 predicted a positive relationship

between turnover rate and PWE.

Three of the four variants

of the dependent variable had a negative relationship with
the turnover rate but only one of these correlations
approached significance,

PWE

(r = -.07, p < .10).

However,
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when controlling for social desirability,

both PWE and job

neglect were negatively related to turnover rate at a .05
level of significance.

Considering the sample size and the

large number of correlations,
chance.

these findings could be due to

Another concern is the percentage of respondents

who belonged to work groups in which there had been no
turnover in the last 12 months

(greater than 40 p e r cent).

These two factors may have contributed to this finding, thus
it is important to continue to examine relationships between
PWE and turnover rate.
Hypothesis 11 proposed a positive relationship between
length of service heterogeneity and PWE.

This hypothesis

received no support across all four variants of the
dependent variable.
Multivariate analyses.

Whereas correlational analysis

describes relationships of the variables in isolation,
multivariate analysis was required to determine to what
extent the three sets of variables explain PWE and to
ascertain if the study's hypotheses are supported when
controlling for other factors.

Multiple hierarchical

regression analyses were used for these tests.
4.14,

Tables 4.13,

4.15 and 4.16 show results of hierarchical regression

analyses for the four variants of the dependent variable.
In these analyses,
desirability,

13 control variables

cohesiveness,

(social

unemployment rate, perceived

ease of movement and organization dummy variables)

were
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entered first,

followed by rational choice variables,

normative conformity variables and affective bonding
variables.

When PWE was used as the dependent variable

(Table 4.13), results indicate that the control variables
explained 7 percent of the variance in PWE ( F 13 429 = 2 .449 , p
< .01).

When the variables sets were entered, rational

choice variables explained an additional 2 percent of the
variance in PWE

(A F17425 =

level of significance,

2.227, p = .07) at a marginal

but the normative conformity

variables did not explain additional variance in PWE
= .25, p = .779).

(A F15427

When the three affective bonding

variables were entered, they explained an additional 1.5
percent of the variance in PWE at a marginal level of
significance

(A F16426 = 2 .371 , p = .07).

The squared multiple correlation of PWE with the three
sets of variables was obtained to determine the amount of
unique variance explained by each variable set
Cohen,

1983).

(Cohen &

General F tests on the variable sets revealed

that the rational choice variables

(SR2B = .02, F4419 = 2 .34 ,'

p < .1) and the affective bonding variables

(SR2B = .015,

f3 ,42o = 2.33, p < .1) made a unique contribution to variance
explained,

but only at a marginal level of significance.

When all variables are entered into the hierarchical
regression with PWE as dependent variable,

no support is

found for relations implied by the synthesized motivation
model.

When all variables had been entered, social
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desirability explained most of the variation in PWE.

Wage

premium was again negatively related to PWE, supporting
Hypothesis 1 (b = -.055, p < .01).

Altruism was negatively

related to PWE (b = -.044, p < .10), providing weak evidence
Table 4.13
Results of hierarchical regression analysis:
Propensity to withhold effort
Variable

Step 2

Step 1
b

SE

b

Step 3
SE

b

Step 4
SE

b

SE

Group Cohesivencss

-.034**

.015

-.032**

.016

-.027

.019

-.017

.020

Social Desirability

-.346***

.132

-.324**

.133

-.333**

.134

-.332**

.134

Unemployment Rate

-.009

.027

-.010

.028

-.011

.028

-.013

.028

.011

.011

.010

.011

.011

.011

.013

.011

Organization 2

-.044

.095

-.000

.097

-.002

.097

.080

.106

Organization 3

-.098

.095

-.039

.097

-.M 3

.097

-,M 5

.098

Perceived Ease o f Movement

Organization 4

-.154

.097

-.074

.101

-.079

.101

-,M 7

.102

Organization 5

-.036

.079

.122

.095

.118

.096

.140

.097

Organization 6

-.038

.106

.002

.108

.000

.108

-.002

.108

Organization 7

-.062

.081

-.038

.081

-.037

.081

-.009

.082

Organization 8

-.079

.119

-,M 0

.120

-.039

.120

-.010

.124

Organization 9

-.021

.105

.226*

.133

.220

.134

Organization 10

-.023

.090

.228

.145

.224

.145

.222*

.133

.214

.145

Wage Premium

-.053***

.018

-.052***

.018

-.055***

.018

W ork Group Size

-.000

.002

-.000

.002

-.000

.002

Interdependence

-.005

.022

-.003

.022

-.003

.022

Perceived Task Visibility

-.002

.014

-.002

.014

-.003

.014

,0M

.010

.006

.010

-.009

.016

-.001

.016

Altruism

-.044*

.025

Turnover Rate

-.157**

.078

Distributive Justice
Effort Norms

LOS Heterogeneity
Constant

2.161***

R2

.270

.069

AR2
F

2.449***

2.147***

.286

* E

<

.1 0

.288

2.255***

,089

,1M

.019

.001

.015

2.182***

2.227*

n = 442.

2.166***

.088

2.418***

AF

Note:

.051

.002

2.226***

.779

**

£

< .05

.292

2.371*

* **

£

<

01
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supporting

Hypothesis 9.

Turnover rate was negatively

related to PWE (b = -.157, p < .05), contrary to Hypothesis
10.

Social desirability was negatively and significantly

related to self-reported PWE (b = -.332, p = .01).
Table 4.14 shows results of a hierarchical multiple
regression analysis with job neglect as the dependent
variable.

Results indicate that control variables,

social desirability and group cohesiveness,
percent of the variance in neglect

such as

explained 9.5

(F13429 = 3 .473 , p < .001).

Adding rational choice variables did not explain a
significant amount of variance in neglect
= .43).

(A F17,425 = .957 , p

However, normative conformity variables accounted

for another 3.9 percent of the variance in neglect

(A F15427 =

9.532, p < .001), and the three affective bonding variables
explained another 2 percent of the variance in job neglect
when they were entered

(A F16428 = 3 .3 3 3 , p < .05).

This

analysis indicates support for Hypotheses 7 and 9 and
provides evidence contrary to Hypothesis 10, but did not
support a synthesized motivation model.
The squared multiple correlation of neglect with the
three variable sets was obtained to determine the unique
variance explained by each set (Cohen & Cohen,

1983).

Significance tests revealed that the normative conformity
variables made a unique contribution to explained variance
(SR2B = .028, F2421 = 6 .99, p < .05) as did the affective
bonding variables

(SR2B = .020, F3420 = 3 .32, p < .05).
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Table 4.14
Results of hierarchical regression, dependent variable:
_______________________ Job neglect
___
Variable

Slep 1
b

Slcp 2
SE

b

Slcp 3

Step 4

SE

b

SE

Group Cohesiveness

-.056***

.018

-.050***

.019

-.002

.022

Social Desirability

-.490***

.157

-.479***

.158

-.503***

.157

Unemployment Rate
Perceived Ease o f Movement

.023

.033

.019

.033

b

SE

.013

.023

-.504***

.156

.020

.032

.014

.033

.006

.013

.004

.013

.004

.013

.007

.013

Organization 2

-.083

.113

-.018

.115

-.084

.113

.034

.123

Organization 3

-.140

.113

-.025

.116

-.158

.114

-.141

.114

Organization 4

-.217*

.116

-.175

.120

-.195*

.118

-.163

.119

Organization 5

-.036

.094

.037

.113

.028

.112

.076

.113

Organization 6

-.261**

.125

-.240*

.128

-.239*

.126

-.225*

.126

Organization 7

-.137

.096

-.124

.096

-.128

.094

-.084

.095

Organization 8

-.129

.141

-.094

.143

-.094

.141

-.018

.144

Organization 9

.033

.124

.146

.159

.122

.156

.139

.155

-.131

.107

-.061

.169

Organization 10

.173

-.065

.170

-.065

-.024

.021

-.022

.021

-.027

.021

.001

.003

.001

.003

.002

.002

Interdependence

-.039

.027

-.027

.026

-.028

.026

Perceived Task Visibility

-.000

.017

.002

.016

-.001

.016

.004

.012

.006

.012

W age Premium
W ork Group Size

Distributive Justice
Effort Norms

-.080***

-.070***

.019

Altruism

-.056*

.029

Turnover Rate

-.158*

.090

LOS Heterogeneity

-.075

.059

3.080***

.340

Constant

2.629***

R2

.320

.095

AR2
F

3.473***

AF

Note:

2.767***

.341

=

442,

* E < .10

.336

.103

.142

.162

.008

.039

.020

2.880***
.957

n

2.901***

.018

** E < .05

3.684***

3.689***

9.533***

3.333**

it it it

E

<

•

01

Table 4.15 contains results of a hierarchical
regression analysis in which SPWE was the dependent
variable.

Results indicate that control variables,

such as

social desirability and perceived ease of movement,
explained 8.9 percent of the variance in SPWE (F13427 = 3 .228 ,
P

< .001).

Adding the set of rational choice variables

increased R2by 2.1 percent

(A F17425 = 2.49, p < .05) whereas

adding the normative conformity variables increased R2 by
another 1.2 percent

(A F15427 = 2.94, p = .05).

However, when

the three affective bonding variables were entered, they did
not add to variance explained in SPWE
.71).

(A F16426 = .465 , p =

The analysis does not provide support for a

synthesized motivation model, but supports Hypotheses 1, 6
and 8.
The squared multiple correlation of SPWE with the three
sets of variables was obtained to determine the amount of
unique variance explained by each variable set (Cohen &
Cohen,

1983) .

Significance tests revealed that the unique

variance explained by the rational choice set of variables
was 2 percent at a level of marginal significance
.02, F44I9 = 2 . 3 9 ,

p < .1).

(SR2B =

The normative conformity

variables contributed unique variance explained of 1.3
percent

(SR2B = .013, F2421 = 3 .11 , p < .05).

The affective

bonding variables did not contribute to variance explained.
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Table 4.15
Results of hierarchical regression, dependent variable:
Supervisor evaluation of employee PWE (SPWE)
Step 1

Variable

Slcp 2

Step 3

Step 4

b

SE

b

SE

b

SE

b

SE

G roup Cohesiveness

-.054

.063

-.012

.067

-.018

.079

-.012

.085

Social Desirability

-1.086*

.559

-.978*

.559

-.790

.562

-.783

.564

Unemployment Rate

-.109

.116

-.102

.117

-.084

.116

-.076

.118

Perceived Ease o f Movement

.045

.136***

.127***

.045

.112**

.045

.112**

.046

Organization 2

-.283

.403

-.218

.407

-.256

.407

-.211

.447

Organization 3

-.559

.400

-.389

.409

-.361

.408

-.418

.413

Organization 4

-.296

.411

-.095

.424

-.016

.423

.035

.431

Organization 5

-.324

.334

.089

.400

.174

.400

.146

.408

Organization 6

-1.110**

.445

-1.137**

.453

-1.100**

.452

-1.146**

.456

Organization 7

-.233

.340

-.175

.339

-.193

.338

-.186

.345

Organization 8

-.293

.502

-.196

.506

-.221

.504

-.300

.521

Organization 9

.463

.401

1.040*

.561

1.138**

.560

1.100*

.562

Organization 10

-.134

.381

W age Premium
W ork Group Size
Interdependence
Perceived Task Visibility

.034

.610

.128

.609

.085

.611

-.149**

.075

-.157**

.075

-.156**

.075

.012

.009

.009

.013

.009

.041

.094

.038

.094

.CM0

.094

.059

-.113*

.059

-.111*

.059

-.098**

.042

-.096**

.042

-.125**

Distributive Justice
Effort Norms

.013

.061

.068

Altruism

-.047

.106

Turnover Rate

-.270

.327

.208

.213

.053

.066

LOS Heterogeneity
Constant
R2

1.139

4.492***
.089

AR2
F

3.228***

AF

Notes
n = 442
* p < .10

**

4.493***

1.206

4.304***

1.206

4.215***

.110

.122

.125

.021

.012

.003

3.088***

3.098***

2.487**

2.939**

P < .05

* * * p < .01

2.728***
.465

1.233
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Table 4.16 contains results of the regression analysis
in which GPWE was used as a variant of propensity to
withhold effort.

Results indicate that control variables,

such as group cohesiveness,
variance in GPWE

explained 2 6.7 percent of the

(F13427 = 12 .029 , p < .001).

Adding rational

choice variables did not explain additional variance in GPWE
(A F17425 = .056, p = .99), whereas adding normative
conformity variables increased variance explained by 1.3
percent

(A F15427 = 3 .78 , p < .02).

When the three affective

bonding variables were entered, they explained an additional
6.4 percent of the variance in GPWE
.001).

(A F 16426 = 13 .56 , p <

This hierarchical regression analysis does not

support a synthesized motivation model, but it provides
evidence in support of Hypothesis 9.
The squared multiple correlation of GPWE with the three
sets of variables was again obtained to determine the amount
of unique variance explained by each set (Cohen & Cohen,
1983).

F tests revealed that rational choice and normative

conformity variables did not significantly contribute to
variance explained while the affective bonding variables
contributed 6.5 percent unique variance explained
•

063, F342g

==

13.26, p < .001).

(SR2B =
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Table 4.16
Results of hierarchical regression, dependent variable:
_________ Employee evaluation of group PWE (G P W E )
Variable

Step 1
b

Slcp 2
SE

b

Step 3
SE

b

Step 4
b

SE

SE

Group Cohesiveness

-.350***

.041

-.351***

.044

-.277***

.052

-.159***

.053

.371

-.121

.356

Social Desirability

-.111

.366

-.111

.370

-.076

Unemployment Rate

-.087

.076

-.086

.077

-.078

.077

-.029

.074

Perceived Ease o f Movement

-.017

.030

-.018

.030

-.024

.030

-.016

.029

Organization 2

.155

.264

-.139

.269

-.210

.269

-.401

.282

Organization 3

-.196

.262

-.171

.271

-.213

.269

-.305

.261

Organization 4

-.057

.269

-.024

.280

-.026

.279

-.122

.272

Organization 5

-.016

.219

.044

.265

.064

.264

-.034

.258

Organization 6

.246

.291

.249

.300

.265

.298

.144

.288

Organization 7

-.237

.222

-.227

.224

-.240

.223

-.296

.217

Organization 8

.485

.329

.493

.335

.484

.333

.362

.329

Organization 9

-.172

.288

-.084

.371

-.084

.369

-.091

.355

.202

.249

.250

.404

.282

.402

.194

.386

-.020

.049

-.021

.049

-.022

.047

W ork Group Size

.001

.006

.002

.006

.002

.006

Interdependence

.000

.062

.018

.062

.054

.060

Perceived Task Visibility

.004

.039

.012

.039

.025

.037

Organization 10
Wage Premium

Distributive Justice

-.031

.028

-.020

.027

Effort Norms

-.107**

.043

-.049

.043

-.415***

.067

Altruism
Turnover Rate

.126

.206

LOS Heterogeneity

.073

.135

Constant

5.579***

R2

.745

.267

AR2
F

12.029***

5.544***

.797

n

=

442.

*

E

<

5.644***

.280

.344

.000

.013

.064

9.131***

. 10

.796

.268

.056

Note:

5.683***

**

8.674***

10.007***

3.775**

13.561***

E < .05

***

£

<

.778

. 01
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Summary of hypothesis tests.

Results of hypotheses

tests by variant of the dependent variable are shown in
Table 4.17.

Although the synthesized motivation model of

PWE was not supported by this data,

the tests of hypotheses

Table 4.17
Summary results of hypothesis tests
PWE

Necflect

1

Supported

NS

S

NS

2

Not Supported

NS

S

S

4

Not Supported

NS

NS

NS

6

Supported

S

S

S

7

Supported

S

NS

S

8

Not Supported

NS

S

S

9

Supported

S

s

S

SPWE

GPWE

Hvoothesis

10

Not Supported

NS

NS

NS

11

Not Supported

NS

NS

NS

Task Visibilitv
3

Supported

5

Not Supported

using four variants of PWE found evidence in varying degrees
supporting Hypotheses 1, 2, 6, 7, 8 and 9 through zero-order
correlations, partial correlations controlling for social
desirability,

and hierarchical regression analyses.

Evidence contrary to Hypotheses 4 and 10 was found.
support was found for Hypothesis 11.

No

In a multivariate
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analysis with PWE as the dependent variable,

none of the

three sets of independent variables made a unique
contribution to variance explained.

However, multivariate

analyses using variants of PWE indicates that the normative
conformity and affective bonding sets of variables did make
unique contributions to variance explained depending upon
how the dependent variable was operationalized.
Hypotheses 3 and 5, which did not involve PWE, received
mixed support.

Hypothesis 3, which proposed a negative

relation between group size and task visibility, was
supported.

Hypothesis 5, which proposed a negative relation

between interdependence and task visibility, was
contradicted by the results of the study.
Generally, the results indicate that reconsideration of
the hypotheses within a synthesized motivation model using
different formulations of the dependent variable may
be a productive path for future research.

The results also

indicate that continued efforts should be made to derive
more effective measures of propensity to withhold effort;
measures that are not as susceptible to response bias.
Supplemental analysis: Demographic variables.

A

supplemental analysis was performed to examine relationships
among withholding effort measures and measures of group
heterogeneity based on age, gender,

race and education.

Appendix F contains correlations among the four measures of
withholding effort and the four measures of demographic
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heterogeneity.

Table 4.18 shows partial correlations of the

demographic heterogeneity variables
education)

and PWE, neglect,

(age, race, gender,

SPWE and GPWE, controlling for

social desirability.
Table 4.18
Partial correlations controlling for social desirability:
Propensity to withhold effort and demography variables
Race

Gender

.02
.25

.05
.13

-.02
.38

-.01
.30

-.05
.15

.08
.03

.01
.40

-.03
.23

.01
.43

.02
.30

-.07
.05

-.03
.28

GPWE

.19

P <
n = 526

.001

-.01
.45

.05
.13

-.03
.25

PWE
P <
n = 529
Neglect
P <
n = 530
SPWE
P <
n = 521

Education

Age

As seen in Appendix F, racial heterogeneity in work
groups is positively related to employee self-report of PWE
(r = .08, p < .10) and positively related to GPWE, the
individual's evaluation of fellow work group members
.21, p < .001).

(r =

Heterogeneity of gender in the work group

is positively related to job neglect (r = .09, p < .05).
These relations indicate that when a work group is more
highly mixed,

either by race or by gender, there is a

133

greater tendency for work group members to withhold effort
or perceive that fellow group members might withhold effort.
As seen in Table 4.18, when social desirability is
controlled, the results indicate that heterogeneity of
education in the work group is negatively related to
supervisor report of employee PWE.

The positive relation

between heterogeneity of race and GPWE persists even when
controlling for social desirability.

This is an interesting

finding in that when groups are more racially mixed,
respondents tended to rate their co-workers lower in
providing work group effort.
In summary, whereas the data collected in this study
did not reveal length of service heterogeneity relationships
with withholding effort as hypothesized,

the findings among

other demographic variables and withholding effort show a
need for further research into relationships between
diversity within organizational work groups and withholding
effort.
Other results of interest.

Other results that do not

relate to the hypotheses and supplemental analyses should be
mentioned.

Three variables included as controls in this

study were generally related to employee propensity to
withhold effort across variants in the dependent variable
measure.

These variables were group cohesiveness,

desirability and perceived ease of movement.

social
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The inclusion of these variables as controls indicates
an a priori belief they would be related to the dependent
variables.

As expected, the social desirability measure was

negatively related to PWE.

The relation of the other two

measures to PWE was less clear when this study began.
Correlational and multivariate analyses indicate that
group cohesiveness was negatively related to the four
variants of the PWE measure.

Members of highly cohesive

groups were more likely to withhold less effort.

These

relations held even when supervisors measured employee PWE
and when group members were asked to evaluate fellow members
of their work groups.
Additional multivariate analyses were conducted with
the group cohesiveness variable removed because of its high
correlation with the effort norm measure,
for multicollinearity.

and the potential

A negative relationship between

effort norms and PWE was found, as hypothesized,
hierarchical regression analyses.

in these

This provides evidence

that presence of the group cohesiveness variable masked
relationships between effort norms and PWE in analyses that
considered both of these variables.
Analyses shown in this chapter generally found positive
relations between perceived ease of movement and PWE across
all four variants of the dependent variable.

Employees who

believed they could easily move to another similar job were
more likely to withhold effort.

The findings regarding work

group cohesiveness, perceived ease of movement and social
desirability can aid in designing future theoretical and
empirical studies of the PWE phenomenon.

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
This chapter discusses the study results shown in
Chapter 4, elaborating on support for the research
hypotheses,

and offering possible explanations for lack of

support for other hypotheses.

The contributions and

limitations of the study are discussed.

This discussion is

followed by potential applications of the findings and by
suggestions for future research.
Chapter 1 posed two questions:

(a) whether Knoke's

model was an appropriate theoretical framework in which to
study PWE, and (b) how variables based on the three elements
of the model explain an individual employee's PWE.
response to those questions,

In

this study detected a lack of

support for the complete model but found evidence that
rational choice, normative conformity and affective bonding
contextual variables all play some role in explaining
employee PWE.

Whereas the framework of a synthesized model

appears applicable to PWE, the model's elements did not work
together to directly explain PWE in this study.
The most significant contributions of this dissertation
are:

(a) a comprehensive synthesis of theory and research

into PWE from the disciplines of economics, psychology,
sociology and management,

(b) the application to and test of

Knoke's synthesized motivation model in multiple work
organizations,

(c) the finding that variables representing
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the three elements of the proposed model —

rational choice,

normative conformity and affective bonding incentives —

are

connected to PWE, and d) the discovery that normative and
affective bonding variables played a more significant role
in PWE than rational choice variables.

In reaching these

conclusions, the study addressed an area often overlooked in
management research:

how contextual elements influence

individual behavior and perception in organizations
(Cappelli & Sherer,

1991) .
Support for Hypotheses

The most consistent finding in this study across the
varying measures of the dependent variable —
report,

job neglect self-report,

supervisor report —

PWE self-

group PWE report, PWE

was for the negative relations

hypothesized between PWE and perceived task visibility,
effort norms and altruism.

Each of these variables

represents a different portion of the synthesized motivation
model: perceived task visibility
norms

(rational choice), effort

(normative conformity), and altruism (affective

b onding).
(Knoke,

Thus, although a synthesized motivation model

1990) was not indicated, portions of the model were

supported in separate analyses.
Negative relations between wage premium and PWE, while
controlling for alternative employment opportunities, were
found in two of four variants of the dependent variable.
This result is consistent with previous tests of the
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efficiency wage hypothesis
1991a).

(e.g., Cappelli & Chauvin,

A positive relationship between work-group size (an

objective indicator)

and PWE was supported in different

degrees across two of the four variations of the dependent
variable.

This finding supports various laboratory studies

regarding social loafing

(e.g., Latane et al.,

Support for Hypothesis 8 —
distributive justice and PWE —

a negative relation between
was found in two of four

variations of PWE measured in this study.
and reciprocity

(Schnake,

1979).

Norms of equity

1991a; Stroebe & Frey,

1982)

in

affecting decisions to contribute effort have been viewed as
important variables in this line of research by sociologists
focusing on collective action

(e.g., Marwell & Ames,

1981)

as well as social psychologists concerned with social
loafing (e.g., Kerr,

1983).

Results consistent with the hypotheses appeared with
greater frequency when a group measure of PWE (GPWE) and a
supervisor evaluation of employee PWE

(SPWE) were analyzed

than when self-report measures of PWE and job neglect were
employed.

The frequency analysis indicated that levels of

skewness and lack of variance in responses may have been
responsible for the lower number of significant findings
when PWE and neglect were used as dependent variables.
Problems with the psychometric properties of PWE scale items
could have contributed to these results.
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More than 60 percent of respondents reported that they
never withheld effort at work or neglected their jobs-

Even

those who admitted to PWE or neglect were prone to social
desirability response bias.

The skewness problem was

attenuated but not eliminated by controlling for social
desirability.
The low reported PWE could be due to lack of trust of
the researcher and the employer, questions of
confidentiality about the research, placement of PWE items
close to the start of the survey, or to a form of selfserving bias in which an employee shifts blame for low
effort to external factors such as unproductive co-workers.
However,

it is possible that the surveyed employees

never withheld job-related effort.

This explanation may be

less likely than the other alternatives because most of the
pre-test sample admitted withholding effort to some degree.
Because they were not part of actual work groups, pre-test
respondents may have been less prone to fear that
information they gave would be used against them,

and thus

may have responded with greater veracity.
Another important finding involved a consistently high
correlation between social desirability and self reports of
PWE and job neglect.

These results indicated that social

desirability should be a construct of theoretical interest
when considering employees' responses to the question of
whether they withhold effort.

Further consideration of PWE
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models should devote more attention to the possible
influence of self-deception by employees who do not want to
admit that they withhold effort at any time.

In cases such

as this, there are no procedures to identify potential
contamination

(Moorman & P odsakoff, 1992).

In this study, alternative measures of withholding
effort were obtained from the employee's supervisor,

and the

prevalence of withholding effort in the work group was
measured.

Although these efforts address some of the

problems that occurred in the self-report measure, they do
not consider the potential impact of response bias on
individual PWE measured by questionnaire.

The potential

influence of impression management indicates that a non
normal distribution of PWE responses may not be an unusual
occurrence if similar measures are used in future research.
Despite these problems,

several relationships were

found between PWE and the independent variables when
attempting to control for response bias.

Those "common

method" results were confirmed when measures of employee PWE
obtained by the supervisor was considered as a dependent
variable.

It is encouraging that several relations

consistent with the hypotheses were found when employees
were asked to evaluate fellow group members.

These findings

generally indicated that when low effort norms,
visibility,

low task

low equity and low altruism were perceived, an
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employee was more likely to report that his or her co
workers did not provide full effort.
Unsupported Hypotheses
Several hypotheses did not receive support.

This may

indicate problems with the data and the measures as well as
the model.

When the model was tested using PWE and neglect

self-reports by bringing in sets of independent variables,
variance explained increased in very small amounts.
instances,

In some

increased variance explained was insignificant.

Considering the findings when alternative measures such
as SPWE and GPWE were used, these non-significant results
could have stemmed from lack of variance in PWE and neglect.
The low R-squares and correlations found with these
predictor variables improved when GPWE and SPWE were used as
dependent variables.

Use of GPWE and SPWE increased

variance in the dependent variable.

However, even when GPWE

and SPWE were used as dependent variables,

results did not

support a synthesized model.
Hypotheses 4 and 5, dealing with relationships between
interdependence and PWE and interdependence and perceived
task visibility were not supported.

This finding may be a

fault of the measure; the alpha was .67, below the usual
reliability threshold for exploratory research
1978).

(Nunnally,

However, theoretical explanations for these results

may be more appropriate.

When interdependence rose,

employees believed task visibility increased.

When
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interdependence increased,
GPWE and job neglect.

some employees reported lower

This may indicate that the

interdependence perceived by employees allowed no latitude
for them to withhold effort or neglect their jobs.
In addition, positive relations between interdependence
and task visibility may indicate that tasks were so
interdependent the supervisor may have had to be directly
involved in the task and thus could better observe
employees.

The findings indicate that this hypothesis

should be reconsidered in future research.
Whereas there are instances when interdependence may
allow employees to hide from the supervisor and increase
PWE, there are other cases in which interdependence would
not permit PWE because employees are working so closely with
each other that withholding effort could cause an entire
operation to fail.
and analyzability

Incorporating measures of task variety
(Perrow,

1970)

in future research may

better enable evaluation of the task interdependence-PWE
relationship.
Regarding Hypothesis 10, turnover, the data indicated a
relation opposite to what was hypothesized in two of the
four variants of PWE.

Almost half of the groups in this

study experienced no turnover in the last year.
these correlations are so low,
resulted from chance.

Because

it is possible the findings
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Future research at the group level of analysis would be
important to determine if respondents'

feelings about the

behaviors of other group members were influenced by the idea
of repeated plays
rate.

(Axelrod,

198 6), measured by the turnover

A measure such as social integration or work place

interaction may better capture repeated plays in future
research.

The strong relation between cohesiveness and PWE

may be more indicative of the role of repeated plays than a
raw turnover rate.
Lastly, there was no support for Hypothesis 11,
demographic heterogeneity as measured by length-of-service
distribution.

The potential relation between demography and

withholding effort may be more effectively explored by using
individual dissimilarity through a distance index
Price & Harrison,

1993).

(e.g.,

This measure considers how

dissimilar employee X is from other members of the group.
This approach may be more effective in linking demography
and withholding effort, particularly in light of
relationships found among other measures of demographic
heterogeneity

(race and gender)

and PWE measures.

Contributions
This study's most significant theoretical contribution
was the synthesis of three varied research streams from
economics,

sociology,

and psychology into a model of

propensity to withhold effort in organizational work groups.
The most significant empirical contribution of the study is
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that contextual elements of rational choice, normative
conformity and affective bonding incentives were shown to
have an impact on an employee's on-the-job PWE even though a
synthesized model was not supported.

These results provide

the groundwork for future research by pointing out how
contextual variables may act together to influence an
employee's willingness to produce full effort on the job.
By conducting this study in a field setting,
possible to measure affective bonding
heterogeneity)

it was

(altruism, turnover,

in ways not possible in a laboratory setting.

The negative relation between altruism and PWE in an on
going work group is a significant finding,

backing up the

idea that non-calculative incentives are an important
determinant of behavior

(Knoke,

1990),

even in a situation

of economic exchange.
The results were also consistent with those of George
(1992)

in regard to the role of perceived task visibility,

and generally consistent with the tenets of the social
loafing perspective:

increased group size relates to

declines in individual effort

(e.g., Latane,

et al., 1979).

The influence of size has been repeatedly found in the
laboratory,

but has rarely been tested in field settings.

In addition, the findings indicated the importance of
perceived effort norms in influencing an employee's PWE.
The study results showed the importance of group effort
norms among work-group members in affecting the behavior of
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employees in work groups.
in laboratory studies
1983).

Influence of norms has been seen

(e.g., Marwell & Ames,

1981; Kerr,

This study provided evidence from existing work

groups of its effect on PWE, possibly as a form of clan
control
1982,

(Ouchi,

1981), or as partial gift exchange

(Akerlof,

1984).
The results demonstrated the importance of group

cohesiveness in determining employees' PWE.

Cohesiveness

was negatively associated with all four variations of the
dependent variable; to the greatest degree with employee's
perception of how much effort fellow group members put into
their jobs.

Whereas there are indications in previous

research that cohesiveness contributes to reduction of
social loafing in a lab setting (Karau & Williams,

1992b),

this study found a similar relation in a field setting.

The

relationship between cohesiveness and PWE was not
hypothesized a priori because it was unclear as to whether
closely bonded employees in on-going groups would act
together to reduce or to increase effort.

These results

indicated the latter, at least from a perceptual standpoint.
The model tested in this study included variables that
reflect rational cost-benefit analysis stressed in economics
(e.g., agency theory; Jensen & Meckling,
transactions costs economics
to management research
1986).

(Williamson,

(e.g., Jones,

1976),
1975),

and
and applied

1984; Barney & Ouchi,

It included variables that reflect normative
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conformity and affective bonding concerns of sociologists
(e.g., Knoke,

1990; Knoke & Wright-Isak,

Marwell & Oliver,

1988).

1982; Macy,

1990;

Taken alone, neither set of

variables considered how an individual's predisposition to
act may be affected by an on-going social system.
On a macro level, Granovetter

(1985) criticized

economists who tried to bring social structure into their
explanations of organizational phenomena because their
efforts viewed social influence as an external force that
sets action in motion and has no further effects.

An on

going debate centers on whether a narrow model of human
motivation advanced by industrial organization economists is
appropriate to study behavior in organizations
1990, Donaldson,

(cf. Barney,

1990).

This study's findings that mixed motivations
contributed to employee contribution of effort indicated
that rational cost-benefit calculations as well as the
impact of norms and affective bonding should be considered
in doing research on behavioral predispositions.

A key in

future research will be in determining how much of which
type of motivation most greatly affects PWE, and whether
behavior is more greatly affected by norms imposed
internally or norms sanctioned by social control —
externally imposed by the organization or by fellow group
members.

As Macy

(1993) noted in his work on collective

action and free riding,

internalized fairness norms may lead
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to too much cooperation toward a collective effort while
external sanctions may provide too little.
Finally,

it is intriguing that in this study of

economic organizations non-calculative incentives such as
norms and altruism played a greater role than rational
choice variables in determining propensity to withhold
effort.

One might expect contrary results when a model

proposed for the study of voluntaristic organizations —

in

which use of norms and affective bonding may be prevalent —
is applied to economic organizations.
Limitations
There are several limitations to this study.

First,

many of the measures were obtained from the same source: a
survey of employees on the dependent and independent
variables.

Common method variance can jeopardize construct

validity; however,

in this study, when a measure of the

dependent variable was obtained from a different source, the
findings produced by surveying employees were often
duplicated.
In addition,
indicators

support for hypotheses involving objective

(i.e., work-group size) was found to some extent.

Ordering the survey with dependent variables first
(propensity to withhold effort)

and independent variables

second (task visibility, perceived effort norms)

also

addressed the potential for problems with self-report
measures

(Podsakoff & Organ,

1986).
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However,

the ordering of the dependent variable could

have led to another problem noted about self-report
measures:
1993).

item context effects

(Harrison & McLaughlin,

The sensitivity of the information sought may have

led to initial anxiety on the part of the subjects
& Sundstrom,

(Roberson

1990); such anxiety could have affected the PWE

responses and responses to other questionnaire items.
The skewness problem with the dependent variable was
addressed by transforming the PWE variable and by using
variations of the dependent variable measure,
neglect

(also transformed), SPWE and GPWE.

such as

These remedies

indicated stronger evidence supporting several of the
hypotheses and had no effect on others.
Internal validity could have been threatened in this
study because in considering multiple organizations, there
are many ways for work groups to differ other than on the
independent variables.

Testing in a single state, testing

for differences among employees on other factors,

and use of

controls for organization membership were among the efforts
undertaken to confront this limitation.

Yet, work groups

are never quite the same on all factors,

and lack of random

assignment to treatment conditions and the possibility of
self-selection through use of questionnaire measures raises
the potential for alternative explanations of the results.
Every effort can be made to minimize differences,
group history could have affected these results.

but work
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The use of Louisiana companies has an impact on the
generalizability of the findings.

The advantages of

conducting this research in Louisiana were practical:

it was

part of a larger study connected to the state's major
university, and this connection helped obtain access to
multiple businesses, which were needed to provide the
sample, and resulted in less costly data collection.
The disadvantages concerned threats to external
validity in that the results can only be generalized to
populations that closely correspond to the population of
businesses in Louisiana.

This generalization may be

difficult because other areas differ from Louisiana,
particularly in recent economic trends,
generalizability is not a major concern.
involves trade-offs,

but the lack of
All research

and the study was designed to maximize

other types of validity by use of rigorous sampling
procedures,

item and data analysis.

Another limitation was that data were unavailable for
more than 100 respondents regarding labor market area wages
for the jobs they performed.
regression models —
model —

This resulted in hierarchical

tests of the synthesized motivation

including only four out of five survey respondents.

Although significant negative relations were found between
PWE and the interaction of wage premium and unemployment
rate,

inclusion of 100 more respondents may have provided

additional information to evaluate this finding and others.

150
Applications
Group performance has an important influence in
improving organizational effectiveness

(Bettenhausen,

1991).

The results of this study could be applied to the design of
work groups in an effort to make them more successful.
First, under the premise that more successful work groups
are those in which the members provide full effort, the
results provided information on several factors that
influence withholding effort.
Second, the results provided information on how to draw
up baseline measures to aid in selecting successful work
teams and project teams.

Third, propensity to withhold

effort focused on task effort in this study and such a focus
may help distinguish between contributions to task with
contributions to quasi-task effort such as maintenance
factors, work-group reputation, work-place safety and
organizational citizenship.
In addition, the results could contribute to an
organization's strategy in determining which forms their
work groups should take and how those work groups might be
supervised.

The importance of establishing strong effort

norms and altruism within the work group indicated that
management should not solely view financial rewards and
other personal recognition as the contextual factors that
influence how much effort is produced.
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Directions for Future Research
The positive results of this study produce several more
questions for future research.

The shortcomings in some of

the measures and the lack of significant support for some of
the hypotheses also reveals a need for additional study.
The significant findings that occurred when employees
were asked to evaluate the PWE of fellow group members
points out the need for more research at the group level of
analysis.

Future research should consider the impact of

variables that are considered to be group-level variables,
such as group norms, cohesiveness,

group interdependence and

altruism, on PWE perceptions at a group level of analysis.
The importance of cohesiveness indicated a need to more
rigorously test the impact of that group level variable on
an employee's PWE.

It would be helpful to replicate the

finding here that cohesiveness has negative effects on
employee PWE, through use of other, more objective measures
of effort,

if available,

in a field setting.

In future research into the PWE concept, better
measures should be sought.

A major shortcoming of this

study was skewness of the major dependent variable measure.
Individuals were unlikely to admit to withholding effort at
work.

If quantifiable measures that actually measure effort

rather than performance,

are available,

considered in future research.

they should be

In addition,

it may be

useful to employ measures of self-limiting behavior

(Veiga,
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1991)

in future consideration of PWE.

Self-limiting

behavior has been used as a surrogate measure for social
loafing (Price & Harrison,

1993) and includes such

dimensions as inattention,

carelessness and withdrawal.

One

can debate whether these dimensions represent PWE, but the
concepts are potentially related.
Having noted the problem with social desirability
response bias,

it may be important to design impression

management and deception scales into future theoretical
work.

It would also be meaningful to consider non

threatening ways to measure objective effort in the field as
is done in the laboratory.

Laboratory researchers have used

strain gauges and cheerleading experiments to measure effort
in PWE studies.

Field researchers need to develop similar

measures, perhaps in the area of job-related computer
simulation.

It is important to remember that these measures

should consider effort rather than performance.
Spicer
reward,

(1985) proposed that the type of incentive, or

system should moderate the way some of the variables

discussed in this study would be related to PWE.

He

proposed that reward system would moderate the influence of
group size,
PWE.

interdependence,

altruism,

Using Spicer's reasoning,

and turnover rates on

the relation between

perceived effort norms and PWE may also be moderated by the
organization's reward system.
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This study did not obtain variance in reward system
needed to test its moderating influence on relations between
the independent variables and PWE.

It is anticipated that

future studies may isolate those receiving group rewards and
those rewarded based on relative individual efforts.
this is accomplished,

Once

it will be possible to test whether

type of reward system moderates the relations of several
variables of interest in this study,

including work-group

size, group effort norms and altruism,

to PWE.

Another potential avenue of inquiry is the relation
between organizational citizenship behaviors
propensity to withhold effort.

(OCBs) and

Such research would extend

the work done in this study, which considered altruism,
OCB dimension,

as an antecedent to effort.

an

PWE has been

viewed in terms of doing less work than required or expected
whereas OCBs are generally presented in terms of performing
acts that are beyond what is required or expected.

Of

further interest are potential relations of courtesy, civic
virtue,

sportsmanship and other behaviors to the common good

of a work group, that is, its reputation,

low production

costs and safe working conditions.
In addition,

future research should consider whether

the implications of withholding effort may differ in service
industries when compared to manufacturing industries.
Withholding effort when in direct contact with a customer
might have quite different ramifications than withholding

154
effort when manufacturing a product.

In the latter case,

organizations may have more capable mechanisms to prevent
the behavior from having an impact on the company.
Contextual factors such as norms may play different roles
depending upon whether the activity takes place while
performing a service or making a product.
Lastly,

future research should apply the findings of

this study to more specific types of groups and teams, such
as top-management teams, project teams or quality teams.

It

would be interesting to determine if the relationships found
and not found in this study of generic work groups translate
to specific types of work groups,

or if there are moderating

influences among different kinds of organizational teams.
Conclusion
Much research has been done in laboratory settings
concerning the prevalence of free riding,
shirking in small temporary groups.

social loafing and

However, previous

research had not tested a comprehensive model of suggested
contextual predictors of the propensity of employees to
withhold effort in a single framework in multiple
organizations.

This study filled that gap in by

constructing and testing a model that includes formal and
informal contextual variables mentioned in previous
conceptual work and in some instances tested.
Whereas elements of context advanced in this model did
not directly explain large amounts of variance in PWE,
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context should be considered in future research as a
potential moderator of relationships between individual or
psychological mechanisms and PWE.
include felt dispensability
intrinsic motivation
attractiveness

Some of these mechanisms

(e.g., Weldon & Mustari,

(e.g., George,

(Zaccaro,

1984).

1988),

1992), and task

For example,

strong effort

norms and perceived altruism in work groups may enhance the
effects of intrinsic motivation and task attractiveness and
negate the effects of felt dispensability on an employee's
willingness to provide effort.
Psychological mechanisms such as role clarity and role
ambiguity may also have an impact on PWE, and these effects
again may be moderated by contextual variables.
example,

For

employees may not provide full effort because they

do not understand how to perform a task.

Task

interdependence, group size, and group norms could influence
the degree to which an employee obtains needed clarity that
might lessen the degree of
This study's focus on

PWE.
context can be the first step in

a research program that examines these
types of groups as well as
organizations,

issues indifferent

in different types of

i.e., the public sector.

The results

reported here provoke interesting questions that should be
addressed as contextual causes of withholding effort
continue to be examined.

ENDNOTES
1.
Olson's book The Logic of Collective Action (1965)
inspired research into free riding at different levels of
analysis in various areas.
Much of this research —
applications across organizations (e.g., Lenway & Rehbein,
1991), collective strategy and free riding (e.g., Carney,
1987) and effects of free riders on right to work laws and
unionization (e.g., Zax & Ichniowski, 1991) — is not
related to the individual level of analysis that will be
used in this study, so it will not be discussed in detail.
2. Albanese and Van Fleet (1985a) and Stigler (1974)
suggested that "cheap rider" more accurately describes such
a group member because gaining benefits usually involves at
least some cost, and a pure free rider is an exception.
There are two characteristics of free-rider hypotheses.
Under a strong free-rider hypothesis, none of a group's
members will contribute because there is too much
opportunity to free ride.
For example, a softball team may
not practice because all of the players regard practice to
be too costly when weighed against the public good of
improved team performance.
In a weak free-rider hypothesis,
provision of a public good will be less than needed, because
some members free ride whereas others contribute (Stigler,
1974).
For example, most players practice, but a few cheap
riders only show up for games.
Thus, team performance, is
not as optimal as it could have been if all had practiced.
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APPENDIX A
ARTICLES RELEVANT TO THE TOPIC OF WITHHOLDING EFFORT
TERM
USED

TYPE

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS OR RESULTS

MANAGEMENT
Jones,
1984

FR/
SH

T

Model suggests that free
riding and shirking mediate
relations between structure/
technology & outcomes

Albanese &
Van Fleet,
1985a

FR

T

Free rider theory and research
reviewed; importance of
altruism & fairness norms
stressed

Weldon &
Gargano,
1985

SL

E/L

Social loafing effects
occurred when Ss working on
judgment tasks believed they
were working alone rather than
with another person

Spicer,
1985

SH/
PG

T

Weldon &
Mustari,
1988

SL

E/L

Feeling dispensable can cause
social loafing effects while
feeling needed can motivate
effort

Earley,
1989

SL

E/L

Collectivistic work beliefs
moderate social loafing
effects

Judge &
Chandler,
1990

SH

E/F

Found individual level
moderators of shirking
propensity, e.g. job
satisfaction, race, age

Schnake,
1991a

SL/S
E

E/L

Sucker effect occurs in co
acting groups and goal setting
more effectively reduces it
than punishment

G eorg e ,
1992

SL

E/F

Relation between task
visibility and social loafing
was strongest when worker's
intrinsic involvement was low

Applied public choice theory
to study of providing effort
in work group
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TERM
USED

TYPE

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS OR RESULTS

Cooper,
Dyck &
Frolich,
1992

SD/
FR

E/L

Fair distribution rules,
participatively developed, can
temper social dilemmas that
are inherent in gainsharing
plans

Miles &
Greenberg,
1993

SL

E/F

Social loafing effects
attenuated and swimmers' group
performance improved when Ss
faced punishment

Alchian &
D emsetz,
1972

SH

T

The need to reduce shirking
via monitoring was major
reason for establishment of
classical firm

Jensen &
Meekling,
1976

M/AC

T

Combined theories of property
rights, agency and finance to
develop a theory of ownership
structure; focused on
relations between principal
(owner) and agent (manager)

Leibowitz
&
Tollison,
1980

SH

E/F

Akerl o f ,
1982

SH

T

Partial gift exchange: Worker
effort depends on norms
determining fair day's work

Akerlof,
1984

SH

T

Tied partial gift exchange
hypothesis to efficiency wage
theory of unemployment

Yellen,
1984

SH

T

Explanation of how efficiency
wage hypothesis explains
unemp1oyment

Hamermesh,
1990

SH

E/F

ECONOMICS

Optimal law firm size to
control shirking and free
riding is about five

Further growth in on-the-job
leisure would reduce
productivity; eliminating
breaks would be counter
productive
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TYPE
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Cappelli &
Chauvin,
1991

SH

E/F

Greater wage premiums
associated with lower levels
of shirking

Krueg e r ,
1991

SH

E/F

Monitoring difficulty
influences timing & generosity
of compensation

Marwell &
Ames, 1979

FR

E/L

Small groups w/ a person who
has an interest in public good
invest more than other groups

Alfano &
Marwell,
1980

FR

E/L

Important normative and
perceptual factors may
influence individual decisions
to contribute toward public
goods

Marwell &
Ames, 1980

FR

E/L

Ss persisted in investing in
public goods despite
conditions designed to
maximize advantages of free
riding

Marwell &
Ames, 1981

FR

E/L

Economics students invested
less in public goods than
subjects in previous
experiment

Oliver,
Marwell &
Teixeira,
1985

CM/
FR

T

Advanced logic of critical
mass to explain how
contributing to provision of
public goods occurs

Macy,

CM/
FR

T

Extended critical mass theory
by applying social learning
theory to decisions about
contributing to provision of
public goods

SOCIOLOGY

1990

SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY
Ingham,
Levinger,
Graves &
Peckham,
1974

SL

E/L

Replicated Ringelmann effect;
individual performance
declined when more people
participated in a group's task
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TYPE

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS OR RESULTS

Condie,
Warner &
Gillmann,
1976

FR

E/F

Blood drive donors had less
free riding tendencies and
felt more social pressure to
donate

Latane,
Williams &
Harkins,
1979

SL

E/L

Average sound pressure
produced per person decreased
as group size increased

Harkins,
Latane &
Williams,
1980

SL

E/L

Social loafing seems to occur
when Ss perform in groups
regardless of whether they
also perform alone

Orbell &
Da w e s ,
1981

SD

T

Williams,
Harkins &
Latane,
1981

SL

E/L

Identifiability of individual
effort eliminated social
loafing

Harkins &
Petty,
1982

SL

E/L

Unique or difficult tasks
reduced or eliminated social
loafing effects

Kerr,

SD/
FR

E/L

Group members reduce effort if
they believe a capable partner
is free riding

Kerr &
B ruun ,
1983

SL

E/L

On disjunctive tasks, Ss w/
low ability gave less effort
than high ability Ss. On
conjunctive tasks Ss w/ high
ability gave less effort

Zaccaro,
1984

SL

E/L

Task attractiveness moderated
social loafing effects in work
groups of two to four

Jackson &
Harkins,
1985

SL

E/L

Found that equity-in-effort
approach (sucker effect)
helped explain social loafing

1983

Suggested altruism as a
possible motivation that may
resolve some social dilemmas
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Harkins,
1987

SL

E/L

Social loafing and social
facilitation can be viewed as
complementary paradigms,
rather than separate research
streams

Harkins &
Szymanski,
1989

SL

E/L

Allowing a group to evaluate
its performance eliminated
loafing effects

Williams &
Karau,
1991

SL

E/L

People worked harder
collectively when they expect
co-workers to perform poorly
on a meaningful task

Shepperd,
1993

SL/
FR/
SE

T

Proposed expectancy theory as
a framework to organize
research on social loafing,
free riding and the sucker
effect in performance groups

Key to Appendix A
Te r m s : SH (Shirking); SL (Social L o a fing); FR (Free R i d i n g ) ;
CM (Critical M a s s ) ;
M (Monitoring); AC (Agency C o sts); SE
(Sucker Eff e c t ) : PG (Public G o o d s ) .
Type of Study; T (Theoretical); E (Empirical); L (Lab); F
(Field)

APPENDIX B
VARIABLES, MEASURES AND SOURCES
Variables
ORGANIZATIONAL VARIABLES: Wage Premium
GROUP CHARACTERISTIC VARIABLES: Group Size, Length of
Service Demography, Turnover Rates
PERCEIVED TASK CHARACTERISTICS:

Interdependence

PERCEIVED GROUP CHARACTERISTICS: Perception of Task
Visibility, Perceived Peer Compliance Effort Norms,
Perceived Degree of Altruism, Distributive Justice
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Propensity to Withhold Effort
CONTROL VARIABLES: Organization Membership, Group
Cohesiveness, Social Desirability, Perceived Job
Alternatives
Measures and Sources
Wage p r e m i u m : Group average wage minus market wage for
job.
Source: work group supervisor; BTA Economic Institute,
1992 Geographic Reference Report: Annual Report of Costs,
Wages, Salaries and Human Resource Statistics.
Group s i z e : Number of people reporting to the
supervisor in that work group; Source: supervisor.
Task interdependence: Five items that collectively
reflect reciprocal interdependence, from Pearce & Gregersen,
1991; Source: employee survey.
Perceived task visibility: Five-item scale used in an
earlier study (George, 1992); Source: employee survey.
Perceived compliance effort n o r m s : 22 original items,
variations of these items were suggested by Kerr and Slocum
(1987) and in Van de Ven and Ferry (1980). Source: employee
s urvey.
Distributive justice: Three items drawn from Martin
(1987); Source: employee survey.
Perceived altruism: Five items that make up a subscale
of the organizational citizenship behavior measure developed
by Smith, Organ and Near (1983); Source: employee survey.
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Length of service demographic heterogeneity:
Dissimilarity in length of service distribution in work
group; Source: employee provided length of time in the work
group; coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided
by the mean) was computed for each group (Allison, 1978).
Turnover r a t e s : Number gone from work group, voluntary
and involuntary over last 12 months; percentage turnover
calculated based on this information; Source: supervisor.
Propensity to withhold e f fort: Ten items drawn from
Judge and Chandler (1990), George (1992), and five original
items tapping dimensions of PWE; four of these items used to
measure PWE in field study.
Source: employee survey.
Job neglect: Six-item scale from Leek and Saunders
(1992); Source: employee survey.
Group P W E : 15 items, drawn from Judge and Chandler
(1990), George (1992) and original items developed for this
study. Adaptation asked employees to evaluate PWE (shirk,
loaf, free ride) of fellow workers; Source: employee survey.
Supervisor evaluation of employee P W E : Six-item scale,
developed from proposed PWE scale through factor analysis of
pre-test; Source: supervisor survey.
Group cohesiveness: Eight-item scale from Dobbins and
Zaccaro (1986); Source: employee survey.
Social desirability: A 16-item, two-point "Responding
Desirably on Attitudes and Opinions" (RD-16) (Schuessler,
Hittle & Cardascia, 1978) was used on the field survey;
Crowne and Marlowe's (1960) 32-item social desirability
measure was used on the pre-test.
Source: employee survey.
Perceived ease of movement: Three-item scale based on
O'Reilly and Caldwell (1981) and Gerhart (1990); Source:
employee survey.
Average group w a g e : Average hourly wage paid to members
of the work group; Source: supervisor survey.
Market w a g e s : Average wage paid in the labor market for
the job performed by work group members; Source:
BTA
Economic Institute, 1992 Geographic Reference Report: Annual
Report of Costs, Wages, Salaries and Human Resource
Statistics.
Unemployment r a t e : Average unemployment rate over the
last 12 months in the labor market; Source: Louisiana
Department of Labor.

APPENDIX C
PRE-TEST INSTRUMENT
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RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE
This questionnaire is designed to measure your attitudes and
opinions concerning some job-related matters. Please answer
these questions as though you were describing the job you
now hold and your current work group. If you are not now
employed/ please answer about the job you most recently
held. Your answers will be kept strictly confidential.
1. In this job, how many people, including you, report to
the same supervisor? ____________________
PART I
PLEASE CIRCLE THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER
NEVER

ALWAYS

1. How often do you give
100 percent effort on the job?

1

2

3

4

5

2. How often do you expect to
give 100 percent effort in the
future?

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

3. How often do you perform
duties that are not formally
required by your job
description?

How characteristic is each of the following item of you
in terms of your job?
4. I defer responsibilities 1
should assume to my coworkers.
5. I put forth less effort on
the job when others are around
to do the work.

1

2

1

2

3

4

5

3

4

5

6. I do not do my share of
the work.

1

2

3

4

5

7. I give less effort than
other members of the work
group.

1

2

3

4

5

8. I avoid performing
housekeeping tasks as
much as possible.

1

2

3

4

5

9. I leave work for the
next shift that I should
really complete.

1

2

3

4

5
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NEVER

ALWAYS

10. I take it easy if others
are around to do the work.

1

4

5

11. I contribute to lowering
production costs in
this work group.

1

4

5

12. I am absent from work
more than others in
this work group.

1

4

5

13. I make an effort to
increase this work group's
reputation.

1

4

5

14. Improving the equipment
used by this work group
is not my concern.

1

4

5

15. I contribute to a work
environment that is free of
safety and health problems.

1

4

5

PART II
PLEASE CIRCLE THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER
STRONGLY
AGREE

STRONGLY
DISAGREE
1. My coworkers and I have
a strong sense of tradition.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. It is the supervisor's job
to see that my coworkers and
work as hard as we can.

5

6

7

4. There is a great deal of
pressure from my coworkers
to exert effort.

5

6

7

5. My coworkers and I don't
talk much about the way we
do our jobs.

5

6

7

6. My coworkers and I care
about each other's well
being.

5

6

7

2. My coworkers and I stress
teamwo r k .
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STRONGLY
DISAGREE
7. My coworkers and I are
rewarded here based on how
well our group does its
job.

1

8. My coworkers rarely worry
about how hard I am working.

1

9. The supervisor has little
impact on how hard we work
here.

1

10. My coworkers and I have
little obligation to work
together to do the best
job we can.

1

11. Maintaining close
friendships is important
to my coworkers and me.
and me.

2

3

4

5

6

7

2

3

4

5

6

7

2

3

4

5

6

7

3

4

5

6

7

2

1

12. My coworkers and I
regularly socialize
together.

STRONGLY
AGREE

2

1

3

2

4

5

3

4

6

7

5

6

7

13. I have a great deal of
independence from my
coworkers.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

14. My co-workers do not
urge me to work hard.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

15. Each member of this
work group is rewarded
based on how well that
person does the job,
compared to other
members.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

16. In this work group,
we expect everyone to pull
together to get the job
done.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

17. It is routine for my
coworkers and I to get
together during non-work
hours.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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How much do members of your work group do the following
things?
NOT AT
ALL

VERY
MUCH

18. Compete with each other to
achieve performance targets.
19. Gang up on the person whose
work is far below that of the
others.
20. Gang up on the person whose
work far exceeds that of the
others .
21. Encourage individuals to
excel and strive for
increasingly higher levels
of work performance.
22. Try to get ahead at the
expense of other work group
members.
PART III
PLEASE CIRCLE THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

STRONGLY
AGREE

1. Members of my work group
help others who have been absent.
2. Members of my work group
volunteer for things that are
not required.
3. Members of my work group
orient new people even though they
are not required to do so.
4. Members of my work group help
coworkers who have heavy workloads.
5. Members of my work group make
innovative suggestions that help
improve the department.

1

2

3

4

5
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PART IV
PLEASE WRITE THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER IN THE SPACE PROVIDED.
STRONGLY DISAGREE
1
2

3

4

5

STRONGLY AGREE
6
7

_____ 1. Before voting, Ithoroughly investigate
qualifications of all of the candidates.

the

_____ 2. I never hesitate to go out of my way to
someone.

help

_____ 3. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work
if I am not encouraged.
_____

4. I have never intensely disliked anyone.

_____ 5. On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to
succeed in life.
_____

6.

I sometimes feel resentful when I don't

_____

7.

I am always careful about my manner of dress.

_____ 8. My table manners at home are as good as
out at a restaurant.

get my way.

when I eat

_____ 9. If I could get into a movie without paying and be
sure I was not seen I would do it.
_____ 10. On a few occasions, I have given up doing
something because I thought too little of my ability.
_____

11. I like to gossip at times.

_____ 12. There have been times when I felt like rebelling
against people in authority even though I knew they were
right.
_____ 13. No matter who I am talking to, I am always a good
listener.
_____ 14. I can remember "playing sick' to get out of
something.
_____ 15.There have been occasions when I took advantage of
someone.
_____ 16. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a
mistake.
_____

17. I always try to practice what I preach.
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_____ 18. I don't find it particularly difficult to get
along with loud-mouthed obnoxious people.
_____ 19. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive
and forget.
_____ 20. When I don't know something,
admitting it.

I don't at all mind

_____ 21. I am always courteous even to people who are
disagreeable.
_____ 22.
things my

At times Ihave really insisted on
own way.

having

_____ 23. There have been occasions when I felt like
smashing things.
______ 24. I would never think of letting someone else be
punished for my wrongdoings.
_____

25. I never resent being asked to return a favor.

_____ 26. I have never been irked when people expressed
ideas very different from my own.
_____ 27. I never make a long trip without checking the
safety of my car.
_____ 28. There have been times when I was quite jealous of
the good fortune of others.
_____
off.

29. I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone

_____ 30.
of me.

I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors

_____ 31. I have never felt that I was punished without
cause.
32. I sometimes think when people have a misfortune
they only got what they deserved.
33. I have never deliberately said something that hurt
someone's feelings.
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PART V
PLEASE WRITE THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER IN THE SPACE PROVIDED
STRONGLY
DISAGREE
1

2

3

4

______ 1. If given the chance,
work group and join another.

5

6

STRONGLY
AGREE
7

I would choose to leave my

2. Members of my work group get along well together.
______ 3. Members of my work group will readily defend each
other from criticism from outsiders.
______ 4. I feel that I am really part of my work group.
______ 5. I look forward to being with the members of my
work group each day.
______ 6. I find that I generally do not get along with
the other members of my work group.
______ 7. I enjoy belonging to this work group because
I am friends with many group members.
______ 8. The work group I belong to is a close one.
PART VI
1. If I were to leave this job, it would be difficult
for me to find another job that was just as good.
________ 2. It would be easy for me to change jobs should
I decide to do so.
________ 3. There are numerous jobs as good
would
be available to me if I decided to
job.

as this one that
leave my current

PART VII
PLEASE WRITE THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER IN THE SPACE PROVIDED.
STRONGLY DISAGREE
1
_____

2

3

4

STRONGLY AGREE
5

1. I work closely with others in doing my work.

_____ 2. I frequently must coordinate my efforts with
o thers .
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STRONGLY DISAGREE
1
2

3

4

STRONGLY AGREE
5

______ 3. My own performance is dependent on receiving
accurate information from others.
______ 4. The way I perform my job has a significant impact
on others.
______ 5. My work requires me to consult with others fairly
frequently.
______ 6. I work fairly independently of others in my work.
______ 7. I can plan my own work with little need to
coordinate with o t h e r s .
______ 8. I rarely have to obtain information from others to
complete my work.
PART VIII
PLEASE WRITE THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER IN THE SPACE PROVIDED.
NEVER
1

2

3

4

ALWAYS
5

______ 1. Think of all the activities that make up your job.
To what extent would you say that you are usually able to
anticipate and predict the nature of these activities?
______ 2. To what extent do you usually encounter the same
kinds of problems in your work day after day?
______ 3. Many jobs require the use of search procedures of
one, kind or another to solve the problems encountered.
To
what extent are the search procedures you use similar from
one day to the next?
______ 4. To what extent are the work decisions you make
similar from one day to the next?
______ 5. If others in your work group do not do their jobs
well, to what extent does this hinder you doing your job
well?
______ 6. To what extent must you communicate with others
your department in order for you to do your job well?

in

______ 7. To what extent is your planned work interrupted
unexpected problems?

by
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NEVER
1

2

3

4

ALWAYS
5

_____ 8. To what extent do you need help to solve the
unexpected problems you encounter?
PART IX
PLEASE WRITE THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER IN THE SPACE PROVIDED.
STRONGLY DISAGREE
1
2

3

4

STRONGLY AGREE
6
7

5

_____ 1. I am compensated fairly for the work I
based on the effort I give on the job.

do here,

_____ 2. I am compensated fairly for the work I
compared to my coworkers.

do here,

3. I am compensated fairly here,
responsibilities I have.

considering

the

PART X
_____ 1. My supervisor is generally aware of when I am
putting forth 1 below average effort.
_____

2. My supervisor is aware of the amount of work I do.

_____ 3. It is generally hard for my supervisor to figure
out how 1 hard I am working.
_____
off.

4. My supervisor usually notices when I am slacking

_____ 5. It is difficult for my supervisor to determine how
much effort I exert on the job.
PART XI
PLEASE WRITE THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER IN THE SPACE PROVIDED.
NEVER
1

2

3

_____ 1. How often do members of
percent effort on the job?

4

ALWAYS
5

the work group give 100

_____ 2. How often do you expect members of this work group
to give 100 percent effort in the future?
_____ 3. How often do members of this work group perform
duties not formally required by their job description?

NEVER
1

2

3

4

ALWAYS
5

Some members of my work group:
_____ 4. Defer responsibilities they should assume to other
members.
_____ 5. Put forth less effort on the job when others are
around to do the work.
_____

6. Do not do their share of the work.

_____

7. Give less effort than other members of the work
group.

_____

8. Avoid performing housekeeping tasks much as
possible.

_____

9. Leave work for the next shift that they should
really complete.

_____

10. Take it easy if others are around to do the work.

_____

11. Contribute to lowering production costs in this
com p a n y .

_____

12. Are absent from work more than others in this
company.

_____

13. Make an effort to increase this work group's
reputation.

_____

14. Believe that improving the equipment used by this
work group is an important concern.

_____

15. Contribute to a work environment that is free of
safety and health problem.

PART XII
What is your age? _____
What is your race? _____
Are you male or female? _____
How far have you gone in formal schooling? _____
Are you a full-time or part-time employee? _____
Do you supervise others in your job? _____

Please circle the correct response to the following
statement.
My job is in the:

SERVICE SECTOR.
MANUFACTURING SECTOR.
PUBLIC SECTOR.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR ANSWERING THESE QUESTIONS.

APPENDIX D
FIELD STUDY INSTRUMENT
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CO ID

WG ID

EMP ID___

Employee Research Questionnaire
College of Business
Louisiana State University
This survey is designed to help us learn more about
what makes work groups successful. Listed below are some
statements about your attitudes and opinions about your job,
your manager and your current work group.
Please show the
degree to which you agree/disagree with each statement
regarding your job by writing the appropriate number (1 to
5) in the blank alongside each statement.
Your answers will
be kept strictly confidential and will be seen only by
researchers at L S U .
Strongly
disagree
1

2

Neither
agree nor disagree
3

4

Strongly
agree
5

_____ Members of my work group help others who have been
absent.
Members of my work group volunteer for things that are
not required.
_____ Members of my work group orient new people even though
they are not
required to do so.
Members of my work group help coworkers who have heavy
worklo a d s .
Members of my work group make innovative suggestions
that help improve the department,
I defer responsibilities I should assume to my
coworkers.
_____ I put forth less effort on the job when others are
around to do the work.
_____ I give less effort than other members of the work
group.
I avoid performing housekeeping tasks as much as
possible.
_____ I leave work for the next shift that I should really
complete.
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Strongly
disagree
1
_____

2

Neither
agree nor disagree
3
4

Strongly
agree
5

I take it easy if others are around to do the work.

_____ I work closely with others in doing my work.
_____ I frequently must coordinate my efforts with others.
_____ My own performance is dependent on receiving accurate
information from others.
_____ The way I perform my job has a significant impact on
others.
_____ My work requires me to consult with others fairly
frequently.
_____ I work fairly independently of others in my work.
I can plan my own work with little need to coordinate
with others.
_____ I rarely have to obtain information from others to
complete my work.
_____ Members of my work group give 100 percent effort on the
job.
_____ I expect members of my work group to give 100 percent
effort in the future.
_____ Some members of my work group defer responsibilities
they should assume to other mem b e r s .
_____ Some members of my work group put forth less effort on
the job when others are around to do the work.
_____ Some members of my work group do not do their share of
the work.
_____ Some members of my work group give less effort than
other members of the work group.
_____ Some members of my work group avoid performing
housekeeping tasks as much as possible.
_____ Some members of my work group leave work for the next
shift that they should really complete.
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_____ Some members of my work group take it easy if others
are around to do the work.
_____ Some members
of my work group contribute to lowering
production costs in this company.
_____ Some members
of my work group are absent from
than others in this company.

work more

_____ Some members of my work group make an effort to
increase this work group's reputation.
_____ Some members
of my work group contribute to a work
environment that is free of safety and health problems.
Please show the degree to which you agree or disagree
with each statement regarding your job by writing the
appropriate number (1 to 7) alongside each statement.
Strongly
disagree
1

2

Neither
agree nor disagree
3
4
5

6

Strongly
agree
7

_____ My coworkers and I stress teamwork.
_____ There is a great deal of pressure from my coworkers to
exert effort.
_____ My coworkers and I are rewarded here based on how well
our group does its job.
_____ My coworkers and I have little obligation to work
together to do the best job we can.
_____ In this work group, we expect everyone to pull together
to get the job done.
_____ Members of my work group encourage individuals to excel
and strive for increasingly higher levels of performance.
_____ If given the chance,
group and join another.

I would choose to leave my work

_____ The members of my work group get along well together.
_____ The members of my work group will readily defend each
other from criticism from outsiders.
_____ I feel that I am really part of my work group.
_____ I look forward to being with the members of my work
group each day.
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Strongly
disagree
1

2

Neither
agree nor disagree
3
4
5

6

Strongly
agree
7

_____ I find that I generally do not get along with the other
members of my work group.
_____ I enjoy belonging to this work group because I am
friends with many group members.
_____ The work group I belong to is a close one.
_____ If I were to leave this job, it would be difficult for
me to find another job that was just as good.
_____ It would be easy for me to change jobs should I decide
to do so.
_____ There are numerous jobs as good as this one that would
be available to me if I decided to leave my current job.
_____ I am compensated fairly for the work I do
on the effort I give on the job.

here, based

_____ I am compensated fairly for the work I do
compared to my co-workers.

here,

_____ I am compensated fairly here considering the
responsibilities I have.
My supervisor is generally aware of when I am putting
forth below average effort.
_____ My supervisor is aware of the amount of work I do.
It is generally hard for my supervisor to figure out
how hard I am working.
My supervisor usually notices when I am slacking off.
_____ It is difficult for my supervisor to determine how much
effort I exert on the job.
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How likely would you be to do the following behaviors
at work?
Not at all
likely
1

2

3

4

Extremely
likely
6
7

5

_____ Avoid working by talking to coworkers,
personal business, daydreaming, etc.

attending to

_____ Put in less effort in your work than you know you can.
_____ Show up late for work even when you could make it on
time.
_____ Deliberately avoid your boss.
Take more and longer breaks than you should.
_____ Call in sick even when you are not sick.
Please write the number in the space provided that most
closely matches the way you feel about the following
statements.
Never
1

2

3

4

Always
5

Think of all the activities that make up your job.
1. How much would you say you are usually able to
anticipate and predict the nature of these activities?
_____ 2. How much do you usually encounter the same kinds of
problems in your work day after day?
_____ 3. Many jobs require using search procedures of one
kind or another to solve problems encountered.
How much are
the search procedures you use similar from one day to the
next?
4. How much are the work decisions you make similar
from one day to the next?
5. If others in your work group do not do their jobs
well, how much does this hinder you in doing your job well?
_____ 6. How much must you communicate with others in your
department in order for you to do your job well?
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Never
1

2

3

Always
5

4

7. How much is your planned work interrupted by
unexpected problems?
_____ 8. How much do you need help to solve the unexpected
problems you encounter?
Please circle "A" or "D " to show whether you agree or
disagree with the following statements.
Do not omit any
items.
A

D

I find that I can help others in many ways.

A

D

I feel that I am better off than my parents
at my age.

A

D

In spite of many changes, there are still
definite rules to live by.

were

A

D

One can always find friends if he tries.

A

D

Anyone can raise his standard of living if he is
willing to work at it.

A

D

Most people really believe that honesty is the
best policy.

A

D

In general

A

D

People will be honest with you
with them.

A

D

It is difficult to think clearly about right and
wrong these days.

A

D

Many people are friendly only because they want
something from you.

A

D

If the odds are against you,
come out on top.

A

D

At times Ifeel that I am a stranger to myself.

A

D

The future

A

D

I

I am satisfied with my
if

lot in life.
you are honest

it's impossible to

looks very bleak.

often feel that no one needs me.

A

D

I am so fed up that I can't take it any more.

A

D

To get along with people,

one must put on an act.
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Please show the degree to which you agree or disagree
with the accuracy of each of the following statements by
writing the appropriate number on the blank alongside each
statement.
Strongly
disagree
1

2

Neither
agree nor disagree
3
4
5

Strongly
agree
7

6

_____ My supervisor knows a great deal about the technical
side of my job.
_____ My supervisor has a good understanding of the
procedures I use in my work.
_____ My supervisor provides appreciation and encouragement.
_____ My supervisor gives recognition for a job well done.
_____ My supervisor is concerned that I grow and get ahead.
I am

satisfied with my job.

_____ I am

satisfied with my pay.

_____ I am

satisfied with my benefits.

_____ I am satisfied with my promotion opportunities.
_____ I am

satisfied with the recognition I receive.

_____ I am
satisfied with the amount ofsay
work is done.

I have

in how my

_____ I am satisfied with my job security.
_____ I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to my
organization.
_____ I do not feel "emotionally attached" to this
organization.
_____ This organization has great personal meaning for me.
_____ I do not feel like part of the family at this
organization.
_____ I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career
with this organization.
_____ I enjoy discussing my organization with people outside
it.
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Strongly
disagree
1

2

Neither
agree nor disagree
3
4
5

6

Strongly
agree
7

I really feel as if this organization's problems are my
own.
I could easily become as attached to another
organization as I am to this one.

In my job, I am evaluated on the basis of
of the following):

(Circle one

A. The performance of my work group.
B. My individual performance.
C. Some combination of A and B.
Please write the number in the blank provided that
shows your agreement about each of the following two
statements.
Almost
never
1

Seldom
2

About half
the time
3

Often
4

Almost
always
5

When target performance goals for your work group are
met or surpassed, how often do the following things happen?
_____ 1. All people in this work group are rewarded or
recognized as a group for their team achievements.
_____ 2. Specific individuals in this work group are rewarded
or recognized for their individual achievements.
When target performance goals for your work group are
not attained, how often do the following things happen?
_____ 1. The work group is reprimanded or told to "shape
to improve work group performance.

up"

_____ 2. Specific individuals in your work group are
reprimanded or told to shape up to improve their individual
performance.

200

GENERAL INFORMATION
How long have you been employed at this company?
years____ months
How long have you been a member of this particular work
group?
years__months
Are you

(circle o n e ) : White

Are you

(circle o n e ) :

Male

Black

Hispanic

Asian

Other

Female

How far did you go in formal schooling?
_____ 11th grade or less
_____ High school diploma or GED
_____ Some College
_____ College Degree _____ Graduate
School
What is your age?_____
Are you a full-time or part-time employee?_____
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR ANSWERING THESE QUESTIONS.
IF
YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS OR COMMENTS ABOUT THIS SURVEY, PLEASE
FEEL FREE TO CONTACT ROLAND KIDWELL AT (504) 388-6150 OR
6748.
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CO ID

WG ID

EMP ID

Supervisor Research Questionnaire
College of Business
Louisiana State University

On the following pages are some statements asking for
your opinions about members of your current work group.
Please complete a page for each employee.
Your answers will
be kept strictly confidential. The results will be seen
only by the research staff at LSU, and all responses will be
identified only by ID codes, not the names of individual
respon d e n t s .

IP YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS OR COMMENTS ABOUT THIS
SURVEY, PLEASE FEEL FREE TO CONTACT ROLAND KIDWELL AT (504)
388-6150 OR 6748. THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE.
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Please answer the following questions about your work group.
1.

How long have you supervised this work group? ____ years
months

2. How many employees do you supervise in this work group?
3. How many employees were in this work group 12 months ago?

4. In the last 12 months, how many employees in this work
group have ___ quit
been fired ___
been transferred
been laid off?
5. How many of these employees have been replaced? _____
6. What is the average hourly pay of the members of this
work group? _____
7.
The employees I supervise are evaluated based on
(Circle one of the following):
A. The performance of their work group.
B. Their individual performance.
C. Some combination of A and B.
Please write the number in the blank provided that
shows your agreement about each of the following statements.
Almost
never
1

Seldom
2

About half
the time
3

Often
4

Almost
always
5

When target performance goals for your work group are
met or surpassed, how often do the following things happen?
_____ 1. All people in this work group are
rewarded or
recognized as a group for their team achievements.
_____ 2. Specific
individuals in this work
group are rewarded
or recognized for their individual achievements.
When target performance goals for your work group are
not attained, how often do the following things happen?
_____ 1. The work group is reprimanded or told to "shape
to improve work group performance.

up"

_____ 2. Specific
individuals in your work
group are
reprimanded or told to shape up to improve their individual
performance.
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GENERAL QUESTIONS
How many people in your work group are:
White____
Black____
Hispanic____
Other____
How many people in your work group are:
Male____
Female____
How far did you go in formal schooling?
11th grade or less
High school diploma
Some College

College
or GED

Degree

Graduate School
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Employee Initials

Employee Number

What percent of the time does this employee provide
full effort in doing his or her job?
(100% = always)
Please write the number in the space provided that
shows how strongly, you agree or disagree with the following
statements about each of the employees you supervise.
Strongly
disagree
1

2

Neither
agree nor disagree
3
4
5

6

Strongly
agree
7

This employee . . .
_____ Defers responsibilities he/she should assume to
coworkers.
_____ Gives less effort on the job when others are around to
do the work.
_____ Gives less effort than other members of the work group.
_____ Avoids performing housekeeping tasks as much as
possible.
_____ Leaves work for the next shift that he/she should
really complete.
_____ Takes it easy if others are around to do the work.
Comes to work more often than the average employee.
_____ Does not take extra breaks.
_____ Obeys company rules and regulations even when no one is
watching.
_____ Is one of my most conscientious employees.
_____ Believes in giving an honest day's work for an honest
day's pay.
_____ Consumes a lot of time complaining about trivial
matters.
_____ Always focuses on what's wrong, rather than positive
side.
_____ Tends to make mountains out of molehills.
Always finds fault with what the organization is doing.
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Strongly
disagree
1

2

Neither
agree nor disagree
3
4
5

6

Strongly
agree
7

_____ Is the classic "squeaky wheel" that always needs
greasing.
_____ Attends meetings that are not mandatory,
considered important.

but are

_____ Attends functions that are not required,
company image.

but help the

Keeps abreast of changes in the organization.
_____ Reads and keeps up with organization announcements and
memos.
_____ Takes steps to try to prevent problems with other
workers.
_____ Is mindful of how his/her behavior affects other
people's jobs.
_____ Does not abuse the rights of others.
_____ Tries to avoid creating problem for coworkers.
_____ Considers the impact of his/her actions on coworkers.
_____ Helps others who have been absent.
_____ Helps others who have heavy workloads.
_____ Helps orient new people even though it is not required.
_____ Willingly helps others who have work related problems.
_____ Is always ready to lend a helping hand to those around
him/her.

APPENDIX E
SCALE ITEMS USED IN FIELD STUDY

Altruism

(alpha = .78)

1. Members of my work group help others who have been
abse n t .
2. Members of my work group volunteer for things that
are not required.
'3. Members of my work group orient new people even
though they are not required to do so.
4. Members of my work group help co-workers who have
heavy work loads.
5. Members of my work group make innovative suggestions
that help improve the department.

Task interdependence (alpha = .67)
1. I work closely with others in doing my work.
2. I frequently must coordinate my efforts with others.
3. My own performance is dependent on receiving
accurate information from others.
4. The way I perform my job has a significant impact on
othe r s .
5. My work requires me to consult with others fairly
frequently.

Group effort norms (alpha = .74)
1. My co-workers and I stress teamwork.
2. In this work group, we expect everyone to pull
together to get the job done.
3. Members of my work group encourage individuals to
excel and strive for increasingly higher levels of
performance.

Distributive justice

(alpha = .85)

1. I am compensated fairly for the work I do here,
based on the effort I give on the job.
2. I am compensated fairly for the work I do here,
compared to my co-workers.
3. I am compensated fairly here considering the
responsibilities I have.

Perceived task visibility

(alpha = .70)

1. My supervisor is generally aware of when I am
putting forth below average effort.
2. My supervisor is aware of the amount of work I do.
3. It is generally hard for my supervisor to figure out
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how hard I am working.
4. My supervisor usually notices when I am slacking
off.
5. It is difficult for my supervisor to determine how
much effort I exert on the job.

Group cohesiveness

(alpha = .88)

1. If given the chance, I would choose to leave my work
group and join another.
2. The members of my work group get along well
together.
3. The members of my work group will readily defend
each other from criticism from outsiders.
4. I feel that I am really part of my work group.
5. I look forward to being with
the members of my work
group each day.
6. I find that I generally do not get along with the
other members of my work group.
7. I enjoy belonging to this work group because I am
friends with many group members.
8. The work group I belong to is a close one.

Perceived ease of movement (alpha = .73)
1. If I were to leave this job, it would be difficult
for me to find another job that was just as good.
2. It would be easy for me to change jobs should I
decide to do so.
3. There are numerous jobs as good as this one that
would be available to me if I decided to leave my
current job.
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APPENDIX F
CORRELATIONS AMONG THE VARIABLES
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VARIABLE

1

1. PWE
2. Job Neglect
3. SPWE
4. GPWE
5. Wage Premium
6. Group Size
7. Interdepen.
8. Task Visib.
9. Eff. Norms
lO.Dist. Just.
11.Altruism
12.Turn. Rate
13.LOS Hetero.
14.Soc. Desir.
15.Cohesive.
16.Unemp. Rate
17.E. of Move.
18.Racial Het.
19.Gender Het.
20.Educ. Het.
21.Age Hetero.
Mean
S.D.

21.

'—
2

—

3—

.1583
.2393
-.062
-. 1793
-. 3453
- .1583
- .5083
.003
.056
-. 1823
- .4703
- .2473
.076'
.2 1 13
.001
.063
-.025
24.91
9.57

.5403
.047
-. 1423
-.044
.1072
- . 1493
-. 2293
-.062'
.018
-. 1533
-. 5193
- .1162
.4363
.043
.054
- .3353
1. 77
1.89

9

10

11

12

13

.2253
.5203
-.016
.005
.1883
.6043
.0952
- . 1763
-.024
-.070
-.046
.019
16.98
3.89

Ease of Movement
Racial Hetero.
Gender Hetero.
Education Het.
Age Hetero.
Mean
S.D.

£

<

.05

E < -01

5

-.028
.053
.1032
-.002
- . 1483
-.056
-. 1713
- .0942
-.001
.059
-. 1303
1353
-. 1503
.1493
.022
.032
-.066
-.023
15.50
8.76

.2283
-. 1092
-.082'
.2423
.2893
.033
-. 2423
.002
-.038
-.030
-.079'
12.85
5.31
16

E £ •1

4

.1693
.1512
.020
.001
-. 1163
-. 089 2
-. 2893
-.074'
- .2203
-.066
-.062
- .2043
- . 2 123
-.025
.067
-.015
.0942
.017
-.027
2.005
.412

VARIABLE
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

3

.2453
.003
.0892
-.004
.079'
-.045
-. 0862
-. 1383
-.058
- .1813
-.073'
-.001
- .1813
-. 2033
- .0882
.0932
.079'
.052
.001
-.022
1.593
.342

VARIABLE
lO.Dist. Just.
11.Altruism
12.Turn. Rate
13.LOS Hetero.
14.Soc. Desir.
15.Cohesive.
16.Unemp. Rate
17.E. of Move.
18.Racial Het.
19.Gender Het.
20.Educ. Het.
Age Hetero.
Mean
S.D.

2

-.051
-.039
.3933
.2013 -.053
-.060
.6163 -.008
.001
.2153
.1573 -.0872
- . 1233
.1843
- . 1273 - . 1743
.027
-.077'
.080'
-.055
.023
.024
.0922
.
.1463
19.12
.191
.851
4.20
.261
.130

.1113

.no3
1703

17

18

19

.045
-. 4863 -.019
-.040
-.037
-.062
.1203 -.073'
.064
.2943
.3923
.2343 -. 3543 -.041
8.009
9.86
-6.13
-2.17
.888
4.97
2.46
1.11

6

7

.027
- . 1293
.1573
-.078
.2243
.042
.081'
-. 1793
.2053
- . 1873 -.027
-.022
.001
-.039
.057
- .2 373
.2133
- .5243 - .0922
-.049
- .0842
.8103
.015
-.010
.071'
.3073 -.073'
-. 4003
.032
12.66
20.44
16.06
3.82
14

15

.3313
.083'
-. 0912
-.083'
.002
-.046
-.062
13.62
2.08

.2323
-. 2623
-. 2043
.016
- . 0942
.072'
44.28
10.05

20

21

.024
-.952
.980

.223
. 105

8

•2783
.2093
.3003
-.056
-.042
.1943
.4083
.082'
-. 1213
-.076'
.025
.072'
.0982
24.83
6.34
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